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Summary
This thesis investigates empirically the effects of the corporate income tax in an
open economy. The analysis is carried out using linear panel-data regression meth-
ods.
The first chapter studies the incidence of the corporate income tax. It introduces a
model with location-specific rents which distinguishes between a direct effect and
an indirect effect of the corporate income tax on labour. The former occurs when
an increase in the corporate tax reduces the rent over which the employees and the
company bargain. This reduces the bargained wage. The latter effect is the result
highlighted in previous literature wherein an increase in the corporate tax reduces
the stock of capital and consequently wages. Chapter 1 estimates the direct effect
using accounting data from over 55,000 companies located in nine OECD countries
(1996–2003) and finds that the tax is largely shifted to the labour force.
Chapter 2 shows that measured productivity of multinational firms is overesti-
mated in low-tax countries (and vice versa), because multinationals manipulate
the value of sales upwards and the costs of intermediate inputs downwards. The
analysis is carried out using accounts from about 16,000 firms located in 10 OECD
countries (1998–2004). The results show that a 10 percentage points cut in the
statutory corporate tax rate induces multinationals to increase their measured to-
9
tal factor productivity by about 10 per cent.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of tax haven operations in a corporate group.
Using accounting data for about 3,400 corporate groups in 15 OECD countries
(2003–2007), the study finds that tax haven operations reduce the tax liabilities
of multinational companies by 7.4 per cent in the long run (at the mean). Also,
the ETR of a corporate group with tax haven subsidiaries is one percentage point
lower than the ETR of entities without such operations. Chapter 3 also finds that
the marginal ETR of companies headquartered in a jurisdiction with a territorial
system is lower than the marginal ETR of companies headquartered in jurisdictions
adopting a worldwide taxation system.
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Introduction
The growing mobility of capital has been one of the most distinct trends in the
global economy over the last 40 years. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign
portfolio investment have surged, especially since the early 1990s, creating renewed
interest in international tax policy and tax design issues. Figure 1 and Figure 2
point to a worldwide expansion of FDI flows (as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP)), in particular during the last decade of the twentieth century.
The increased integration of capital markets has forced economists and policy mak-
ers to re-think the effects of taxing capital in the open economy. Most developed
and developing countries aim to tax profits inside the borders of the jurisdiction
within which they are produced. That is, the corporate income tax is levied on
a source basis. By mid-2009 the United States remained the sole large country
still adopting some elements of a residence-based taxation system. However, the
funds collected from the taxation of foreign earnings are small and this means that,
broadly, the international taxation of profit is levied on a source basis (Devereux
(2008)).
This thesis offers an empirical investigation of some of the most prominent issues
raised by the corporate income tax levied on a source basis, and in an open econ-
omy. The first chapter addresses the fundamental question of the real incidence
13
of the corporate income tax, while the following two chapters focus on some im-
portant effects of the profit-shifting activities of multinationals (MNCs). More
specifically, Chapter 2 tests whether manipulation of transfer-prices affects the
well-documented productivity advantage of MNCs with respect to domestic enti-
ties. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of tax haven operations on the tax burden
of multinational corporate groups. The empirical analysis of the effects of the cor-
poration income tax is carried out using linear panel-data regression models and
the firm-level dataset ORBIS which records companies’ accounting information.
The literature provides different motivations for the presence of a source-based
corporate income tax in the open economy. Political considerations are perhaps
the most powerful reason why governments still apply such an inefficient tax on
returns to capital. There seems to be a popular view that rich corporations should
pay their fair share of tax, and consequently that the corporate income tax has a
redistributive purpose. This idea cannot be supported on economic grounds: as
entities and not individuals, corporations cannot bear the tax, which instead will
be passed on to the labour force, the owners of capital, and (or) consumers. The
literature analysing the incidence of the corporate income tax in a closed econ-
omy states that the effective incidence of the tax is on capital owners (Harberger
(1962)). However when considering the more realistic case of an open economy,
results change considerably. A central theorem in the theory of optimal taxation
states that in a small open economy without location-specific rents, source-based
taxes on capital income are borne by the immobile factors of production: labour
and land. In a small open economy, which cannot influence the world rate of return,
a tax on capital increases the required pre-tax rate of return. An outflow of capital
achieves this. In other words, capital can avoid a source-based tax by investing
elsewhere. This distorts the capital-labour ratio and therefore leads to production
14
inefficiency. With less capital in the economy, the demand for the immobile factors
of production such as labour and land will shrink. With less capital, both labour
and land will be less productive; therefore they are rewarded with lower wages and
lower rents. In summary, the burden of the corporate income tax is shifted onto
the immobile factors: the labour force and land (Gordon (1986)). The theoretical
literature provides clear-cut predictions on the incidence of corporate income tax.
Nonetheless, how much of the corporate income tax is passed on to the immobile
factors is an empirical question. The first chapter of this thesis aims to re-examine
the extent to which taxes on corporate income are passed on to workers in the
form of lower wages.
The research makes two novel contributions to the understanding of the effective
incidence of the corporate income tax levied on a source basis. First, we model a
new mechanism by which corporate taxes may be passed on in lower wages: the
wage bargain. This implies that it is possible to differentiate two aspects of the ef-
fective incidence of the tax: a direct and an indirect effect. Previous contributions
such as Gordon (1986) and the more recent Randolph (2006) and Gravelle and
Smetters (2006) derive results on the incidence of the corporate tax using Com-
putable General Equilibrium (CGE) models in which there are no location-specific
rents. Chapter 1 proposes a more realistic set-up, where quasi-rents arise from
the economic activity of firms. In a partial equilibrium setting, the firm and the
workforce bargain over after-tax profits.
This model is the first to identify the direct incidence of the tax: given the pre-tax
profit of the firm, a higher tax bill will directly reduce the quasi-rent over which
the workers and the company can bargain. This generates a previously unexplored
channel through which corporate taxes can affect wages. The indirect incidence
15
instead has an effect on wages through determining the level of pre-tax profit via
two routes. There may be an effect of a change in the tax liability on the output
price, conditional on capital and labour. Additionally, a change in tax policy may
affect the incentive to invest and hence the capital stock, and thus indirectly the
labour force. Both of these effects may affect the pre-tax level of value added. The
effect on the capital stock determines the size of the deadweight cost arising from
distortions in the behaviour of the company because of the tax.
The second novel contribution of this research is that the size of the direct effect
is tested empirically. We use unconsolidated firm-level accounting data for over
55,000 companies in nine European countries. The results suggest that this direct
effect is both large and significant. Hassett and Mathur (2006) also attempt to
estimate the incidence of the corporate income tax in the open economy. However,
they do not distinguish between a direct and an indirect effect and this leads to
an identification problem in their estimations. On the one hand, it is important
to control for value added, that is for productivity, as the more productive firms
are likely to have higher wages and higher tax charges. Nonetheless, controlling
for value added wipes out the effect of the corporate income tax that materialises
through the indirect effect of a change in the capital stock, and subsequently of
productivity. In fact this effect would be captured entirely by value added. Chap-
ter 1 recounts the first attempt to resolve this deadlock by deriving and estimating
the indirect effect in isolation. Controlling for labour productivity (and hence
for the effects of the corporate tax through capital) and other relevant company
characteristics, the chapter examines whether firms with a higher tax liability pay
lower wages, ceteris paribus. Analysing this variation enables us to identify the
direct effect of the tax on wages, while controlling for other effects through the
pre-tax level of profit. It does not allow the identification of the scale of indirect
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effects. The empirical analyses carried out in the first chapter show that in this
bargaining framework, a substantial part of the corporate income tax is passed on
to the labour force in the form of lower wages.
The literature proposes a justification for taxing profits on a source basis when
there are location-specific rents, such that r > r∗, where r and r∗ are the domestic
and worldwide returns to capital respectively. In this case, the standard argument
is that there will not be an outflow of capital and therefore no distortion to produc-
tion. This would be an efficient way of raising revenues (Zodrow (2006)). Without
capital outflows, the tax would then be entirely borne by capital owners. In fact,
according to the bargaining model set out in Chapter 1, when the tax rises the em-
ployees will bargain over a smaller rent and this will negatively affect their wages.
In the presence of location-specific rents, the labour force might bear some of the
corporate income tax if there is bargaining on location-specific rents between the
company and the employees. The empirical analysis of Chapter 1 suggests that
this effect is large. Only in the absence of bargaining is the corporate income
tax borne entirely by capital. There is an argument that the corporate income
tax is levied at source to capture rents accruing to non-residents who use public
goods (for example infrastructure and law enforcement) in their production pro-
cess (Sørensen (2007)) In the light of the results on incidence outlined in the first
chapter, it is unlikely that foreign owners bear the tax levied in the source country.
In a world of integrated capital markets, a source-based tax is not only distort-
ing but it is also difficult to implement. When multinational companies conduct
different activities in different jurisdictions, the administration and collection of
revenues from the corporate income tax become very challenging for tax author-
ities. By definition, a source-based tax attempts to tax profits in the country in
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which they are generated. In the interconnected business environment we face
now, it might be extremely complex to assign profits to a specific jurisdiction. For
example, multinational companies can shift their earnings to the part of their op-
erations located in lower-tax jurisdictions. In recent years, researchers have found
evidence that multinationals shift profits by manipulating the value of intragroup
debt and transfer-prices, and hence the value of their sales and the costs of inputs
to minimise their overall tax burden (for a survey, see Devereux (2007)).
Labour and total factor productivity (TFP) play crucial roles in GDP growth
and therefore their dispersion across firms has been at the centre of extensive re-
search. A broad literature reports the heterogeneity in productivity levels between
multinationals and domestic firms. The general finding is that MNCs are more
productive than domestic entities in terms of both labour and total factor produc-
tivity (for a survey see Lipsey (2002)).
The second chapter of this thesis assesses whether the measurement of produc-
tivity is impaired when companies engage in manipulation of transfer-prices and
those manipulated prices are employed in the measurement of productivity. Inso-
far as there is intragroup trade and transfer-price manipulation is not prohibitively
costly, MNCs have an incentive to overstate the true value of sales and to under-
state the costs of their intermediate inputs in a low-tax country (and vice versa).
As book values of sales and costs of materials are generally used in the calcula-
tion of productivity levels, measured productivity for international companies will
be over-reported in low-tax countries, just as sales will be over-recorded and the
costs of intermediate inputs will be under-recorded. Hence the well-documented
productivity advantage of multinationals is overestimated in low-tax jurisdictions,
and vice-versa. Chapter 2 shows that profit shifting is not only relevant for the
18
public finance literature, but it also has important implications for studies on
cross-company and cross-country productivity differences if the researcher employs
manipulated prices. This is another novel contribution from the research. Using a
sample of about 16,000 companies located in 10 European countries, we find that
the statutory corporate tax rate has a negative impact on the measured TFP of
multinationals relative to domestic companies.
A specific aspect of the difficulty of implementing a source-based tax in the open
economy is the shifting of earnings to tax havens. Tax havens and low-tax countries
are very active in terms of international flows of capital. Small tax havens such as
the small Caribbean islands1 and low-tax larger jurisdictions such as Hong Kong,
Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland display higher ratios of inward and outward
FDI to GDP than any other group of countries. In particular, smaller tax havens
are characterised by spectacular inflows and outflows of capital with respect to
their GDP (see figures 3 to 6).
Jurisdictions with very low taxes cast further doubt on the feasibility of imposing
a source-based tax on capital income. Tax havens normally attract profits without
attracting real economic activity. By separating real capital from profits, their
presence symbolises the difficulty of implementing the core principle of a source-
based tax on capital, which is to tax profits in the country in which they originate.
Governments’ interventions during the recent financial crisis and the resulting
worldwide recession have placed a lot of strain on public finances. At the same
time, the need for better regulation and more transparency in financial markets
has become apparent. In this environment, the role of tax havens in the global
1Small Caribbean islands include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bar-
bados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands
Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Turks and Caicos Islands.
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economy has recently regained attention in many political circles and in the me-
dia. It is thought that offshore fiscal centres erode (unjustly) the tax base of larger,
higher-tax countries and provide an unfair competitive advantage to corporations
organising some of their operations through them.
The third chapter of this thesis investigates the effect of tax haven operations on
the tax liabilities of corporate groups, holding other firm characteristics such as
profitability constant. By analysing the tax bill of the whole group, the research
reported in this chapter is able to assess whether the corporation income tax is
(in fact) substantially avoided, thus creating the conditions for an erosion of the
worldwide tax base. Previous studies such as Desai et al. (2006b) have investi-
gated the effect of offshore low-tax jurisdictions using unconsolidated accounts.
Unfortunately, an analysis based on unconsolidated accounts is unable to test ap-
propriately whether the corporate income tax is in fact avoided, as tax savings in
one subsidiary could be compensated for by higher tax charges in other subsidiaries
of the group. Using consolidated accounting data for 15 OECD countries, Chapter
3 finds that the presence of tax haven subsidiaries reduces group tax liabilities
over total assets. Additionally, corporate groups with offshore low-tax operations
display a lower marginal effective tax rate (ETR) with respect to entities without
such operations.
The United Kingdom recently substituted a worldwide system for a territorial sys-
tem for the taxation of corporate profits. The reform has spurred a debate on
whether the new system substantially reduces the tax burden of MNCs. The third
chapter of this thesis also reports the results of an investigation of whether the
marginal ETR of the corporate groups headquartered in countries with a world-
wide system is larger than the marginal ETR of the companies whose parent is
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resident in jurisdictions with an exemption system.
The existence of profit-shifting activities undermines a key principle underlying a
source-based tax: that is, to tax profits in the jurisdiction in which they are pro-
duced. This casts further doubt on the idea that a source-based tax is efficient in a
setting where there are location-specific rents. When profits arising from location-
specific rents can be shifted through debt and (or) transfer-prices, capital owners
will in part be able to avoid the tax burden.
The same critique applies to the argument that the corporate income tax is a
backstop for the personal income tax. According to the standard claim, the tax
would prevent entrepreneurs from fully escaping the personal income tax. Without
a tax levied on corporate profits, there would be an incentive to transform both
labour and capital incomes into corporate earnings, and to finance consumption
with loans taken out by the company (Zodrow (2006)). The idea of the corporate
income tax as a backstop to personal income tax is certainly appealing, but the
evidence on profit shifting provided in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 weakens its ra-
tionale. In this context, it is easy to imagine that the entrepreneur can avoid, at
least partially, the taxation of their income.
The findings of this thesis identify the adverse effects of the incidence of the corpo-
rate income tax (Chapter 1) and the consequences of its difficult implementation
in a world of integrated capital markets (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Overall, this
work suggests that in an open economy with the corporate income tax levied on a
source basis, the distortions are many and important in size. This has significant
implications for a world where the source-based corporate income tax is still widely
used and is still generating revenues (Devereux et al. (2004)).
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Figure 2: FDI Outflows (% GDP)
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Figure 3: FDI Inflows (% GDP) in Small Tax Havens
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Figure 4: FDI Inflows (% GDP) in Large Tax Havens
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Figure 5: FDI Outflows (% GDP) in Small Tax Havens
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Figure 6: FDI Outflows (% GDP) in Large Tax Havens
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Chapter 1
The Direct Incidence of
Corporate Income Tax on Wages
25
“On corporation tax, the Chancellor got his priorities wrong today.
The public will simply not understand why, when businesses are enjoying record profits,
the Chancellor found money to cut their tax payments”.
“The TUC is not in favour of companies paying excessive taxes,
but we do expect them to pay fair taxes”.
Brendan Barber,
General Secretary, UK Trades Union Congress
on the 2007 UK corporation tax cut (FT.com (2007))
1.1 Introduction
A central issue in the distribution of tax burdens is the effective incidence of the
corporation tax. This has been the subject of study for nearly 50 years in theo-
retical, and in CGE models.1 Nonetheless, despite its policy relevance, until very
recently it received virtually no econometric investigation.
This chapter re-examines the extent to which taxes on corporate income are passed
on to workers in the form of lower wages. We make two main novel contributions.
First, we model a new mechanism by which corporate taxes may be passed on in
lower wages: the wage bargain. We differentiate two aspects of the effective in-
cidence of the tax. Differently from previous contributions, we identify the direct
incidence of the tax: given the pre-tax profit of the firm, a higher tax bill will di-
rectly reduce the quasi-rent over which the workers and the company can bargain.
The indirect incidence instead has an effect on wages through determining the
level of pre-tax profit, by affecting either investment or output prices. Second, we
test the size of this effect using unconsolidated firm-level accounting data for over
55,000 companies in nine major European countries over the period 1996 to 2003.
Variations in tax payments and effective tax rates arise due to both differences
1In a 1994 survey of North American tax professionals undertaken by Slemrod (1995), 75 per
cent of respondents believed that corporate income taxes are largely passed on to workers and
consumers.
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across countries and over time in the legal tax system, and due to firm-specific
factors. We identify the effects of taxation using all of these sources of variation.
The literature on the incidence of taxes on corporate income dates back to Har-
berger (1962), who developed a model of a closed economy with a corporate sector
and a non-corporate sector, and analysed the introduction of a tax only in the
corporate segment of the economy. Harberger (1962) showed that the incidence of
the tax depended on a number of factors, including the elasticities of substitution
between labour and capital used in each sector, and between the goods produced in
each sector. His main conclusion was that under reasonable assumptions, the tax
is borne by all owners of capital, across both segments of the economy, as it drives
down the post-tax return to capital. A number of more complex CGE models with
a larger number of sectors generate similar results (see for example Shoven (1976)).
However these results depend crucially, on among other things, the assumption of
a closed economy, which restricts the supply of capital to the economy. If capital
is perfectly mobile between countries, but labour is not, then the results can be
very different. Bradford (1978) and Kotikloff and Summers (1987) showed that the
introduction of a tax on corporate income in a home country tends to reduce the
home rate of return to capital, and tends to shift capital from the home country to
the rest of the world. This shift in capital reduces the return to labour in the home
country, and increases the return to labour abroad. As the home country becomes
small relative to the rest of the world, the effect on the world rate of return dimin-
ishes towards zero. There remains an exodus of capital, and the domestic labour
force effectively bears the entire burden of the tax. Indeed given a deadweight loss
induced by the outward shift of capital, the cost to the home country labour force
can exceed the tax revenue generated. This suggests that a small open economy
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would be better off taxing immobile labour directly, compared to imposing a tax
which distorts the allocation of capital (Gordon (1986)).
A number of recent contributions have developed more sophisticated general equi-
librium models of the long-run incidence of taxes on corporate income in an open
economy (Randolph (2006); Gravelle and Smetters (2006); Harberger (1995) and
Harberger (2006)). Randolph (2006) considered a model with two countries and
five sectors, with three of the sectors being taxed only in the domestic country. Of
critical importance in the model are the assumptions about factor mobility, sup-
ply elasticities, and the relative capital intensities of the different sectors. Under
reasonable assumptions, Randolph (2006) found that the domestic labour force
and owners of domestic capital bear the tax burden roughly in proportion to their
factor income shares: labour bears 73 per cent of the tax burden. Where the do-
mestic economy is large (as for the United States), the tax also increases wages and
reduces the return to capital in the foreign country. Gravelle and Smetters (2006)
allowed for a form of imperfect competition with the possibility that tradable goods
are not perfect substitutes across countries. This effectively reduces the mobility
of capital, and increases the extent to which owners of capital bear the tax burden.
Of course these models exclude several factors that may be important. In a recent
survey, Auerbach (2006) noted a number of such factors including dynamics, in-
vestment incentives, corporate financial policy, choice of organisational form and
alternative forms of imperfect competition. In this chapter, we extend the litera-
ture by drawing on many studies of wage determination to investigate how taxes
on corporate income can play a role in the wage bargain. Instead of making the
simple assumptions that the aggregate stock of labour is fixed, and that labour is
paid its marginal product, we investigate the wage bargain at the firm level. To
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do so, we introduce a tax on corporate income into the basic efficient bargaining
framework of McDonald and Solow (1981), in which the firm and the labour force
bargain over both wages and employment.
This generates a previously unexplored channel through which corporate taxes can
affect wages. Companies operating in imperfect competition may bargain over the
proportion of quasi-rents paid out in wages. We introduce into the bargain a stan-
dard tax on domestic corporate income, which is levied on profit net of wages and
an allowance for capital expenditure. We refer to the impact of the tax through the
wage bargain itself –conditional on value added –as a direct effect, which reduces
the size of the quasi-rent available to bargain over. Our model specification enables
us to identify this effect empirically at the level of an individual firm. We present
evidence below suggesting that this direct effect is both large and significant.
We distinguish this from indirect effects of the tax, which can arise through two
channels. First, there may be an effect of a change in the tax liability on the out-
put price, conditional on capital and labour. Second, a change in tax may affect
the incentive to invest and hence the capital stock, and indirectly the labour force.
Both of these may affect the pre-tax level of value added.2 The second effect de-
termines the size of the deadweight cost arising from distortions to the behaviour
of the company as a result of the tax.
This chapter builds on an empirical literature investigating the extent to which
wages are partly determined by sharing in quasi-rents.3 Part of this literature ex-
2In an international context, wage bargaining may give a firm an incentive to generate outside
options in the form of foreign investment. See, for example, the model by Eckel and Egger (2009).
3In a recent contribution, using similar data to this chapter, Budd et al. (2005) investigated
whether wages are determined as a share of parent-firm profit as well as subsidiary profit.
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amined the extent to which rents generated by technological innovation are passed
on in higher wages; for example, Van Reenen (1996) followed both a reduced form
and a structural approach to examine this question. Like Abowd and Lemieux
(1993), Van Reenen (1996) emphasised the importance of dealing with the endo-
geneity of quasi-rents. Dealing with endogeneity appropriately can significantly
raise the estimated proportion of quasi-rents passed on to the workforce. Our es-
timates of the elasticity of wage payments with respect to value added are higher
than those in the literature. However, we find these elasticities plausible, in that
they imply that the effect of a marginal increase in quasi-rents on wage payments
is very similar to the ratio of wage payments to quasi-rents. Our model indicates
that a marginal increase in the tax liability has a larger effect, since unlike the
pre-tax quasi-rent it is not subject to tax itself. The empirical results support this.
Four other recent papers aim to provide empirical evidence of the incidence of
taxes on corporate income.4 Hassett and Mathur (2006) used aggregate wage and
tax data from 72 countries over the period 1981–2002. They experimented with
different measures of the tax rate. They found that wages are highly responsive
to the corporate tax rate, and more so in small countries. One element of this
approach is surprising however. In most of its empirical formulations, the paper
adds controls, including a measure of value added per worker in the manufactur-
ing sector. This control is unlikely to be independent of the effects of the tax
on corporate income, which the authors are seeking to identify: a higher tax rate
should generate a net outflow of capital, which is likely to depress value added
per worker. To the extent that their paper identifies a large effect of the tax on
wages, conditional on value added per worker, then the effect they identify would
also seem to abstract from effects arising indirectly through changes in value added.
4A survey of this literature is provided in Gentry (2007).
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Felix (2007) employed aggregate data on wages differentiated by skill level from 19
developed countries over the period 1979–2000. Controlling for the openness of the
economy, and using alternative measures of the tax rate, Felix (2007) also found
very large and significant effects of the corporate income tax on wages. The effect
tends to be uniform across skill levels. Desai et al. (2007) used aggregate data on
the activities of US companies in around 50 countries in four years to estimate
jointly the impact of the corporate income tax on the wage rate and the rate of
profit. Fixing the sum of these effects to be unity, they found results of a similar
magnitude to Randolph (2006): between 45 and 75 per cent of the corporate tax
borne is borne by labour with the remainder falling on capital. Again, fixing the
sum of the effects to be unity abstracts from the indirect effects of the deadweight
cost, which if included would generate a total effect in excess of unity.
Riedel (2008) also presented a wage-bargaining model in the presence of a simpli-
fied corporate tax. Partly based on the empirical results of Budd et al. (2005),
she modelled the bargain as being over the sum of the parent firm’s profit and
the subsidiary’s profit. Abstracting from capital, this model predicts that a higher
domestic tax rate would tend to increase domestic wages, because it would reduce
the cost to the domestic subsidiary of paying wages (since taxable income is net of
wages), while not reducing the size of the parent company’s profit.5 Symmetrically,
a rise in the tax rate applied to the parent company would tend to reduce wages
in the domestic subsidiary, since the total profit to be bargained over would fall,
while the cost of paying domestic wages would be unchanged. Riedel (2008) found
5Note that this is the exact opposite of the result that would be found if the domestic sub-
sidiary bargained over domestic profit only, but there was an outside option. In this case the
higher tax rate would leave the value of the outside option unaffected, leading to a lower domestic
wage rate. This effect was showed, for example, by Goerke (1996).
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empirical support for the latter proposition, but not for the former.
Our empirical analysis differs from these papers in several important respects. We
exploit within-firm and cross-firm variation in taxation using firm-level data. We
use a panel of unconsolidated firm-level accounting data for around 55,000 compa-
nies in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom over the period 1996–2003. Controlling for labour pro-
ductivity (and hence for the effects of the corporate tax through capital) and other
relevant company characteristics, we examine whether firms with a higher tax li-
ability pay lower wages, ceteris paribus. Analysing this variation enables us to
identify the direct effect of the tax on wages, while controlling for other effects
through the pre-tax level of profit. It does not allow us to identify the scale of
indirect effects.
We are able to identify the effects of taxation by exploiting firm- and time-specific
variation in the tax liability. We therefore do not have to rely solely on changes in
the statutory tax system. Tax liabilities can vary across firms with similar levels of
profit because of diversity in the form of their economic activity, such as the assets
invested in and the sources of finance used, the extent to which profits are shifted
between subsidiaries, the extent of losses brought forward from earlier periods, and
a number of other reasons. We use lagged values of firm-specific variables based
on these factors as instruments for the endogenous tax liability.
Using micro data also allows us to exploit the heterogeneity of companies’ be-
haviour, displaying more cross-sectional variation, which is useful for identifying
parameters. We are able to exploit companies’ heterogeneity to analyse whether
the incidence of the corporate income tax differs according to the type of firm. For
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example, multinational corporations may differ from domestic companies because
they have the option to relocate part or all of their productive activity abroad.
Moreover, firms in multinational groups are more likely to shift profit to lower tax
jurisdictions. This may increase their bargaining power, as well as reducing the
location-specific profit over which they would be prepared to bargain.
We provide rigorous empirical evidence that, in this bargaining framework, a sub-
stantial part of the corporation income tax is passed on to the labour force in the
form of lower wages. Our central estimates show that, conditional on value added
per employee, in the long run an exogenous $1 increase in the tax bill tends to
reduce real wages at the median by 75 cents.6 Note that since wage payments
are deductible from the tax base, this induced reduction in wages will generally
generate a further increase in the tax bill. At the mean statutory tax rate (τ),
in our sample 35 per cent, this would imply a further increase in tax of just over
26 cents. Relative to this overall tax increase of $1.26, the effective incidence on
labour is therefore approximately 59 per cent.
Our bargaining model indicates that the effective incidence of an exogenous $1
rise in pre-tax value added should be lower than this. The model is based on the
assumption that the two parties bargain over the share of the post-tax quasi-rent.
A rise in pre-tax value added is partly shared by the government in higher taxes.
The model predicts that the effective incidence on labour of an exogenous $1 rise
in pre-tax value added should be a fraction (1− τ) of the effective incidence of an
exogenous fall of $1 in the tax liability. Evaluated at the mean tax rate of 35 per
cent, the above result implies that wages would rise by 49 cents (0.75*0.65=0.49)
6Calculations are based on the estimated long-run elasticity of -0.093 and are detailed in
Section 1.4.4.
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in response to an exogenous $1 rise in pre-tax value added. In fact, our empirical
results indicate that, at the median, the effective incidence of an exogenous $1 rise
in pre-tax value added is 57 cents. The similarity of these two estimates provides
support for the hypothesis that firms and workers do indeed bargain over the post-
tax quasi-rent.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 develops the conceptual frame-
work, which allows us to consider the impact of corporate income taxes on the
determination of wages, and to differentiate their direct and indirect effects. Sec-
tion 1.3 presents the data used in the empirical section. Section 1.4 discusses
various econometric issues, and presents the results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
We employ a simple model to inform the empirical work reported below. We con-
sider the case of a single firm. The wage rate, w, and the labour force, N, are set
through efficient bargaining between the firm and a single union representing all
the workers in the company. Simultaneously, the firm chooses its capital, K. The
model is similar to many used in the literature (see references in Booth (1995);
Blanchflower et al. (1996); Addison and Schnabel (2003)).
Employees have an outside wage available, w¯. This may reflect the wage rate in
an alternative job, or an unemployment benefit; it is unaffected by the bargain.
The union aims to maximise (u(w) − u(w¯))N , where u(.) represents the utility
of a single worker and N is the number of workers employed by the firm. The
firm may have the option of shifting its activities to another location, or another
activity where, net of the costs of shifting, it can earn an outside post-tax profit.
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The firm is prepared to bargain over location-specific profit (before wages), that
is, the additional profit available by producing locally. Domestic post-tax profit is
pi = F (K,N)− wN − rK − T. (1.1)
is a standard revenue function, depending on capital, labour, and the output price.
We interpret F as value added. The cost of capital is rK. Corporation tax, levied
at rate τ is denoted T and is defined as
T = τ {F (K,N)− wN − αrK + φ} . (1.2)
Thus, the tax is levied on revenue net of wage payments and an allowance for the
cost of capital, where α is a measure of the generosity of depreciation allowances.
In addition however, many other factors can affect the firm’s tax position. These
include for example, the size of interest payments, the allocation across types of in-
vestment which receive different capital allowances, the existence of losses brought
forward from an earlier period, the extent to which taxable profit can be shifted
abroad to a lower-tax country through manipulating transfer-prices, stock relief,
or the contribution to an investment reserve or pension fund. We do not explicitly
model these factors; rather we include them all in the term φ. The existence of this
term implies that tax liabilities may vary across firms that have the same revenue,
wage payments, and investment. In the empirical work, it is the existence of the
factors incorporated in φ which allows us to identify the effects of tax indepen-
dently of F .
We assume that the additional factors determining the tax liability in the outside
option are not captured exactly by φ. If they were, then this term would drop out
of the wage bargain. This assumption is clearly reasonable if the outside option is
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to shift production abroad to where there is a different tax system. The outside
option could also be undertaken by the same domestic firm by stopping production
in period t and resuming it in the following period t+1. In this case for example,
losses could be carried forward to period t+1. Their net present value will depend
on the interest rate and on the probability of producing enough income in t+1 to
be able to claim them. Unless the interest rate is zero and it is certain that the
losses will be claimed in the following period, the value of loss carry forwards will
be smaller in the outside option. The same holds for the deductions for interest
payments and for capital allowances. Without production, they will generate a
loss in period t and the loss will be carried forward to the following period. The
net present value of the loss will be lower than in the situation without strike.
Additionally, the strike and the subsequent lack of production are likely to change
the financing and investment patterns of the firm with respect to the situation in
which there are no labour disputes. For example, the firm might need to borrow
more to face the consequences of lower o zero profits or it might decide to invest
less. This implies that interest payments and capital allowances accrued in a sit-
uation without the strike will be somehow different from those that would accrue
when there is no production and probably little revenues.
The bargaining power of the firm, µmay depend on the cost of a temporary dispute
with the workforce. The bargaining power of the union is (1−µ); this may depend
on the availability of alternative income to the workers in the event of a dispute.
We assume that wages and employment are determined by a Nash bargain, which
maximises:
B = {[u(w)− u(w¯)]N}(1−µ) {pi − pi∗}µ (1.3)
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where pi is defined by (1.1) and (1.2). The first order conditions for maximisation
are:
(1− µ) u
′(w)
u(w)− u(w¯) − µ
{
N(1− τ)
pi − pi∗
}
= 0 (1.4)
and
FN(K,N) = w − (1− µ)
µ
{
pi − pi∗
N(1− τ)
}
(1.5)
Finally, the firm chooses its capital stock by maximising its net of tax profit pi.
This yields the familiar expression:
FK(K,N) = (1 +m)r (1.6)
where m is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), m = τ(1−α)
(1−τ) . The three ex-
pressions (1.4), (1.5), and (1.6) jointly determine the values of the wage rate, w,
the capital stock, K, and the number of workers employed, N.
To investigate the role of tax in affecting these three variables, we can begin by
expanding u(w) around the observed wage w. This yields u(w¯) ∼= u(w)+u′(w)(w¯−
w). Making this approximation and substituting into (1.4) generates an expression
similar to (1.5), but with the marginal product FN replaced by the outside wage
w¯:7
w ∼= µw¯ + (1− µ)
{
F (K,N)− (1 +m)rK
N
− τφ
(1− τ)N −
pi∗
(1− τ)N
}
(1.7)
7Since it is based on equation (1.4), this specification could also be generated from a right to
manage model.
37
Here the wage is approximately equal to a weighted average of the outside wage
and a share of the per-employee location-specific profit, gross of wages. The de-
ductibility of labour costs from taxable income implies that there are only three
elements of the home country tax in the expression.
The first is the effect of less than full deductibility of capital expenditure. For a
cash flow tax α = 1, implying that m = 0. However, in the more common case of
α < 1, the additional tax liability reduces the profit over which the firm is prepared
to bargain, thereby reducing the wage rate. This effect is independent of any effect
via the capital stock K, as discussed below. Note that α typically varies across
firms, depending on the mix of assets in which the firm invested.
Second, the other factors determining the tax liability, captured in φ, also remain
as elements affecting the size of the post-tax profit over which the firm is prepared
to bargain. Conditional on other factors, a rise in φ induces a rise in tax, and this
will tend to reduce the wage rate:
∂w
∂φ
= −(1− µ)
N
τ
(1− τ) < 0 (1.8)
We describe this effect as the direct impact of taxation through the wage bargain:
a rise in φ reduces the wage conditional on the levels of capital, employment, and
pre-tax profit. This is the effect identified in the empirical estimation when the
wage rate is regressed on the tax liability per employee conditional on F/N, proxied
by the variable value added per employee. The tax liability itself is likely to be
endogenous, as we discuss below.
There may also be an indirect effect of a change in φ via a change in value added,
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F. This may be reflected in a change in investment, and hence in the capital stock,
K. Nonetheless, the more obvious route for such an effect would be through the
effective marginal tax rate m discussed below. A change in φ may also reflect a
modification in the output price, conditional on a given level of capital and labour.
The extent to which the company can pass on in its prices its tax liability incorpo-
rated in φ is constrained by competition in the output market. It is most probable
that any change in a company’s tax liability that is not reflected in its competitors’
tax bill will not be passed on in higher prices.
A third effect of taxation in equation (1.7) is that the home country tax rate also
affects the value of the outside option in the bargain.8 The value of the firm’s out-
side option itself may be unaffected by the tax rate (depending on what the outside
option is), but the deductibility of wages from the home country tax implies that
in the bargain the outside option is effectively grossed up by (1 - τ). This effect
of the tax rate mirrors its effect through the firm’s discrete location choice. The
latter can be affected by the tax rate, even under a cash flow tax (see Devereux
and Griffith (1998)).
There may be another indirect effect on wages through the impact of the effective
marginal tax rate m on the cost of capital in equation (1.6). This is straightforward
to analyse when labour is fixed. In this case, a rise in m induces a fall in K, from
(1.6). In turn, the fall in K induces a reduction in the marginal productivity of
labour FN , which in the absence of bargaining implies a reduction in the wage rate.
The analysis of a rise in m is more complex though when considering an individual
8Goerke (1996) presented a theoretical model identifying the effect of the home country tax
rate.
39
firm, or indeed in any case where the labour force is not fixed. To explore the effect
of m on the wage rate, we totally differentiate the three first order conditions,
allowing w, K, and N to vary in response to a change in m, but holding all outside
options constant. This yields:
N
{
1
µ
− (w − FN)u
′′(w)
u′(w)
}
dw +
w − FN
µ
dN +
(1− µ)
µ
rKdm = 0 (1.9)
{
FN − w
µ
+NFNN
}
dN +NFNKdK =
N
µ
dw +
(1− µ)
µ
rKdm (1.10)
and
FKKdK + FKNdN = rdm (1.11)
Combining (1.9), (1.10), and (1.11) implies that a sufficient condition for a negative
effect of m on w, dw
dm
< 0 is that
w < FN + µN
[
FNKFKN − FNNFKK
FKK
]
(1.12)
Given concavity of the production function, the term in square brackets is posi-
tive. Thus a rise in m can reduce the wage rate, even when the wage exceeds the
marginal product of labour. We describe the effect of m on w as another indirect
effect of tax on the wage rate, since it allows for an effect through K and N, and
hence through value added.9 This indirect effect determines the deadweight cost
of the tax-induced distortions to capital and labour decisions.
In the empirical work below, we attempt to identify only the direct effect of cor-
poration tax on wages. We estimate a log-linear version of expression (1.7), where
9Note though that part of the effect is direct, since even conditional on K and N , a rise in m
reduces the post-tax location-specific profit that is bargained over.
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the post-tax quasi-rent per employee is captured by two terms: value added per
employee and tax per employee. Identification of the direct effect of taxation is
straightforward: conditional on the other factors, the ‘tax per employee’ term iden-
tifies the effect of φ on the wage rate. Because of the potential endogeneity of the
tax liability, we instrument this term using two sets of instruments. One measures
the legal parameters of the tax system, and so is common to all companies in the
same country and year. The other depends on the firm-specific tax liability. These
measures include the use of debt finance, the markup of capital expenditure, and
the extent to which losses from previous periods may be used to reduce current
liabilities.
Note that the size of the tax effect is predicted to be larger than that of value
added. Interpreting the tax term in the empirical equation as T ∗ = τφ/N , the
expected coefficient would be ∂w/∂T ∗ = −(1 − µ)/(1 − τ). By contrast, the
expected coefficient on the value added per employee term is ∂w/∂(F/N) = (1−µ).
This difference arises because value added is pre-tax: a marginal addition to value
added is shared between the firm, the workforce, and the government. By contrast,
a reduction in tax is shared only by the firm and the workforce. This accounts for
the fact that the marginal impact of tax is grossed up by (1− τ).
In the empirical estimation, we also consider heterogeneity across firms. In partic-
ular, we compare firms that are part of multinational groups with purely domestic
companies. In the model there are two reasons why these may behave differently.
First, the outside option of the multinational pi∗ may be higher, implying that
the size of the profit over which the firm is prepared to bargain is lower. This is
difficult to test; we cannot observe the outside option since the firm does not in
practice choose it. In the empirical estimation, we therefore cannot include the
outside option. This means that we may over-estimate the size of the profit over
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which the firm is willing to bargain, and that the degree of overestimation is higher
for multinational firms. This may induce greater negative bias in the estimated
coefficients for firms that are part of multinational groups.
As a possible proxy for the outside option, we experiment by including the value
added and the tax of the rest of the multinational group. As a proxy for the
outside option, these variables would tend to have a negative impact on the wage.
However, as Budd et al. (2005) and Riedel (2008) argued, it is also possible that
domestic workers bargain over the firm’s entire profit, rather than only on the
part earned domestically. In this case, these group variables would have a positive
impact on the domestic wage.
A second element of heterogeneity between firms is that a multinational may also
find it cheaper to transfer production to another plant temporarily while it is en-
gaged in a dispute with a union. This would tend to increase the firm’s bargaining
power µ, as it can be more patient in waiting to achieve a deal, compared with a
firm which does not have this opportunity. We can examine this effect by testing
whether the coefficients from the bargaining equation (which reflects bargaining
strength) differ between these two groups of firms.
Note that the model predicts that a higher bargaining power of the firm would
result in the firm paying a smaller share of any additional profit to the workforce
through higher wages. Given the symmetry in the model across all cash flows
within the firm, this also implies that a firm with greater bargaining strength
would respond to an increase in tax by passing on a smaller proportion of the
increase to the workforce. From equation (1.7), we have:
∂ (∂w/∂φ)
∂µ
=
τ
(1− τ)N > 0 (1.13)
That is, as the bargaining power of the firm increases, the coefficient on the tax per
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employee term should rise. That is, a multinational which has greater bargaining
power should have a smaller coefficient in absolute terms.
Finally, note that in the empirical work below we do not attempt to identify the
indirect effect of taxes through the effective marginal tax rate and the capital
stock, or through an effect of φ on prices, conditional on capital and labour. To
evaluate the former would mean that we could not include other firm-level variables
as controls in the equation, since all of them would be affected by the size of
the capital stock. Another possible approach would be to identify separately the
impact of the effective marginal tax rate on investment and the capital stock, and
the impact of the capital stock on value added. These effects would need to be
combined with the effects of value added on the wage rate that we do estimate.
We leave evaluation of these effects for future research.
1.3 Data
The empirical analysis is carried out using a commercially available firm-level
worldwide data set called ORBIS, compiled by the Bureau van Dijk (2007). It
consists of accounting data from the balance sheet and profit and loss account of
companies all around the world from 1996 to 2003. In addition ORBIS contains in-
formation on the ownership structure of the firms in 2004, including the number of
shareholders, their names, their country of residence and their percentage interest
in the company, and the number of subsidiaries, their names, and the percentage
participation of the parent company.
Initially, we selected only the companies not defined as ‘micro’ in European Com-
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mission (2003).10 This sample was further restricted as follows. First, it was
limited to companies for which unconsolidated data and ownership information
were available; our interest is in the determination of wages at the level of an
individual company, rather than at the level of a group of companies. Second,
observations which showed clear errors and missing values were dropped, along
with observations in the first and one hundredth percentiles of the distribution for
the main variables.11 Finally, the dynamic model specification and the method
of estimation we used required companies with at least four continuous years of
data. The final sample consists of 55,082 companies located in Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
We used ownership information from the original full set of data to identify compa-
nies in the same group in our sample. Companies were classified as: (i) belonging
to a multinational group if they were connected to at least one other company in
a different country by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent of the capital; (ii)
belonging to a domestic group if the company was connected to other companies
by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent but with none of those companies
located in a different country; or (iii) as a stand-alone company if it did not have
any ownership links with other companies.
Table 1.1 illustrates the distribution of companies across the nine countries. It
also shows the number of companies that are stand-alone (overall around 35 per
cent), part of a domestic group (30 per cent), or part of a multinational group (35
per cent). Table 1.2 indicates the number of observations used in the estimation
10Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two subse-
quent years of recorded total assets greater than 2,000 EUR and at least one employee.
11The main variables are wage rate, number of employees, fixed assets per employee, tax bill
per employee, and value added per employee.
44
for each company. Over 15,000 companies (over one quarter of the sample of
companies used) have data for eight years; a similar number of companies have
either six or seven observations. Table 1.3 shows the number of observations per
year used in the regressions; each year is well represented.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
Based on the conceptual framework in Section 1.2, and in particular on equation
(1.7), we consider the following log-linearised dynamic specification for wage rate
w :
wit =
2∑
j=1
γjwi,t−j +
2∑
j=0
[
βjvi,t−j + δjTi,t−j + λ
′
jZi,t−j
]
+ αi + αt + εit (1.14)
where i and t index companies and years respectively, w is log wage rate, v is
log value added per employee, T is log tax bill per employee, αi is a company-
specific fixed effect, αt is a year effect, and εit is the error term. The vector Z
contains other variables associated with wage bargaining such as the outside wage
and union density. About 15 per cent of our sample observations contain either
a negative or a zero value for the tax liability. We assume that the effect of the
actual magnitude of the tax burden on the wage rate is only present when there
are positive taxes, so we include T only when it is positive. To account for the
observations with non-positive taxes, we include in Z a dummy variable indicating
a non-positive tax liability. We allow for a general dynamic specification, which
can also be derived from a static model with an AR(2) process for the disturbance.
Several econometric issues need to be considered before a choice of an appropriate
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technique is made for the estimation of a dynamic equation of this form. Due to
the presence of permanent company-specific unobserved heterogeneity (αi) which
is correlated with the lagged dependent variables and endogenous regressors (v,
T and the outside wage), the pooled OLS and within-group (WG) estimators are
inconsistent. It is well recognised in the literature that the most appropriate tech-
nique to use in this case is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) applied to
the first-differenced equation that does not contain αi. The precise set of moment
conditions that should be used to generate the appropriate instruments depends
on the assumptions about the correlation between the regressors and the com-
posite error term uit = αi + εit.
12 Much of the recent literature has focused on
finding appropriate instruments for the application of GMM. Arellano and Bond
(1991) (AB) proposed the use of lagged levels of the variables as instruments for
the endogenous differences in the first-differenced model [GMM-diff]. However,
later research (for example, Blundell and Bond (1998)) has shown that when the
series are highly persistent, the levels instruments are weak predictors of the dif-
ferenced endogenous variables. Therefore, the AB estimator can have very poor
finite sample properties in terms of bias and precision. Blundell and Bond (1998)
(BB) proposed the use of additional moment conditions that correspond to the
use of lagged differences of endogenous variables as instruments for the model in
levels. This GMM estimator is known as system GMM [GMM-sys]. It combines
moment conditions for the model in first differences with the moment conditions
for the model in levels. BB and Blundell et al. (2000) showed that the system
GMM estimator had better finite sample properties than AB’s original differenced
GMM estimator. They advocated the use of this technique when the series were
highly persistent. However, this relied on certain stationarity conditions of the
initial observation. Bun and Windmeijer (2007) showed that when the variance of
12We accommodate the time effects using year dummies.
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the unobserved heterogeneity αi is high relative to the variance of the idiosyncratic
error εit, the performance of the system GMM deteriorates. In summary, whether
one uses GMM-diff, or GMM-sys, or even some other method of estimation will
depend on the statistical properties of the variables used in the model. Our choice
of instruments for our GMM estimation has been based on this discussion. We
shall return to the issue of appropriate instruments later when we discuss the re-
sults.
We have used two tests to investigate the validity of our chosen instruments.
The first is the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identification (Sargan (1958); Hansen
(1982)) which requires a non-rejection of the null hypothesis being tested. The
second is a serial correlation test (Arellano and Bond (1991)) that tests for the
presence of serial correlation in the first differenced errors εit. White noise errors
εit would imply an MA(1) process for the ∆εit, thus rejecting the null of no first
order serial correlation but not rejecting the null of second order serial correlation.
We use xtabond2 (Roodman (2009b)) in StataCorp (2005) to estimate our models
using the GMM technique.
1.4.1 Variables
The wage rate is calculated as the annual average company wage (that is, costs
of employees (435) divided by the total number of employees (425)).13 We also
calculate an outside wage. We assume that a worker could move to take up a job
in the worst paid company in the same broad industrial sector14, the same country,
and the same year; we take this to be the outside wage in that sector, country, and
13This is the only measure of wage available in the dataset. The variable codes in ORBIS are
given in parenthesis in bold.
14The broad industrial sector is defined using the Nomenclature Ge´ne´rale des Activite´s
Economiques dans les Communaute´s Europe´ennes (NACE) core codes, revision 1.1 (Rev 1.1)
at the 2-digit level.
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year. We use the ORBIS measure of value added (439).
The tax variable recorded in the profit and loss statement (430) is our measure of
the tax liability of the firm in each period.15 As discussed above, this measure is
company and time-specific, in that the tax liability depends on many factors spe-
cific to the firm’s performance in any particular period. We treat the tax liability
as endogenous. We use two different sets of instruments. The first set includes the
country and year-specific measures of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), the
effective average tax rate (EATR)16 and the statutory corporate tax rate. These
measures are based on the legal tax system, and so are unlikely to be affected by
the shocks to the individual firm’s profit and wages. The second set of instruments
is a collection of lagged time-varying firm-specific variables. We use the ratio of
tangible fixed assets (406) to total fixed assets (404) as an indicator of the likely
value of depreciation allowances for tax purposes. Non-current liabilities (416) as
a proportion of total assets (412) are employed as an indicator for the extent to
which taxable income is likely to be reduced by interest payments. We also use a
binary indicator of whether profit before taxes (429) in previous periods was neg-
ative, which may indicate that the company has brought forward taxable losses to
set against current profit to reduce current tax liabilities.
All monetary variables are deflated to 2000 prices using OECD country- and year-
specific consumer price indexes, and converted to a common currency (US dollars)
using the year 2000 OECD national average exchange rates.17 We also investigate
15This is an approximation, since firms may record a value for the tax liability which differs
from their obligation to the tax authorities; however, there is no reason to believe that there
should be a systematic bias in using this measure.
16These are calculated according to the methodology proposed by Devereux and Griffith (2003),
and are computed from a number of sources.
17OECD consumer price indexes and exchange rates are taken from www.OECDStat.org
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the impact of union density (UD) using a country- and year-specific index from
the OECD (2004).18 Table 1.4 displays some basic descriptive statistics for the
main variables and instruments.
1.4.2 Basic Specification
Table 1.5 presents results for our basic specification using different estimators.
This specification includes only value-added per employee (v) and the tax bill
per employee (T ). All specifications include time dummies and two lags of each
variable. Since the preferred specification required two lags of each variable, we
have estimated the same model using different methods to illustrate the effect
of choice of technique on the estimated coefficients. Column 1 presents the re-
sults from a pooled OLS regression. There is no allowance for company-specific
unobservables in this specification, although the standard errors are clustered to
account for this. Columns 2 and 3 present results from the WG estimation (OLS
on variables entered in mean deviations) and OLS on the first-differenced data
respectively. These are two alternative ways of dealing with company-specific un-
observables in the estimation. Generally, in the absence of endogenous regressors,
the pooled OLS estimator of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
upward-biased, while the WG and the OLS on the first-differenced estimators are
downward-biased estimates (Blundell et al. (2000)). The coefficient estimates on
the lagged dependent variables are very different in the three model estimations
and are consistent with these biases. Both the pooled OLS and the WG estimates
of the coefficient on wit−1 are positive, though of very different magnitudes. The
first-differenced OLS model estimate of this coefficient is negative. Surprisingly,
all other coefficient estimates are very similar.
18For a review of the effect of union density on labour market performance, see OECD (2006).
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GMM estimation results are provided in columns 4 to 8 of Table 1.5. The sets of
instruments used in these specifications are different. As noted above, all sets of
instruments include country- and time-specific measures of the EMTR, the EATR,
and the statutory corporate tax rate. Also included are the following time-varying
firm-specific variables in logs: tangible fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed as-
sets, non-current liabilities as a proportion of total assets, and an indicator variable
for non-positive profit before tax. Indicator variables to pick up zero values of the
logged variables were also included in the set of instruments. Columns 4 and 5 are
based on the AB GMM-diff estimation of the first-differenced equation using levels
of the endogenous variables as additional instruments. Columns 6 and 7 are based
on the BB GMM-sys estimation, which uses levels (first-differences) of the endoge-
nous variables as instruments for the first-differenced (levels) endogenous variables.
One practical problem with both approaches is that the number of instruments
can be numerous. Unlike in two-stage-least-squares (2-SLS) where the estimation
sample is restricted according to the choice of lag for the instrument, in standard
applications of GMM-diff and GMM-sys, a separate instrument is included for each
time period. To illustrate this problem, consider our application where T = 8. If
we were to apply 2-SLS to estimate (1.14) in first-differences, wit−3 can be used
as an instrument for ∆wit−1 under standard assumptions. This would imply that
the estimation sample would be t = 4,...,8. However, every additional lag of our
dependent variable that is included in the set of instruments would result in the
loss of one extra time observation. In our sample where the number of companies is
large, every loss of a time observation results in a loss of around 55,000 observations
per period. In contrast, the standard GMM-diff and GMM-sys approaches include
separate instruments for each time period. This results in a sparse instrument set
but a larger estimation sample. Three practical problems can result from the use
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of a sparse instrument set (Roodman (2009a)).19 First, the instruments can be too
weak to identify the relevant effects. Second, the precision of the weighting matrix
that is used in the GMM estimation is affected. Third, the Sargan-Hansen test
has low power. Given these problems, we also investigate the approach in a strand
of the literature where the standard GMM-diff instruments are combined through
addition to create a smaller instrument set (Roodman (2009b)).20 Columns 4 and
6 present results from the GMM estimation that used the full set of unrestricted
instruments, while columns 5 and 7 present results from estimation that used the
smaller restricted instrument set.
However, in all cases, the Sargan-Hansen test for over-identification is rejected
and the tests for first and second order serial correlations are rejected, implying a
problem with the estimators.21 The table reports that the degrees of freedom for
the over-identifying tests in the case of the restricted instrument matrix are much
smaller. However, the tests still reject the null of instrument validity.22
19 Taking a simple example to illustrate this issue, consider an AR(1) specification in
first-difference as follows: ∆yit = γ∆yit−1 + ∆εit, and the model would be estimated us-
ing t = 3,..T. The instrument matrix for the ith company in the case of AB-diff would be:
Zi =

yi1 0 0 0 0 0 0...
0 yi1 yi2 0 0 0 0...
0 0 0 yi1 yi2 yi3 0...
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. For example, the instruments for the observation
yi3 − yi2 would be yi2 and yi1.
20This is achieved in STATA using the ‘collapse’ option in estimation command xtabond2.
Taking the example given in footnote 19, the new instrument matrix would be Zi =
yi1 0 0 .
yi2 yi1 0 .
yi3 yi2 yi1 .
. . . .
 .
21In Table 1.9, we have provided the results from OLS and WG estimations of simple univariate
AR(1) and AR(2) models. The results are not suggestive of a near unit root in the two main
variables w and v. Hence, the need for the estimation of the model using GMM-sys is not present.
When we used the GMM-diff estimator, we were only able to find a reasonable specification which
passed all the model diagnostics when we used lags 5 or more as instruments. This resulted in a
drastic loss of observations and we therefore did not pursue this strategy.
22Bun and Windmeijer (2007) showed that when the variance of the unobserved company-
specific heterogeneity (αi) relative to the variance of εit increases, the bias in the GMM-sys can
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We next turn to our preferred estimates, which are provided in column 8 of Table
1.5. These results refer to the GMM estimation of the first differenced equation
using a set of first differenced instruments. Using a general notation, in the example
of footnote 19, the instrument matrix for this GMM estimation is as follows:
Zi =

0 0 0 0
yi2 − yi1 0 0 0
yi3 − yi2 yi2 − yi1 0 0
yi4 − yi3 yi3 − yi2 yi2 − yi1 0
. . . .

.
We treat all lags from two upwards of all our variables as being predetermined.
The columns of the above matrix refer to the different instruments used.
Unlike the results in columns 4 to 7 of Table 1.5, for the specification shown in col-
umn 8, the tests for over-identification and the tests for first and second order serial
correlations are all satisfactory. The Sargan-Hansen test for over-identification is
not rejected. The test for first order serial correlation is rejected, while the test for
second order serial correlation is not. This is what we would expect if the errors
in the levels equation were not serially correlated.
Turning to the coefficient estimates, the estimated effects are broadly consistent
with the theoretical model presented in Section 1.2, even though we have added
dynamics in the empirical specification. Both the first period and second period
lagged wage rate terms have a significant effect on the current wage rate, after
become quite high compared to the GMM-diff estimator and they advocate the use of GMM-diff
in this case.
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controlling for company-specific unobservables and accounting for endogeneity of
the regressors. There is some persistence but it is not very high; the coefficients
are smaller than the GMM-diff and GMM-sys estimates but are larger than the
WG estimates in column 2. The short-run elasticity of the wage rate with respect
to the tax per employee is quite large compared to other columns; it is estimated
to be -0.095 in column 8, about six times those reported in columns 1 to 3. The
long-run elasticity is a little lower at -0.066. The short-run elasticity with respect
to value added per employee is estimated to be 0.773, and the longer run is again
slightly lower at 0.723. We explore below the implications of these results for the
incidence of the tax.
1.4.3 Basic Specification with Bargaining Variables
In Table 1.6, we use the same estimator as in column 8 of Table 1.5, but add
variables associated with union bargaining. The new variables include a measure
of country- and year-specific aggregate union density, and a measure of the outside
option available to the workers.23 As a proxy for the latter, we use the minimum
of the log wage per employee in that sector and country in a particular year. We
also include a dummy for those companies that pay the minimum wage.
For ease of exposition, column 8 of Table 1.5 is reproduced in column 1 of Table
1.6. We add the extra variables one at a time: column 2 of Table 1.6 includes the
aggregate union density variable and column 3 includes additionally the outside-
option variables. Since these variables do not vary by company, they are unlikely
to have a very strong effect. This is what we find, although the variables have
the correct sign. Including these additional controls has little impact on the other
23Although union coverage would be a better measure of union strength, we were unable to
obtain consistent data series for our sample of countries for the years we have used. Hence, we
include union density as a proxy for the strength of the union in these countries.
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coefficients and standard errors. The diagnostic tests change a little: in particu-
lar the Sargan-Hansen statistic no longer rejects the null at 10%. The estimated
short-run elasticity of T is now slightly higher; for example, in column 3 if Table
1.6 it is -0.120. The union density variable is correctly signed and is positive and
significant at 5%.
In summary, the basic specification results displayed in column 8 of Table 1.5 do
not change much with the addition of variables associated with the bargaining
strength. Below, we use column 3 of Table 1.6 as our preferred model for further
investigations. We next examine the behaviour of multinationals compared to
domestic companies.
1.4.4 Evaluating the Direct Incidence
As already noted, the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the tax liability
per employee, T, is a little higher with the additional bargaining variables. In
column 1 of Table 1.6, the short-run elasticity is estimated at -0.095 and the long-
run elasticity at about -0.066. In column 3, the short-run elasticity is -0.120 and
the long-run elasticity is -0.093. Standard errors of both the short- and long-run
estimates for column 3 of Table 1.6 are given in Table 1.7.
Since the wage rate is calculated as total compensation per employee, these esti-
mates are equivalent to the elasticity of total compensation with respect to the
tax liability. To use these results to identify the direct incidence of tax, it is useful
to calculate the impact of an exogenous $1 change in the tax liability on total
compensation. Calculations are presented in Table 1.7. We calculate the incidence
for each observation in the sample by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the
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ratio of the wage rate to tax per employee. Based on the estimates of column 3
of Table 1.6, at the median of the resulting distribution, a $1 increase in the tax
liability leads to a 97 cents reduction in total compensation in the short run, and
a 75 cents reduction in the long run. These are very large effects: the majority of
any additional $1 of tax is passed on in lower wages, and this effect happens within
one period. Note though that the reduction in wages results in a further increase
in the tax liability because of the deductibility of wages from the tax base. At the
mean tax rate in the sample, a reduction in wages of 75 cents would generate a
rise in tax of around 26 cents (τ∆w = 0.35 ∗ (−0.75) = −0.26). The change in
wages is just under 60 per cent (0.75/1.26 = 0.59) of the overall change in tax of
$1.26.
Recall that these are estimates only of the direct effects of an increased tax liability.
They do not include any indirect effect through prices or the capital stock, since we
are controlling for pre-tax value added per employee. Note also that we would not
expect over-shifting in the direct effect, which simply measures the distribution of
a given location-specific profit between the firm and the workers.
It is also interesting to compare the effects of taxation and value added. Following
the same procedure as above, we find the effective incidence of a $1 change in
value added by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the ratio of the wage rate
to value added per employee. Table 1.7 indicates that the median of the resulting
distribution in the short run is 0.67. A fall of $1 in value added reduces wage
payments by 67 cents. The long-run reduction is 57 cents. These figures are close
to the median share of labour compensation in value added in the sample, which
is 0.67.
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From the theory above, we would expect the incidence of the tax to be higher than
the incidence of a change in the pre-tax value added; the theory would suggest that
the impact of an exogenous $1 increase in value added would need to be grossed
up by a factor (1 − τ) to find the expected impact of an exogenous $1 reduction
in tax. Our estimate of 75 cents in the long run is only slightly smaller than this,
evaluated at the median.
There are a number of estimates of the elasticity of the wage rate to value added per
employee in the literature. These vary widely and depend on the specification and
econometric techniques used. For example, estimates from Nickell and Wadhwani
(1990), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), and Van Reenen (1996) vary between 0.2
and 0.4. One possible explanation of the higher elasticities found here is that we
use unconsolidated accounting data, which link wage payments of each subsidiary
within a group to the value added of that subsidiary.24 Other studies that use
consolidated data may combine separate wage negotiations in different parts of
the group; this may reduce the estimated elasticity. We test for the effects of other
parts of the group below. In any case, as pointed out already, our estimates of the
marginal effect of changes in value added seem plausible in that they are consistent
with the average share of value added captured by the labour force.
1.4.5 Behaviour of Multinationals
Finally, we consider two forms of heterogeneity across firms, both of which involve
multinational companies. Both are based on the specification of Table 1.6 column
3 (which is reproduced in column 1 of Table 1.8 for ease of reference).
24Budd et al. (2005) employed the same data source as used here, and found much lower
elasticities. We attribute this primarily to the fact that they use a level, rather than a log,
specification. By contrast, Riedel (2008) also used the same data, but with a log specification
found a similar range of estimates of the effect of value added to those presented here.
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First, we investigate whether the estimated parameters differ according to whether
a firm is part of a multinational group or not. The conceptual framework in Sec-
tion 1.2 indicated that the stronger the bargaining power of a firm, the lower the
proportion of profit before wages that would be passed on to the labour force,
and symmetrically, the lower the proportion of any increase in tax that would be
passed on to the labour force. To consider differences in bargaining power, we
investigate two sub-samples of the data: in column 2 of Table 1.8, we consider
only stand-alone firms and in columns 3 and 4, we consider only firms, which are
part of multinational groups.
The short-run elasticities of the wage rate with respect to tax per employee are
very similar for the two groups of companies, whilst the long-run elasticity is bigger
for international groups (-0.108 for multinationals versus -0.075 for stand-alones).
The long-run incidence of an exogenous $1 rise in tax is very similar. At the
median of the stand-alone sub-sample, compensation would fall by 73 cents. For
companies that are part of multinational groups, the comparative figure is around
70 cents. For value added, the short-run elasticities for the two groups are very
close. However, the long-run elasticity, and the long-run incidence of an extra $1
of value added, evaluated at the median, are both slightly higher for companies
that are part of multinational groups25. Both of these results are consistent with
multinational companies having greater bargaining power, although the evidence
is not strong.
A second effect for multinationals could occur through the outside option. In col-
25The long-run elasticity is 0.816 for stand-alones and 0.900 for multinational companies. The
long-run incidence of value added is 0.542 for stand-alones and 0.611 for multinationals.
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umn 5 we investigate this for multinational companies by including the tax and
value added variables for the rest of the multinational group. The group variables
are calculated aggregating values over all of the other subsidiaries of the group for
which we have data. We express these aggregates as a proportion of the number
of the original company’s employees. If these terms proxy the outside option of
the group, then a higher value added (or lower tax) in the rest of the group may
indicate a more valuable outside option and hence a lower domestic wage.
In fact, we do not find any significant effects of these variables. This may of course
simply indicate that they are not good proxies for the firm’s outside options. Such
lack of significance also differs from the results of Budd et al. (2005) and Riedel
(2008). They find the opposite effect for the value added of the parent firm. The
value added of the parent has a positive effect on the wage in the subsidiary. They
attribute this to the domestic labour force bargaining over profits in the parent as
well as in the subsidiary. However, neither paper includes the tax or value added
of the rest of the multinational group, but only the parent. The lack of significance
in our results may be due to this difference in our approach. More generally, it
may reflect the possibility that the workers may bargain over worldwide profits, a
factor that offsets the use of worldwide profit as a proxy for the outside option in
the bargain.
1.5 Conclusion
The standard model of a small open economy yields strong results for the effective
incidence of a tax on capital located in that country. Given a fixed world rate of
return, a tax will raise the pre-tax rate of return, but leave the post-tax rate of
return unaffected. The rise in the pre-tax rate of return is achieved by an outflow
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of capital, which reduces labour productivity and hence the compensation received
by the immobile domestic labour force. There is therefore a presumption that the
burden of the tax will be shifted away from the owners of capital to the labour force.
In this chapter, we investigate empirically part of this effect. Specifically, in our
estimation we analyse the impact of a change in taxation conditional on value
added. We interpret this in the context of a wage bargaining model: for a given
pre-tax quasi-rent, a higher tax reduces the post-tax quasi-rent available to be
bargained over by the firm and the employees. This wage bargain introduces a
direct channel by which taxation affects the wage rate, a channel which can be
estimated conditional on the value added of the firm. We estimate the size of this
direct effect using a large database of over 55,000 companies in nine countries over
the period 1996 to 2003.
We do not estimate the indirect effect of a change in tax, which affects the wage
rate through changing the size of the pre-tax quasi-rent available to be bargained
over. More specifically, although by controlling for value added (as an estimate of
the pre-tax quasi-rent) we estimate the impact of changes in value added on the
wage rate, we do not estimate the impact of the tax on the size of value added. By
excluding this effect, our estimate of the direct effect can be interpreted as exclud-
ing the effects associated with the deadweight cost of the tax, and any changes in
output price.
The results strongly support the hypothesis of a direct effect of corporate income
tax through wage bargaining. We find that source-based taxes on corporate in-
come are largely passed on in the form of lower wages. At the median, our results
suggest that 75 per cent of an exogenous increase in tax is passed on in lower
wages in the long run. These estimates are for the direct effect of the tax only,
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conditional on value added (and hence indirectly conditional on investment); they
are additional to possible indirect effects through value added.
We also investigate whether the incidence of the corporate income tax on the
wage rate differs between stand-alone companies and companies that are part of
multinational groups. We find only weak evidence that the companies that are part
of multinational groups shift a smaller proportion of any additional tax onto the
workforce (or keep a larger proportion of any reduction in tax). This is consistent
with such companies having greater bargaining power. We find no effect on the
wage rate of the profit or tax liability elsewhere in the multinational group.
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Table 1.1: Number and Type of Company, by Country
Country Number of companies Number of observations
Total Stand-alone Part of Part of
domestic groups multinationals
Belgium 1,954 224 453 1,277 3,408
Finland 1,023 91 467 465 2,833
France 17,505 4,894 5,645 6,966 54,511
Germany 168 24 19 125 319
Italy 8,483 3,212 2,775 2,496 29,021
Netherlands 303 10 32 261 911
Spain 13,704 6,873 3,906 2,925 42,367
Sweden 2,713 99 1,053 1,561 5,964
United Kingdom 9,229 3,972 1,985 3,272 27,415
Total 55,082 19,399 16,335 19,348 166,749
Table 1.2: Number of Observations per Company
Years available per firm Number of companies
Frequency Per cent
4 12,261 22.3
5 12,217 22.2
6 7,667 13.9
7 7,632 13.8
8 15,305 27.8
Total 55,082 100
Table 1.3: Observations per Year
Years Frequency Per cent
1999 24,087 14.5
2000 30,614 18.4
2001 32,848 19.7
2002 38,527 23.1
2003 40,673 24.4
Total 166,749 100
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Table 1.6: Extensions to the Basic Specification (Column 8 from Table 1.5)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Basic specification Basic specification Basic specification
Log(wage rate) & Union density & All bargaining variables
Log(wage rate)
t-1 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.135***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
t-2 0.029*** 0.024** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Log (tax per employee) -0.095*** -0.118*** -0.120***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037)
t-1 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
t-2 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Dummy: negative or zero tax bill 0.386*** 0.376*** 0.361***
(0.078) (0.091) (0.088)
t-1 -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.089***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
t-2 -0.012** -0.012** -0.011*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log (value added per employee) 0.773*** 0.849*** 0.889***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.067)
t-1 -0.136*** -0.145*** -0.155***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
t-2 -0.022*** -0.023** -0.025***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Union Density 0.012** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006)
t-1 -0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.006)
t-2 -0.010 -0.005
(0.009) (0.008)
Log(industry minimum wage) 0.002
(0.002)
t-1 0.003*
(0.002)
t-2 0.004***
(0.001)
Dummy: Company is min wage company -0.731
(0.571)
t-1 0.124
(0.207)
t-2 0.037
(0.067)
AR(1) -13.99 -13.19 -13.30
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.23 -1.12 -1.24
p-value [0.219] [0.263] [0.214]
Hansen over-identification test 45.64 43.71 48.28
Degrees of freedom (37) (35) (39)
p-value [0.156] [0.148] [0.147]
(i) See notes to Table 1.5. (ii) All regressions use difference GMM estimates. (iii) Excluded instruments used
are the same as in the model of column 8 of Table 1.5.
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Table 1.7: Estimated Incidence from Table 1.6, Column 3 Results
Elasticity Incidence
Short run
Tax bill -0.120 -0.970
(0.037)
Value added 0.889 0.670
(0.067)
Long run
Tax bill -0.093 -0.751
(0.031)
Value added 0.851 0.569
(0.0670
(i) Standard errors in parenthesis.
(ii) The reported incidence is the median value.
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Table 1.8: Difference GMM Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable All Stand-alone Multinational Multinational
Log(wage rate) companies companies companies companies
Lagged log(wage rate) 0.135*** 0.079 0.166*** 0.093**
(0.024) (0.066) (0.028) (0.040)
t-2 0.031*** -0.013 0.055*** 0.014
(0.011) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016)
Log (tax bill per employee) -0.120*** -0.118*** -0.117** -0.101***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.047) (0.033)
t-1 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.029** 0.028**
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
t-2 0.007*** 0.006 0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Dummy: negative or zero tax bill 0.361*** 0.549*** 0.391*** 0.316
(0.088) (0.136) (0.142) (0.311)
t-1 -0.089*** -0.149*** -0.045 0.185
(0.021) (0.033) (0.034) (0.207)
t-2 -0.011* -0.025*** 0.004 0.080
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.083)
Log (value added per employee) 0.889*** 0.863*** 0.837*** 0.640***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.133) (0.105)
t-1 -0.155*** -0.101** -0.122*** -0.111***
(0.023) (0.045) (0.037) (0.051)
t-2 -0.025*** -0.001 -0.014 -0.004
(0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019)
Union density 0.013** -0.007 0.020** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
t-1 0.003 -0.012 0.002 -0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
t-2 -0.005 0.017* -0.017 -0.031**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Log(industry minimum wage) 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
t-1 0.003* -0.000 0.005* -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
t-2 0.004*** -0.000 0.005*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy: min wage company -0.731 -1.091 -0.751 -0.037
(0.571) (1.222) (1.090) (0.759)
t-1 0.124 -0.041 -0.213 -0.249
(0.207) (0.358) (0.523) (0.287)
t-2 0.037 -0.033 -0.074 -0.091
(0.067) (0.137) (0.169) (0.100)
Log (group tax bill per employee) 0.010
(0.018)
t-1 -0.011
(0.010)
t-2 -0.003
(0.003)
continued
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Table 1.8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Stand-alone Multinational Multinational
companies companies companies companies
Dummy: negative or zero group tax bill -0.062
(0.093)
t-1 -0.014
(0.047)
t-2 -0.006
(0.020)
Log (group value added per employee) 0.074
(0.063)
t-1 0.015
(0.049)
t-2 0.003
(0.006)
AR(1) -13.30 -9.61 -5.55 -5.13
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.24 -1.97 -1.11 -1.74
p-value [0.214] [0.048] [0.265] [0.081]
Hansen over-identification test 48.28 23.37 23.24 40.00
Degrees of freedom (39) (19) (19) (30)
p-value [0.147] [0.221] [0.227] [0.105]
Observations 166,749 62,955 56,883 35,820
Number of companies 55,082 19,399 19,348 13,717
(i) See notes to Table 1.6; (ii) Additional excluded instruments used in columns 2 and 3 were first-differences
of EMTR, EATR, statutory corporate tax rate, third order lags of log (tangible fixed assets as a proportion of
total fixed assets if positive), log (non-current liabilities as a proportion of total assets if positive) and binary
indicators for: non-positive profits excluding taxes, zero tangible fixed assets and non-current liabilities.
Additionally, third order lags of the group level variables of the additional instruments used in columns 2 and 3
were also used in column 4. (iii) The group variables are calculated by adding up the values for the subsidiaries
present in the dataset, excluding the company concerned. The group tax bill and value added are divided by
the employment of the subsidiary.
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Chapter 2
Profit Shifting and Measured
Productivity of Multinational
Firms
69
“The global integration of production cuts costs
and taps new sources of skills and knowledge”
Samuel Palmisano,
IBM Chairman, President and CEO
on the evolution of multinationals (Palmisano (2006))
2.1 Introduction
The divergence in productivity between multinationals and other companies is now
well-documented in both developed and developing economies (Lipsey (2002)).
Multinational enterprises are not only more productive than purely domestic firms
are, they also seem to be the major forces driving the international performance
of European countries (Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)). But is the performance of
these stars measured correctly?
In recent years, researchers have provided evidence that multinationals (MNCs)
manipulate transfer-prices and hence the value of sales and the costs of inputs
to minimise their overall tax burden (Devereux (2007)). We argue that manip-
ulation of transfer-prices affects the measured productivity of MNCs. As there
is intra-group trade and transfer-pricing manipulation is not prohibitively costly,
measured productivity for international companies will be over-reported in low-tax
countries, as sales will be over-recorded and the costs of intermediate inputs will be
under-recorded. Hence, the productivity advantage of multinationals with respect
to domestic entities will be overestimated in low-tax jurisdictions, and vice versa.
We find that a 10 percentage points cut in the statutory corporate tax rate would
induce affiliates of multinationals to increase their measured total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) by about 10 per cent relative to domestic firms. At the sample mean,
the TFP advantage of international companies would increase by about 44 per cent.
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There is increasing evidence that international companies engage in either over-or
under-pricing of components shipped among various affiliates (Clausing (2003) and
Bernard et al. (2006)). Despite a variety of contributions on the performance of
MNCs, the effect of transfer-pricing manipulation on their reported productivity
has not been studied so far. Our study fills this gap. It bridges two streams of liter-
ature, the research on productivity heterogeneity across firms and the investigation
of profit shifting. The novel aspect of our analysis is that we investigate changes
in the measured TFP advantage of multinationals with respect to domestic firms
following changes in the corporate tax rate. After a tax cut, multinationals have
less incentive to shift profits abroad, while domestic enterprises should not change
their behaviour, ceteris paribus. A direct comparison between multinational and
domestic companies has not been used previously in the profit-shifting literature.
We complement it with the use of company fixed effects to control for unobserved
firm-level characteristics which might affect the productivity premium of inter-
national firms. The literature on the performance of MNCs rarely controls for
unobserved firm effects as this would wipe out the multinational indicator which
is mostly time-invariant in short panels.
Using ORBIS unconsolidated accounting data from 1998 to 2004, we find that the
statutory corporate tax rate has a negative impact on the measured TFP of multi-
nationals relative to domestic companies. The advantage of ORBIS is twofold.
Companies can be classified as either multinational or domestic. Additionally,
ORBIS allows us to compare entities and hence corporate tax rates across coun-
tries. This is unusual in the productivity literature where most of the contributions
are country studies and the effects of taxes have been neglected.1 Our sample con-
1In a single country short panel, there might not be enough time-series variation in the tax
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sists of about 16,000 companies located in the European countries: Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes
the most relevant literature on productivity of multinational companies and on
profit shifting. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 presents the results and
a number of extensions designed to show the robustness of our results. Section
2.5 concludes. A detailed description of the dataset construction is presented in
Appendix B.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Productivity of Multinational Companies
Heterogeneity in firms’ productivity has been the subject of many studies encom-
passing developed, developing, and transitional economies.2 Affiliates of multina-
tionals are usually found to be superior to domestic companies in terms of both
labour and total factor productivity. Estimates of the TFP advantage of MNCs
with respect to domestic firms range from 2.3 per cent to 15.5 per cent.3
Doms and Jensen (1998) is one of the earliest studies addressing productivity
heterogeneity using longitudinal micro-level data. They focus on the US manu-
facturing sector and show that foreign-owned establishments have between 2.3 per
rate to identify any effect.
2For reviews of the earlier literature, see Lipsey (2002) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
3Castellani and Zanfei (2007) find that subsidiaries of multinationals located in Italy are
15.5 per cent more productive in terms of TFP than are domestic Italian companies. Their data
correspond to the 1996 Italian subset of ORBIS. For more information on ORBIS and its subsets,
see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
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cent and 3.7 per cent higher TFP than their purely domestic counterparts, even
after controlling for observable characteristics such as size, age, state and industry.
For the United Kingdom, Criscuolo and Martin (2009) analyse the TFP of 19,000
British manufacturing establishments between 1996 and 2000 using the Annual
Respondent Database (ARD). They estimate that the establishments owned by
MNCs are around 4.7 per cent more productive than purely domestic ones. Ad-
ditionally, US-owned entities display the highest performance (4.4 per cent higher
TFP than non-US MNCs). For Germany, Arnold and Hussinger (2005) find that
the TFP distribution of multinationals stochastically dominates that of domestic
companies.4
An important concern with these studies is the potential endogeneity of multina-
tional status, if company-specific unobservable characteristics affect the probability
of a particular unit of observation being owned by a multinational company. The
literature has discussed many reasons why this could occur. For example, Criscuolo
and Martin (2009) find that MNCs systematically take over more productive en-
tities in the United Kingdom. In this chapter, we focus on changes in the TFP
advantage of multinationals following changes in the corporate tax rate. Unlike
previous studies concerned with the level of TFP advantage, we can simply use
subsidiary fixed effects to address the endogeneity of multinational status.5
4The authors use the Mannheim Innovation Panel and the Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on
Direct Investment (MiDi). For more information on the MiDi dataset, see Table A.13 in Appendix
A.
5While investigating productivity spillovers from MNCs to domestic companies in Venezuela,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) are able to control for company fixed effects. Their ownership
indicator changes over time. The same is true for Fukao et al. (2006) and Girma and Go¨rg
(2007), who investigate TFP growth in establishments acquired by foreign companies in Japan
and in the United Kingdom, respectively.
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2.2.2 Evidence on Profit Shifting
Multinational groups can shift income among affiliates resident in different coun-
tries in two main ways. First, they can alter the financing structure of the affiliates.
Multinational groups have an incentive to finance affiliates in high-tax countries
with debt, which may be provided by other affiliates in lower-taxed countries,
because debt interest payments are deductible from the tax base. The second
channel, which is the main focus of this chapter, is through transfer-pricing. If
subsidiaries within the same group trade with each other, then there is an incen-
tive for the subsidiary in the higher-taxed country to underprice the goods that it
sells to the subsidiary in the lower-taxed country, and to overprice the goods that
it purchases from the subsidiary in the lower taxed country. Goods may include
material inputs, intermediate products, or intangible goods such as royalties. The
reverse is true for the subsidiary in the low-tax country.
Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) analyse the effect of profit-shifting activities on
reported value added using the sector-level OECD Structural Analysis (STAN)
database.6 The dataset does not allow the authors to distinguish between MNCs
and domestic companies. The authors disentangle the effects of profit shifting from
the effects of changes in real economic activity by employing the ratio of total
value added to wage payments. Assuming a technology with constant elasticity of
substitution, they estimate the following econometric model:
Vijt =
[
1 + (ccsy)(1/(ρ+1))(
r˜it
wijt
)ρ/(ρ−1)
]
[1 + γcs(τit − τ−ijt )] + ²ijt (2.1)
where Vijt is the reciprocal of the observed labour share in country i, sector j and
time t; τit is the headline corporate tax rate in country i at time t and τ
−i
jt is the
6For more information on the STAN database, see Table A.8 in Appendix A.
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weighted average corporate tax rate for the foreign countries (excluding country i)
in period t for sector j. The coefficient ccsy is allowed to vary across country, sector
and time, whereas the coefficient γcs is allowed to vary across country and sector
only. The authors’ estimates of the CES function parameter c range from 2.7 to
3.57, whereas their estimate of the tax-shifting parameter γ range from -0.0033 to
-0.0042, depending on whether γ is fixed or if it varies across countries or sectors.
These estimates suggest that the size of profit shifting can be significant. The
authors report a back of the envelope calculation according to which 68 per cent
of the additional revenue created by a one per cent tax rate increase is lost due to
profit shifting.
The literature has found both direct and indirect evidence of manipulation of
transfer-prices at the firm level. Clausing (2003) uses the Bureau of Labour Statis-
tics data on US international trade export and import prices. The data allow one
to distinguish between intrafirm trade and ‘arm’s length’ trade. She finds that
a one per cent lower statutory tax rate in the foreign country is associated with
0.8 per cent lower intrafirm export prices to, and 0.8 per cent higher intrafirm
import prices from, the foreign country. In addition, Bernard et al. (2006) use
the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transactions Database which links individ-
ual trade transactions to firms in the United States between 1993–2000. The data
record whether the transactions take place at ‘arm’s length’ or between ‘related
parties’. The authors create for each related party price, the price wedge which
is equal to the difference between the log of a representative ‘arm’s-length’ trade
price minus the log of the ‘related party price’. They find that a one percentage
point decrease in the host country (average effective) tax rate is associated with
an increase of 0.55 to 0.66 points in the price wedge. Other literature that finds
evidence of transfer-pricing includes Swenson (2001) and Overesch (2006).
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Two recent contributions find indirect evidence of transfer-pricing manipulation
using European data. Weichenrieder (2009) finds indirect evidence of transfer-
price manipulation analysing German inbound FDI. He finds that an increase in
the home country’s tax rate of 10 percentage points increases the return on assets
for the German subsidiary by half a percentage point, which is roughly a 10 per cent
increase. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use the AMADEUS dataset,7 the European
sub-sample of the ORBIS dataset. Their sample consists of subsidiaries located
in Europe that belong to multinational groups whose parents are also located in
Europe, and their parent companies. They find that European multinationals’
semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory corporate tax
rate is -1.3, while profit-shifting costs are estimated to be 0.6 per cent of the tax
base.8
2.3 Data
The sample is drawn from ORBIS, a database recording balance sheet and profit
and loss account items for companies all over the world. The dataset is created
by Bureau van Dijk (2007) and is based on the mandatory information from filed
and publicly available accounts. The ORBIS unit of observation is an individual
company, which may be a subsidiary of a larger group.9
The comparison between the behaviour of MNCs and domestic firms when the
7Fore more details on AMADEUS, see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
8The sample used in this chapter is different from the sample used in Huizinga and Laeven
(2008). As detailed in Table B.1, we start from a sample of about 900,000 companies as we
drop small and very small firms (with assets smaller than 2,000 EUR or less than one employee)
from the general sample. Additionally, we only consider companies with at least three years of
consecutive data for EBIT and costs of employees. We also drop very big MNCs and very small
domestic companies so that the group of domestic entities acts as a control group.
9For more information on ORBIS, see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
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corporate tax rate changes will be the source of our identification strategy: the
total factor productivity advantage of multinationals relative to domestic firms is
expected to increase after a tax cut.
To implement this comparison, firms must be classified as either multinational or
domestic. This can be done in ORBIS, as it provides information on the share-
holders and subsidiaries of the company, on shareholders’ type (that is, individual
or corporate) and country of residence. We classify firms as multinationals if they
are owned by a corporate shareholder (with more than 50 per cent of their capital)
either resident abroad or owning subsidiaries in at least one other foreign country.
The rest of the companies for which adequate ownership information is provided
are classified as domestic. For a more detailed description of how we derive the
ownership structure of each firm, see Appendix B.
We restrict our analysis to companies that are classified to the manufacturing
sector to reduce conceptual and empirical problems in measuring productivity in
the non-manufacturing sectors.10 We eliminate very large multinationals and very
small domestic companies in terms of total assets to obtain a sample of more
comparable entities in both groups. We keep only companies with at least three
consecutive years of observations between 1998 and 2004.11
The sample consists of 16,022 firms (85,606 observations) over the period 1998–2004.
The geographical distribution of these companies is given in Table 2.1, where firms
10Each country uses a specific industrial classification system for cataloguing the industries of
the companies filing accounts with the official registries. All company accounts filed in a given
country, therefore, indicate the company’s sector of activity with this national code. ORBIS
matches this code with the NACE code (Rev 1.1) for each firm. For the manufacturing sector,
the NACE code ranges between 15.00 and 40.00. For more information, see Appendix B.
11See Appendix B for a more in depth analysis of how we created the sample.
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are divided between multinational and domestic entities. In Belgium, Finland,
France, and United Kingdom the proportion of MNCs is not far from that of do-
mestic firms. In Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden domestic companies
represent nearly, or more than, two-thirds of all companies, depending on the coun-
try. The Czech Republic is an exception: about 67 per cent of the sample belongs
to a multinational group.12
The country coverage of our sample can be explained as follows. As shown in
Table B.1 and as explained in detail in Appendix B,13 after a thorough cleaning
and after selecting firms with a known ownership structure, we are left with about
120,000 companies. We then select only manufacturing firms14 and we drop host
countries with a small sample size (less than 15 domestic or multinational com-
panies).15 Finally, we make the sample of the MNCs and of the domestics more
comparable so that the domestics can be used as a control group. We drop very
small domestic companies and very big multinationals.16
The literature suggests that companies owned by MNCs are systematically bigger
than their domestic counterparts (Flanagan (2006)). Our sample is no exception.
In every country, firms affiliated to an international group display on average a
larger size in terms of value added, fixed assets, and number of employees (see
Table 2.2).17
12The results remain robust to the exclusion of the Czech Republic from the sample (see Section
2.4.3).
13See the section on Financial data.
14This is a difference with Chapter 1.
15These two last requirements eliminate countries such as Germany which have a small coverage
in ORBIS.
16For more details, see the section on Financial data in Appendix B.
17The Czech Republic and Poland are exceptions when size is measured by the number of
employees. Domestic companies in these transitional economies might still have a large labour
force which is relatively unproductive, as suggested in Table 2.4. For robustness checks excluding
the Czech Republic and Poland, see Section 2.4.3.
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In this analysis, changes in the statutory corporate tax rate identify the effect of
profit shifting by MNCs on their measured total factor productivity. As depicted
in Table 2.3, the variations are mainly cuts. Belgium reduced its rate from 40 per
cent to 34 per cent in 2003. More gradual cuts happened in the Czech Republic
where the rate was decreased from 35 per cent in 1998 to 28 per cent in 2004, in
France where the tax rate was reduced from 42 per cent to 34 per cent between
1998 and 2002, in Poland were the rate was lowered gradually by 17 percentage
points and in Italy where the tax rate dropped in stages from 41.2 per cent to
37 per cent within the period 2000–2004. Smaller changes happened in Finland,
United Kingdom, and Spain.
2.4 Empirical Model and Main Results
The purpose of this study is to look at how the measured TFP of multinational
companies is affected by transfer-pricing manipulation and hence by the host coun-
try’s corporate tax rate. Total factor productivity can be affected by other country-
specific factors for which one can control only partially. We consider a change in
the statutory corporate tax rate. Multinationals can react to a change in the
statutory corporate tax rate by increasing or decreasing the extent to which they
shift profits abroad. Domestic firms do not have this opportunity. They cannot
engage in the manipulation of transfer-prices but, at the same time, they are af-
fected by all the other host-country- specific factors (for example, infrastructure,
regulations), which also affect the resident multinationals.
In our sample, tax rate changes occur at different points in time and in different
countries. Additionally, some of the tax cuts did not happen in one year, but rather
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gradually over a longer period. In this study, we identify the effect of transfer-
pricing manipulation on multinationals’ TFP using a dummy variable indicating
multinational status interacted with the corporate tax rate of the host country.
This approach has not been implemented previously in the profit-shifting literature.
It is a robust method as, through the inclusion of domestic firms, it controls for
unobserved factors affecting multinational and domestic companies at the same
time. We further control for firm-level fixed effects which are likely to be correlated
with MNC status.
2.4.1 TFP Measurement
We consider a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
Yi,t = Ai,tK
αK
i,t L
αL
i,t (2.2)
where i indexes a firm, and t a year. Yi,t is value added. Our main measure of value
added is constructed as reported earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus
reported costs of employees. In our robustness checks we also consider sales minus
costs of materials as an alternative measure of value added.18 Ki,t is capital stock.
In our main specification, we measure capital as the book value of fixed assets, but
we also consider the book value of tangible fixed assets as an alternative measure.
Li,t is the number of employees.
Taking logarithms of equation (2.2) and rearranging,
ln(Ai,t) = ln(Yi,t)− αK ln(Ki,t)− αLln(Li,t) (2.3)
18The UK companies do not report costs of materials. Hence, we drop them when using this
second measure of value added.
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Measurement of log TFP (that is, ln(Ai,t)) requires estimates of the parameters
αK and αL. The literature reports two main ways of obtaining these estimates.
19
The factor share approach calculates the parameters from cost share data for each
firm.20 Assuming that the firm maximises profits, the first order conditions for
optimal input choices imply that αK =
rK
Y
and αL =
wL
Y
, where r is the cost of
capital and w is the wage. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, we
also have αK = 1−αL = 1− wLY , so that this approach only requires data on wage
bills and value added, both of which are available in ORBIS.
The production function approach estimates these parameters from a regression of
log value added on log capital and log labour, and hence estimates log TFP as the
residual of this estimated production function.21
The main results that we present in Section 2.4.2 are based on a version of the cost
share approach, but we also present results for estimated production functions in
Section 2.4.3 as a robustness check.
Imposing constant returns to scale in (2.3), we then obtain our main measure of
log TFP as:
ln(Ai,t) = ln(
Yi,t
Li,t
)− αK ln(Ki,t
Li,t
) (2.4)
The parameter αK is measured separately for each country-industry pair, as the
mean value of one minus the share of labour costs in value added for firms in that
country and industry.22
19See Van Biesebroeck (2008) for a review of the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
20See Caves et al. (1982).
21See for example Griliches and Mairesse (1998) and Klette (1999).
22 Industry here is defined as a sub-sector of manufacturing industry. We have defined three
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Table 2.4 shows that the unconditional mean TFP and labour productivity of
multinationals are significantly higher than those of domestic firms in all coun-
tries.23 A mean-comparison t-test reveals that the MNCs’ advantage relative to
domestic companies in both total factor and labour productivity is significant at
the one per cent level for all countries, except for Sweden where the difference in
labour productivity is significant at the 5 per cent level.
2.4.2 Main Results
We estimate a regression model to assess how changes in the statutory corporate
tax rate affect the measured TFP of companies owned by multinational groups
relative to those of domestic companies:
ln(Ai,t) = β1(multii ∗ τc,t) + β2(Cc ∗ Tt) + fi + εi,t (2.5)
where c indexes a country, multii is a time-invariant dummy variable indicating
that a firm belongs to a multinational group, and τc,t is the statutory corporate
tax rate in the home country in year t; (Cc ∗Tt) are country-year dummy variables
which control inter alia for different inflation rates in different countries;24 fi is an
unobserved time-invariant company-specific effect which might be correlated with
multinational status; εi,t is an idiosyncratic shock.
sub-sectors on the basis of the NACE code (Rev 1.1). For more details, see Appendix B. The
values of αK range from 0.13 to 0.37 with an overall mean of 0.21. In column 4 of Table 2.7,
we also run the regression with αK which is calculated at the country-industry level but differs
between multinational and domestic companies. The resulting estimates do not change.
23As we would expect, the difference between TFP of multinational and domestic companies
is higher in Table 2.4 than reported in the previous literature (see Section 2.2.1). This is because
the literature conditions on other factors which we believe are not correlated with the tax factor
(for example, R&D).
24This is a simpler alternative to deflating nominal values country by country. Country-year
dummies also control for country-specific macro effects.
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We allow the extent to which the productivity of MNCs differs from that of do-
mestic enterprises to vary with the host country corporate income tax rate. As
discussed earlier, we expect the productivity advantage of multinationals to in-
crease following a reduction in the host country tax rate. This would be consistent
with a negative value of the parameter β1.
This assumes that other relevant countries do not cut their corporate tax rate at
the same time. The incentive for MNCs to transfer profits out of a country also
depends on tax rates in the countries where the MNCs of our sample own sub-
sidiaries and more specifically on the difference in the tax rates between country C
and country G. If many of the relevant countries cut their rates simultaneously and
we do not control for it, we would have an omitted variable problem and the bias
in our estimate of β1 could be large.
25 Table 2.3 shows that many countries of our
sample cut their corporate tax rates; however it confirms that corporate tax rate
changes were not synchronised during our sample period. Huizinga and Laeven
(2008) construct a weighted average of tax rates for all countries where an individ-
ual multinational has affiliates. We do not follow this approach here because our
sample only has partial coverage of multinational groups (see Appendix B). The
weighted average constructed in Huizinga and Laeven (2008) displays the same
problem: their sample only includes European subsidiaries of European multina-
tionals.
25This is likely to be an upward bias. Consequently, our estimate of β1 will be an upper bound
for the true population parameter. If we admit there are adjustment costs and (or) expectations,
past and future values of other countries’ tax rate could be relevant and considered as omitted
variables in equation (2.5). We estimated a dynamic version of equation (2.5) but the statistical
tests used did not provide any evidence that a dynamic specification would fit the data better.
Results are available with the authors.
83
We estimate equation (2.5) with a standard within-group estimator.26 This allows
us to control for unobserved firm-level fixed effects. The results are presented in
column 1 of Table 2.5. The coefficient on the interaction term between the MNC
dummy and the corporate tax rate is negative and highly significant. It implies
that a 10 percentage points increase in the host country tax rate decreases the
measured TFP of multinationals by about 10 per cent relative to domestic firms.
This is approximately the difference between the corporate tax rate in Italy (37.4
per cent) and Sweden (28 per cent) in 2004. At the sample mean,27 the result
implies that the TFP advantage of multinationals would increase by about 44 per
cent.28
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented so far are based on a TFP measure where value added is cal-
culated as EBIT plus cost of employees, and the capital stock is measured by the
book value of fixed assets. We first test whether our findings hold when we employ
other measures of value added and capital. Column 2 of Table 2.5 reports results
using value added calculated as sales minus costs of materials. Here the sample
drops to 52,692 observations because UK firms do not report costs of materials.
Column 3 shows results where the capital stock is measured as the book value
of tangible fixed assets. In both columns, the coefficient on the interaction term
between the MNC dummy variable and the corporate tax rate remains negative,
26Standard errors are clustered at the company level to allow for serial correlation within
the firm. We also clustered at the country, country-sector, and country-global owner levels to
allow for common country, country-sector, and country-global owner shocks. Coefficients remain
significant at 1%.
27See the last row of Table 2.4.
28At the sample mean, the initial TFP gap between multinational and domestic companies is
seven (see last row of Table 2.4). After a 10 percentage points cut in the corporate tax rate, the
total factor productivity of MNCs will increase by 10 per cent (see the coefficient estimate of
column 1 of Table 2.5) to 34.1. The gap between the TFP of multinationals and domestic firms
will increase to 10.1. This is an increase of about 44 per cent with respect to the initial gap.
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significant, and very close in magnitude to the main specification of column 1. So
far we have presented results for an unbalanced panel of firms. Column 4 of Table
2.5 shows that the coefficient on the interaction of the MNC dummy variable and
the tax rate remains negative and significant in a balanced panel where all firms
have all seven years of data.29
As a further robustness check, we restrict the analysis to a sub-sample of coun-
tries which have implemented substantial cuts in their corporate tax rate (that is,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland). Column 1 of Table 2.6
shows that in this sub-sample, the coefficient on the variable of interest stays neg-
ative, significant, and very close in magnitude to the main specification of Table
2.5. A 10 percentage points increase in the corporate tax rate would reduce the
TFP of multinationals relative to domestic firms by about 11 per cent. Columns 2
to 6 estimate equation (2.5) on separate sub-samples for these individual countries.
The estimated coefficients remain negative and significant (except for Belgium),
although with differing magnitudes. This is not particularly surprising as many
other country-specific tax provisions (for example, controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) rules) and firm-specific factors (for example, location of affiliates) may af-
fect the degree to which MNCs can engage in profit shifting.
One feature we notice is that the estimated coefficient is consistently larger for
the two transitional economies. Column 7 of Table 2.6 tests the robustness of our
results to the exclusion of the Czech Republic and Poland. The key coefficient
remains negative and significant although smaller in magnitude: a 10 percentage
points cut in the corporate tax rate would here reduce the TFP of multinational
29In this sample all firms from the Czech Republic are necessarily dropped, as we do not have
Czech data for all seven years.
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companies by about 6 per cent.
Subsidiaries of multinational companies are known to be larger than the average
domestic firm (Lipsey (2002)). In column 1 of Table 2.7, we rule out that the effect
picked up by the multinational dummy is in fact a size effect. Whilst the negative
impact of the tax rate for multinational companies remains strong and highly sig-
nificant, it shows that the size effect is insignificant.30 In the same table, we allow
for domestic and multinational companies to be different across the economic cy-
cle. Column 2 shows that the tax rate does not proxy the economic cycle.31 Also,
real productivity of multinational companies could respond differently to tax rate
cuts. For example, multinationals might be quicker in increasing their productivity
because they can adjust their investment decisions faster. Devereux and Griffith
(2003) explain that conditional on the discrete investment choice (that is, where
to locate), marginal investment decisions (that is, the size of investment) depend
on the EMTR. The latter is a measure of the effect of taxes on the cost of capi-
tal. It accounts not only for the statutory corporate tax rate, but also for capital
depreciation allowances and different forms of financing. In column 3 of Table 2.7
we allow for the effect of the EMTR32 to be different between multinational and
domestic entities. The coefficient on the variable of interest stays negative and
not statistically different from one, but it increases in magnitude with respect to
the benchmark specification of Table 2.5 where we do not control for the EMTR.
Column 4 allows for a different αK between multinational and domestic compa-
nies. The key coefficient remains negative and even if lower, its magnitude is not
30The size dummy takes value one when the log(total assets) is bigger than the sample median
log(total assets) for at least four years. It is a time-invariant variable. The model in column 1 is
also tested with a time-variant size dummy. The estimates do not change.
31To control for the economic cycle, we employ the World Bank Development Indicators on
inflation, GDP growth, and unemployment rates.
32For more details on how the EMTR is built, see Devereux and Griffith (2003). Effective
marginal tax rates are taken from Devereux et al. (2008).
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significantly different from the estimate of the benchmark specification of Table 2.5.
If after a tax cut multinational companies systematically buy highly productive
domestic entities, our estimates will be upward biased. To control for this effect, we
identify companies involved in operations of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) dur-
ing the sample period using a dataset called ZEPHYR.33 Unfortunately, because
of a lack of information, we are not always able to identify whether a company has
changed its ownership status after an M&A deal. Therefore, in column 5 of Table
2.7 we drop all companies involved in some sort of M&A operations between 1998
and 2004. Our results remain strongly robust to the exclusion of firms which have
potentially changed their ownership status in response to a change in the corporate
tax rate.
In Table 2.8, we show that our results are not sensitive to the use of the factor
share approach to measure TFP. As an alternative, we combine equations (2.4)
and (2.5) and estimate an extended production function of the form
ln(
Yi,t
Li,t
) = αK ln(
Ki,t
Li,t
) + (2.6)
+β1(multii ∗ τc,t) + β2(Cc ∗ Tt) + fi + εi,t
In column 1 of Table 2.8, we report within-group estimates of equation (2.6). The
coefficient of the key interaction term remains negative, highly significant, and
very close in magnitude to the results of Table 2.5. The estimated value of αK is
somewhat lower than suggested by the cost share data (see Footnote 22). The pro-
duction function approach allows us to relax the constant returns to scale (CRS)
33ZEPHYR is also compiled by Bureau van Dijk as ORBIS. It is therefore possible to merge
the two datasets and identify some but not all ownership changes occurred during the sample
period. For a description of ZEPHYR, see Table A.11 in Appendix A. For a description of how
we employed and merged ZEPHYR with ORBIS, see Appendix B.
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assumption easily by adding the term α1ln(Ki,t) on the right-hand side of equation
(2.6). The results shown in column 2 of Table 2.8 confirm that our main findings
hold when we do not impose CRS: a 10 percentage points cut in the tax rate would
induce MNCs to increase their measured TFP by about 9 per cent.
In summary, tables 2.6 to 2.8 indicate that the effect of changes in the tax rate on
the TFP gap between multinational and domestic companies is robust to various
sensitivity checks.
2.5 Conclusions
We find evidence consistent with multinational companies shifting revenues into
low-tax countries and shifting input costs into high-tax jurisdictions. This has
implications for measured TFP. In particular, if MNCs engage in transfer-price
manipulation, the difference in TFP between multinationals and domestic com-
panies will tend to be underestimated in high-tax countries and overestimated in
low-tax countries.
We estimate that a 10 percentage points increase in the host country tax rate
decreases the measured TFP of multinationals by about 10 per cent relative to do-
mestic firms. At the sample mean, this implies a 44 per cent increase in the TFP
advantage of multinationals. This has potentially important implications when
comparing measured TFP differences across countries with high and low corporate
tax rates. If a high-tax country such as Italy were to reduce its statutory corpo-
rate tax rate (37.4 per cent) to the level of Sweden (28 per cent), multinational
companies located in Italy would increase their measured TFP relative to domestic
companies by about 10 per cent.
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Table 2.1: Ownership Structure
Country Domestic MNCs Total
Belgium 485 382 867
56 44
Czech Republic 40 81 121
33 67
Finland 112 117 229
49 51
France 1,434 1,381 2,815
51 49
Italy 1,575 514 2,089
75 25
Norway 361 131 492
73 27
Poland 209 141 350
60 40
Spain 2,272 558 2,830
80 20
Sweden 1,015 534 1,549
66 34
United Kingdom 2,666 2,014 4,680
57 43
Total 10,169 5,853 16,022
63 37
(i) Number of firms. (ii) Percentages in italics.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics –Unconditional Means
Country Value added Fixed assets Number of employees
MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics
Belgium 4,672 2,487 4,450 2,608 81 49
Czech Republic 3,636 3,009 6,388 4,417 197 270
Finland 6,374 4,205 4,734 4,227 107 86
France 5,029 3,413 3,430 2,041 95 72
Italy 3,857 2,862 3,064 3,426 78 61
Norway 4,686 3,188 3,790 2,643 70 55
Poland 3,353 2,823 5,663 4,060 205 227
Spain 4,206 2,156 4,597 3,017 80 50
Sweden 3,994 2,421 3,994 2,741 84 57
United Kingdom 4,642 3,904 3,770 2,944 98 99
Total 4,562 3,013 3,870 2,905 94 73
(i) Values for value added and fixed assets are in thousands of US$ 2000 prices. (ii)Values for the number
of employees are headcounts. Value added is calculated as EBIT plus costs of employees.
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Table 2.3: Statutory Corporate Tax Rates
Country Rates Years
(per cent)
Belgium 40 1998–2002
34 2003–2004
Czech Republic 35 1998–1999
31 2000–2003
28 2004
Finland 28 1998–1999
29 2000–2004
France 41.7 1998
40 1999
36.7 2000
35.3 2001
34.3 2002–2004
Italy 41.2 1998–2000
40.3 2001–2002
38.2 2003
37.3 2004
Norway 28 1998-2004
Poland 36 1998
34 1999
30 2000
28 2001–2002
27 2003
19 2004
Spain 35 1998–2003
35.3 2004
Sweden 28 1998–2004
United Kingdom 31 1998
30 1999–2004
Sample Mean 34.3
Table 2.4: TFP and Labour Productivity –Unconditional Means
Country TFP % Difference Labour productivity % Difference
MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics
Belgium 38 32 18*** 65 56 16***
Czech Republic 8 6 33*** 36 18 100***
Finland 30 24 25*** 68 53 28***
France 37 34 9*** 63 56 12***
Italy 26 20 30*** 63 56 12***
Norway 45 35 29*** 83 65 28***
Poland 10 7 43*** 44 28 57***
Spain 25 18 39*** 64 50 28***
Sweden 21 18 17*** 54 49 10**
United Kingdom 33 26 27*** 56 44 27***
Total 31 24 29*** 60 50 20***
(i)Values are in thousands of US$ 2000 prices. Labour productivity is calculated as (EBIT plus costs
of employees) / number of employees. (ii) % difference is calculated as follows: (MNCs’ productivity -
domestics’ productivity)/domestics’ productivity. (iii)*** 1% significance level and ** 5% significance
level for a mean-comparison t-test where H0: mean(MNCs)-mean(domestics)= 0 and Ha: mean(MNCs)-
mean(domestics)> 0.
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Table 2.5: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.034*** -1.088*** -1.023*** -0.798***
(0.210) (0.232) (0.208) (0.240)
Company fixed effects X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X X X
Observations 85,606 52,692 84,306 39,991
Number of companies 16,022 10,041 15,824 5,713
R-squared 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.00
(i) Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the company level. Model esti-
mated using within-groups estimator.
(ii) Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (2.4). In all columns, except
for column 2, value added is defined as EBIT plus costs of employees. In column 2,
value added is defined as sales minus costs of materials. In all columns, except for
column 3, capital is measured as fixed assets. In column 3, capital is measured as
tangible fixed assets. (iii) Column 4 reports results for a balanced panel where each
firm has seven years of data. The Czech Republic drops out of this sample. (iv) ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1%. ∗∗ significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
Table 2.6: Results by Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FR, IT, BE, France Italy Belgium Czech Rep Poland All except
CZ, PL CZ & PL
MNC dummy * -1.075*** -0.684*** -1.698*** -0.228 -4.873*** -2.866*** -0.622***
corporate tax rate (0.213) (0.243) (0.754) (0.346) (2.406) (0.821) (0.193)
Company fixed effects X X X X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 33,185 14,483 11,442 5,006 596 1,658 83,352
Number of companies 6,242 2,815 2,089 867 121 350 15,551
R-squared 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.38 0.00
(i)Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at company level. Model estimated using a within-groups estimator. (ii)
Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (2.4). Value added is defined as EBIT plus costs of employees. Capital is
measured as the book value of fixed assets. (iii) In column 1, the sample contains five countries which have substantially
reduced their corporate tax rate: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Poland. (iv) In column 7, the sample
includes all countries of column 1 of Table 2.5 except the Czech Republic and Poland. (v) ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%. ∗∗
significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 2.7: Variations of the Main Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.094*** -1.067*** -1.203*** -0.730*** -1.031***
(0.217) (0.228) (0.252) (0.199) (0.212)
Size dummy * corporate tax rate 0.242
(0.210)
MNC dummy * Inflation -0.012***
(0.004)
MNC dummy * GDP growth 0.001
(0.003)
MNC dummy * Unemployment rate -0.002
(0.004)
MNC dummy * EMTR 0.297
(0.328)
Company fixed effects X X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 85,606 85,606 85,606 85,606 84,119
Number of companies 16,022 16,022 16,022 16,068 15,753
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.096 0.078 0.097
(i)Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at company level. Model estimated using a within-
groups estimator. (ii) Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (2.4). Value added is defined
as EBIT plus costs of employees. Capital is measured as the book value of fixed assets. (iii) The
size dummy takes value 1 when the log(total assets) > median log(total assets). It is time invariant.
(iv) In column 4, αK is different for multinational and domestic firms. (v) In column 5, the sample
excludes companies which have undergone an M&A operation during the sample period. (vi) ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1%. ∗∗ significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
Table 2.8: Production Function Estimation
(1) (2)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.009*** -0.879***
(0.217) (0.201)
Log(fixed assets / employees) 0.139*** 0.435***
(0.007) (0.013)
Log(fixed assets) -0.380***
(0.012)
(Country*year) dummies X X
Company fixed effects X X
Observations 85,606 85,606
Number of companies 16,022 16,022
R-squared 0.04 0.10
(i) Dep. variable: EBIT+wage bill
no.employees
. (ii) Columns 1 and 2 esti-
mated using a within-groups estimator. (iii) Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at company level.
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Chapter 3
Tax Haven Activities and Tax
Liabilities of Multinational
Groups
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3.1 Introduction
The debate on the role of tax havens has lately gained great momentum, beyond
any expectations one might have entertained at the beginning of 2008. In the wake
of the credit crunch and the following severe economic downturn, with heavy gov-
ernment intervention, declining tax revenues, and pleas for new market regulation,
pressure on tax havens has mounted to unprecedented levels. Under the threat of
being placed on an OECD blacklist of “jurisdictions that have not committed to in-
ternationally agreed tax standard” on transparency, low-tax countries agreed just
before the Group of Twenty (G20) meeting of April 2009 to curtail bank secrecy
rules. The affected countries include Switzerland, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; tra-
ditionally they have been very reluctant to amend their rules on bank secrecy and
the exchange of information. In May 2009, Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco
were removed from the OECD list of uncooperative tax havens, after agreeing on
a timetable to implement the standards of transparency and effective exchanges of
information set out by the organisation. Now more and more low-tax jurisdictions
are signing treaties in accordance with the OECD principles on tax matters. In
June 2009, Bermuda signed its twelfth treaty (with the Netherlands) crossing the
OECD threshold between being a tax haven or not. The OECD moved Bermuda
to a list of jurisdictions that have substantially implemented the internationally
agreed tax standard. This is the list which includes Group of Eight (G8) coun-
tries. A month later, Luxembourg signed its twelfth treaty with Norway. These
are the first tax treaties satisfying OECD guidelines ever signed by Luxembourg
with another OECD member (OECD (2009)). In August 2009, the Cayman Is-
lands and the British Virgin Islands signed their twelfth bilateral agreements with
New Zealand and they now also appear in the OECD list of jurisdictions that have
substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard. At 28 August
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2009, the OECD list of jurisdictions that have not committed to internationally
agreed tax standard was empty. These developments concern mainly evasion of
personal taxation; therefore they are not likely to affect tax avoidance by multi-
national corporate groups. They are nonetheless a sign that in recent months tax
havens have come under unprecedented pressure.
More relevant for corporations, in May 2009 the US Presidency announced mea-
sures which could reduce the incentives for corporations to shift profits to tax
havens. The measures aim at preventing the use of the check-the-box rules to
avoid Sub-part F regulations for intra-group debt1. Additionally, they would dis-
allow expenses deductions associated with deferred foreign profits and they would
introduce a pooling system of foreign tax credits which should reduce tax planning
of multinationals (Shaviro (2009)).2
Critics of these proposals argue that the measures will reinforce the deviation of
the US tax system from those of most other countries. After Japan and the United
Kingdom adopted a territorial (exemption) system in 2009, the United States re-
mained the only major country with a worldwide taxation system on corporate
income (credit system). Under a territorial system which exempts foreign profits,
companies have an incentive to maximise overall the group profit by locating their
real activities and by shifting some of their earnings into low-tax jurisdictions. Un-
der a worldwide system of taxation, this incentive is smaller as foreign profits are
1Sub-part F of the US Internal Revenue Code was introduced in 1962 and it prescribes that
certain income earned by a controlled foreign corporation has to be taxed, even if it is not
repatriated (for example, income from intra-group loans). The check-the-box rules introduced
in 1996 allow for choosing whether certain entities are to be treated as separate corporations for
US tax purposes. The rules have unintentionally weakened Sub-part F (Shaviro (2009)).
2The measures are likely to be included in the 2009 US budget document. They have to be
approved by the Congress. For more details on the US legislation and the proposed changes, see
Shaviro (2009).
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taxed at the same rate as domestic profits when they are repatriated (Dharmapala
(2008)). This could imply a higher tax burden for companies headquartered in
credit countries.
Critics of tax havens argue that offshore tax centres erode tax revenues, undermine
fair competition, and dangerously reduce transparency. Other analysts suggest
that even though tax haven activity might reduce the tax burden of MNCs, it
enhances economic activity in nearby non-haven countries by lowering the cost of
capital (Desai et al. (2006a); Dharmapala (2008)). But are offshore low-tax juris-
dictions really important in reducing the tax burden of multinational groups and
hence in eroding the tax base of higher-tax countries?
This chapter studies whether in the aggregate MNCs are successful in reducing
their tax liabilities by shifting profits in tax havens. More specifically, it identifies
the effect of tax haven operations on the group tax bill, and it investigates whether
the presence of group operations in offshore low-tax jurisdictions reduce the tax
burden of the corporate group.
Despite a variety of contributions on the extent to which multinational companies
shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions through manipulation of transfer-prices and
(or) debt financing,3 direct evidence of the effect of tax haven operations on tax
liabilities is minimal. The emerging small body of literature focuses mainly on
3For contributions that report findings of direct evidence of transfer-pricing activities among
US multinationals, see Swenson (2001); Clausing (2003); Bernard et al. (2006). Altshuler and
Grubert (2002) and Desai et al. (2004), among others, find direct evidence of debt shifting
with US data. Huizinga et al. (2008) report evidence of debt shifting using European data
from AMADEUS. For more information on the dataset, see Table A.10 in Appendix A. Several
researchers find direct evidence of debt shifting using the German Bundesbank MiDi dataset
(see Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005); Buettner et al. (2006); Buettner and Wamser (2009)). For
more information on the dataset, see Table A.13 in Appendix A.
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US-owned companies (with the exception of Markle and Shackelford (2009)).
This chapter compares the marginal ETR of corporate groups headquartered in
credit countries with that of groups headquartered in exemption countries, where
the marginal ETR measures the increase in the tax liabilities when accounting prof-
its increase by one US dollar. Corporate groups whose ultimate owner is resident
in jurisdictions with a worldwide system are characterized by a higher ETR. In
particular, companies headquartered in the United States display the highest ETR.
The analysis is carried out by merging two datasets: ORBIS and ZEPHYR. OR-
BIS contains accounting data derived from profit and loss (P&L) accounts and
balance sheet items. In the online version of ORBIS used here, for each global
ultimate owner, the country of residence of its first-level subsidiaries is available.4
ZEPHYR contains information on M&A deals which may have changed the own-
ership structure of the group. Information includes acquisition and (or) sell-off
of affiliates in tax havens. Therefore, a time-varying ownership structure can be
created by merging ORBIS with ZEPHYR. Our sample consists of about 3,400
ultimate owners between 2003 and 2007 located in 15 countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A com-
mon problem of the previous literature is that the effect of tax haven operations
on tax liabilities is not identified properly because of endogeneity issues which are
not tackled. The decision to boost or to reduce tax haven activity is likely to
be influenced by both unobserved group fixed effects such as the ability of the
tax department, and by unobservable time-varying shocks likely to affect the tax
4The online version of ORBIS contains information on second- and further-level subsidiaries
but it is not possible to download it in a format which can be processed with standard econometric
softwares.
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liabilities simultaneously. Desai et al. (2006b) control for group fixed effects but
none of the studies in the literature controls for the simultaneous determination
of the tax bill and of tax haven activities. By merging two datasets and creating
a time-varying ownership structure, this cross-country research is able to investi-
gate tax payments of corporate groups with tax haven operations, whilst dealing
with the identification issues underlying the relationship between offshore low-tax
operations and tax liabilities.
Differently to Desai et al. (2006b), this chapter employs consolidated accounts and
therefore it identifies the determinants of the tax liabilities of the group instead of
the single affiliate. Unconsolidated accounts could lead to an overestimation of the
ETR. Suppose company A owns a subsidiary B located in a tax haven. Suppose
that A borrows US$ 100 from B and pays 10 per cent interest. The parent com-
pany can deduct interest payments from its tax base. If in the home country the
statutory corporate tax rate is 30 per cent and A reports a pre-tax profit of US$
100, then its ETR is 30 per cent.5 Suppose additionally that B reports profits only
from interest payments received, and that its relevant statutory corporate tax rate
is zero. If consolidated data are used, the profit of the tax haven subsidiary will
be added to the profit of the parent and the ETR will drop to 27 per cent.6 Ad-
ditionally, unconsolidated data only give a partial picture of how offshore low-tax
jurisdictions affect tax liabilities. In fact, a reduction in the tax bill of one affiliate
could be compensated for by an increased tax bill somewhere else in the group. By
failing to provide information on the tax liabilities of the whole group, unconsoli-
dated accounts are not suitable for comparing the tax burdens of corporate groups
resident in exemption countries with the tax burdens of companies headquartered
5[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10) ] = 0.30.
6[ 0.3∗(100−10)(100−10)+10 ] = 0.27.
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in credit countries.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. Section 3.3
presents the data used in the empirical section. Section 3.4 develops the empirical
model and discusses various econometric issues. Section 3.5 presents the results.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature
The emerging literature can be partitioned into the accounting literature describ-
ing country- or group-level ETRs (Markle and Shackelford (2009); Dyreng and
Lindsey (2009)) and the studies trying to establish a causal relationship between
affiliate-level tax payments and the tax haven operations of multinational firms
(Desai et al. (2006b)). The accounting literature is descriptive because it does not
control for observable characteristics of the firm such as profitability, which clearly
affects tax liabilities.
The accounting literature employs consolidated data whilst Desai et al. (2006b)
employ unconsolidated confidential affiliate-level data. Unfortunately, as discussed
in Section 3.1, unconsolidated data fail to provide a complete picture of the real
tax burden faced by a corporate group.
The literature differs across various dimensions but it has a common, important
problem. The common actor is that it does not deal with identification issues
arising from the simultaneous determination of tax liabilities and offshore low-tax
operations. This implies that the effect of tax haven operations is not correctly
identified.
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Markle and Shackelford (2009) describe country-level ETRs between 1988 and
2007 for 85 different countries. They employ consolidated accounting data from
OSIRIS.7 The authors distinguish aggregate country-level ETRs between domes-
tic and multinational firms using time-invariant ownership information for 2008.
OSIRIS contains information on tax haven subsidiaries. Given the time-invariant
nature of the ownership information, the research employs a pooled OLS. Markle
and Shackelford (2009) calculate the ETR as the ratio of book total tax expenses
divided by net income before taxes (NIBT). They employ only companies with
positive NIBT and positive tax charges.8 Regressing the ETR on a set of country
dummies identifying the location of the ultimate owner and of its subsidiaries, the
authors find that the ETR of corporate groups with tax haven affiliates is 0.5 per-
centage points lower than the ETR of the ultimate owners without low-tax offshore
operations.9 More specifically, the ETR of US firms with offshore low-tax opera-
tions is between 0.1 per cent and 0.7 per cent lower than that of US companies
without tax haven operations. For UK multinationals, the ETR of those with tax
haven operations is between 0.1 per cent and 0.2 per cent lower than the ETR of
companies without offshore low-tax jurisdictions. For countries with a territorial
system such as France and Germany, the ETR of the multinationals with tax haven
operations is 2.4 per cent and 0.1 per cent lower, respectively, than the ETR of
companies without tax haven operations. Also, within the same country multi-
nationals overall do not seem to enjoy a lower ETR than do domestic companies,
but multinationals domiciled in tax havens have a slightly lower worldwide ETR,
7OSIRIS is also produced by Bureau van Dijk. It contains financial information for listed
companies, banks, and insurance companies around the world. For more information on the
dataset, see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
8As explained in Section 3.4, this might lead to sample selection bias.
9The only exception is Japan.
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as explained above.10 Markle and Shackelford (2009) also investigate whether
companies headquartered in credit countries have a higher ETR with respect to
companies headquartered in exemption countries. They do not report results for
this analysis. They simply say that the additive dummy recording whether the
ultimate owner is resident in a credit country is not statistically significant.
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) estimate the worldwide, federal, and foreign tax bur-
dens on the corresponding worldwide, domestic, and foreign incomes of US-owned
multinationals. They use a panel of consolidated accounting data from Compustat
for the period 1995 to 2007.11 The time-varying presence of a corporate group
in low-tax jurisdictions is derived from Exhibit 21 of form 10-K submitted to the
US Security and Exchange Commission. Form 10-K is an annual report that pub-
licly traded companies incorporated in the United States are required to submit
according to the US federal securities laws. The form contains business and finan-
cial information, including audited financial statements. In particular, Exhibit 21
gathers information on the subsidiaries of the registrant, including their name and
location. Using an OLS estimator, the authors find that the effect of tax haven
operations on the worldwide tax charges of US multinationals is small. The world-
wide ETR (inclusive of US state taxes) for US multinationals is about 36 per cent.
For groups with at least one subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, the ETR is one
and a half percentage points lower than the ETR of other MNCs. Foreign taxes
on the foreign income of US multinationals are on average 26 per cent, but for
groups with tax haven operations the foreign ETR is about 3.2 percentage points
lower than the ETR of companies without those low-tax operations. The paper
also finds that the federal tax on foreign profits is on average 4.4 per cent with no
10Markle and Shackelford (2009).
11For more information on Compustat, see Table A.9 in Appendix A.
101
significant difference between companies with and without tax haven operations.
This measures the US federal taxes on repatriated profits. Operations in low-tax
jurisdictions do not seem to influence the federal ETR on domestic profits which
is 36 per cent at the mean.
The aforementioned studies are descriptive. They do not establish a causal rela-
tionship between tax haven operations and the tax burden. The presence in tax
havens could be proxying some other characteristics such as the unobserved ability
of the tax department to reduce the fiscal burden of the group effectively,12 or the
observable size and profitability of the company over which they do not have con-
trolled. Also, the presence in tax havens could be determined at the same time as
the tax burden. In this context, to prove a causal relationship between the fiscal
burden of a multinational group and its low-tax subsidiaries, one has to control
for the heterogeneity of observable characteristics such as profitability, intangibles
intensity, and size and for unobservable characteristics such as the aggressiveness
of the tax department. To this aim, a time-varying ownership structure is useful
as this allows the researcher to control for the unobservable group-level fixed effects.
Desai et al. (2006b) provide a quantification of the extent to which tax haven
operations reduce the tax burden of affiliates of US multinationals. Using group
dummies and affiliate dummies, they control for unobserved fixed effects. Unfortu-
nately, they do not control for the endogeneity of the decision to set up operations
in an offshore low-tax jurisdiction even if the data contain a time-varying own-
ership structure. They employ a panel of unconsolidated confidential accounts of
US-owned affiliates for the period from 1982 to 1999. The data are drawn from
12In this case, one would attribute a lower tax bill to the presence in tax havens when in fact,
the ability of the tax department determines both the tax bill and the decision to locate some
operations offshore.
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the affiliate-level confidential data of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.13 The
authors find that US firms use tax haven operations to reduce their domestic and
foreign tax bills. In general, affiliates whose parent company owns operations in
offshore regional tax centres reduce their ratio of taxes to sales by about 2 per
cent with respect to companies without operations in regional tax havens. More
specifically, the authors distinguish operations between small tax havens such as
the Cayman Islands and large tax havens such as Ireland and Switzerland. The
presence only in regional small tax havens reduces the tax bill by less than the
broader ownership of tax havens. At the same time, companies with many low-tax
affiliates are more likely to have operations in small tax havens, whilst groups with
many subsidiaries located in high-tax countries are more likely to have operations
in large tax havens also. The authors argue that these findings are consistent
with affiliates in large low-tax countries such as Ireland and Switzerland being
used to shift profits away from high-tax locations, and with affiliates in small tax
havens being employed to defer US taxation. Desai et al. (2006b) also show that
companies with operations in offshore territories (or belonging to a group which
owns subsidiaries in tax havens) are larger, more international, and have extensive
intra-firm trade and higher R&D intensity.
3.3 Data
This chapter investigates the effect of tax haven operations on group tax payments
using ORBIS, a database recording balance sheet and profit and loss account items
for companies all over the world. The dataset is created by Bureau van Dijk and is
based on the mandatory information from filed and publicly available accounts.14
13For more information on the dataset, see Table A.12 in Appendix A.
14For more information on the dataset, see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
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The online version of ORBIS used here15 includes only large and very large com-
panies.16 The unit of observation is a group of companies which file consolidated
accounts together and under the name of a parent company, called the global ul-
timate owner (GUO). The GUO is a company that ultimately owns at least one
subsidiary (with at least a share of more than 50 per cent of capital). For the
definition used by Bureau van Dijk, at least one of the shareholders of the GUO
must be known and this shareholder cannot own more than 50 per cent.
The sample consists of 3,389 industrial corporate groups17 over five years (2003–2007)
for a total of 12,876 observations distributed across 15 OECD countries.18 The dis-
tribution of the observations across years is shown in Table 3.3. There are large
differences in the number of companies reported for each country (see Table 3.4).
Differences are due to different reporting requirements and different industrial
structures. For example, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have
large multinationals, whilst countries such as Spain are characterised by smaller
and less internationalised groups. US and UK global ultimate owners represent
about 55 per cent and 19 per cent of the sample respectively, together forming a
total of almost 75 per cent. More than half of the remaining quarter are German,
French, and Swedish groups.19
Following Desai et al. (2006b), 38 countries are classified as tax havens and di-
15The version of ORBIS used in this chapter has been accessed on 16 October 2008.
16Bureau van Dijk defines large and very large companies as those having operating revenue
greater than 13 million $US (10 million EUR) or total assets greater than 26 million $US (20
million EUR) or a number of employees greater then 150 headcounts.
17This excludes GUOs which are insurance companies, financial companies, banks, hedge funds,
private equity firms, venture capital firms, mutual and pension funds, and public authorities. The
different sectors represented in the sample are showed in Table 3.1.
18For more details on the sample construction, see Table 3.2.
19The observations are less than 27,120 (see last rows of Table 3.2) because companies with
only one year of data are dropped in a dynamic model with one lagged dependent variable. Also,
the use of the instrumental variables and their lags reduces the sample.
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vided between large and small low-tax jurisdictions (see Table 3.5). Among oth-
ers, the former group includes two OECD countries (Ireland and Switzerland) and
two Asian tigers (Hong Kong and Singapore). Small tax havens include differ-
ing jurisdictions ranging from Caribbean islands such as the Bahamas and the
Cayman Islands to archipelagos in the Indian Ocean such as Mauritius and the
Seychelles, through to European small countries such as Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg, and Malta.20
In the sample, the most popular low-tax jurisdictions are large countries such as
Switzerland, Singapore, Ireland, and Hong Kong reflecting the wider opportunities
of their larger and more developed economies (see Table 3.6). Ultimate owners of
all 15 countries are present in the four large low-tax jurisdictions. More specif-
ically, Switzerland has a prominent role among continental European countries.
It is the most popular low-tax location for Austrian, German, Danish, Finnish,
French, Dutch, and Swedish companies. Ireland is the favourite destination of UK
companies whilst Singapore is the prevailing choice for US multinationals, followed
by Hong Kong and Ireland. Among small tax havens, the most popular is Luxem-
bourg. It is the first destination for Belgian GUOs whilst remaining important for
Spanish, Greek (second destination), French, and Swiss companies (third destina-
tion). Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Barbados are
also prominent small tax havens. Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and Barbados are
strongly dominated by US companies whilst about one fourth of the subsidiaries
in the British Virgin Islands are UK-owned.
20Table 3.5 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax jurisdictions. Some tax havens such
as the Maldives, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table 3.5 includes
only the offshore fiscal centres in which the ultimate owners in the sample own a subsidiary.
Interestingly, for US global ultimate owners, the pattern of tax haven operations is similar to the
one in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) who find that US companies locate their low-tax subsidiaries
mainly in Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland, Barbados, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands (see
Table 3.6).
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The identification strategy of this chapter relies on measuring the change in the
consolidated tax bill after tax haven operations have been expanded or reduced:
groups with more extensive offshore operations are expected to have a lower tax
bill. To implement this strategy, the extent of tax haven operations of each group
must be identified. This can be done in ORBIS as it provides information on the
country of residence of the immediate subsidiaries of the ultimate owner filing the
consolidated accounts. Unfortunately, ORBIS contains only time-invariant infor-
mation on the ownership structure.21 To create a time-varying variable recording
the number of subsidiaries in offshore low-tax centres, the dataset is merged with
ZEPHYR.22 The latter contains M&A deals that occurred between 1999 and 2007.
By merging the two datasets, it is possible to create a time-varying ownership
structure using ORBIS ownership information as a starting point. In other words,
if a company in ORBIS appears in ZEPHYR as an acquirer and (or) as a vendor of
a subsidiary located in a tax haven, a time-varying variable recording the number
of subsidiaries in offshore centres can be built. For an example of how such a
variable as been constructed see Table 3.8.
The datasets used have some limitations. First, the variable recording the number
of tax haven subsidiaries is built starting from the static information recorded in
ORBIS. This includes only first-level subsidiaries. The empirical analysis of this
chapter is carried out using a difference-GMM and therefore the effect of tax haven
subsidiaries is identified only using the corporate groups which have increased or
decreased the number of their first level low-tax subsidiaries during the sample pe-
riod. It is important, however, to recognise that if a company has only second and
21The information refers to the last available year, mainly 2007.
22ZEPHYR is also produced by Bureau Van Dijk. For a summary of the final dataset down-
loading and construction, see tables 3.2 and 3.7. For more information on the dataset, see Table
A.11 in Appendix A.
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further level tax haven subsidiaries, it will not be used to produce the estimates.
It is difficult to understand in which direction the bias would be. Companies with
first level tax haven subsidiaries could be very special with respect to the average
company with low-tax offshore operations. They could also be thought of being
more aggressive tax planners. In this case, the results would overestimate the effect
of tax haven subsidiaries for the whole population of companies in the economy.
On the contrary, it could be possible that corporate groups without first-level tax
haven subsidiaries but with less apparent and more complicated structures23 have
greater opportunities to shift profits to low-tax offshore jurisdictions. In this case,
the results would underestimate the real effect. Second, the time-varying changes
in the variable are built using ZEPHYR. The latter only records M&A deals.
It does not record whether a new subsidiary has been created. More generally,
there might be an underestimation of their presence in tax havens. Despite the
drawbacks of the sample used here, this is one of the first cross-country datasets
constructed with time-varying information on tax haven operations.
Descriptive statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 3.9. Ultimate owners
are classified as multinationals if they own foreign subsidiaries (with more than 50
per cent of their capital). The rest of the companies are classified as domestic. For
descriptive purposes, multinationals are then classified further into two groups:
those with at least one subsidiary in tax havens and those without any operations
in offshore centres24 (see Table 3.10). In the sample, multinationals are evenly
split between those with and those without first-level tax haven subsidiaries. Each
of the two groups represents about 40 per cent of the total GUOs. Most of the
individual countries are characterised by a higher proportion of multinational ulti-
23A typical structure would see a first level subsidiary in a non tax haven country such as the
United Kingdom or the Netherlands and then a second level subsidiary in a tax haven.
24See Table 3.5 for a classification of tax havens.
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mate owners without offshore first-level subsidiaries, with the exception of Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Multinationals with operations in tax havens are on average not only the most
profitable but also the least likely to run losses (see tables 3.10 and 3.11). Ad-
ditionally, their losses are the smallest on average. These factors explain their
higher tax bill (divided by total assets): higher profits lead to higher tax charges,
ceteris paribus. Ultimate owners with subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions are also
the largest in terms of number of employees and the number of total subsidiaries,
including non-tax havens subsidiaries.
3.4 Empirical Model and Main Empirical Chal-
lenges
The purpose of this chapter is to assess how tax haven operations impact on the tax
bill of a corporate group. Tax payments can be affected by various characteristics
of the tax base such as deductions for labour costs and interest payments. Given
these characteristics, a group with tax haven operations has the ability to reduce
its tax bill to a relatively greater extent than can groups without operations in
low-tax jurisdictions. To motivate the empirical analysis illustrated later in this
chapter, the consolidated profit of a corporate group with operations in a tax haven
can be described with a stylised model where a MNC headquartered in country H
owns a subsidiary in a low-tax country F and tH > tF :
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Π∗ = piA − tH [piA(1− ξ − s1)− s2K − s3I]+
−tF [s1piA + s2K + s3I]+
−γ1
2
s21 −
γ2
2
s22 −
γ3
2
s23
(3.1)
piA is accounting profit which is generated only in the home country H; tH is the
statutory corporate tax rate in the home country and tF is the statutory corporate
tax rate in a foreign country F. ξ represents the proportion of accounting profit
which does not form part of the taxable profit; K represents consolidated total
assets. The amount of profit shifted to low-tax jurisdictions can either be propor-
tional to accounting profit (s1) and (or) be associated with other characteristics of
the firm such as size K (s2) or the amount of intangible assets I (s3). Two corpo-
rate groups with the same profitability may be able to shift different amounts of
profits around the world. In particular, larger firms may have more opportunities
to relocate earnings in one of their many subsidiaries. The same can be said for
intangible assets whose role in profit-shifting activities has been widely recognised
in the literature. For US-owned MNCs, Grubert (2003) argues that half of the
difference between their profitability in low-tax and high-tax subsidiaries can be
explained by transfer of intellectual property. The terms γ1
2
s21,
γ2
2
s22, and
γ3
2
s23 rep-
resent the cost of profit shifting entailed by the resources needed to set up tax
avoidance schemes and by the legal expenses arising if such schemes are contested
by the tax authorities or by the minority shareholders. Such costs are assumed
not to be tax deductible.
Suppose the only decision variables are the amounts of profit shifted from H to
F. The firm maximises its overall profit by choosing to shift optimal amounts of
profits s∗1, s
∗
2, and s
∗
3 such that:
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s∗1 =
(tH − tF )piA
γ1
(3.2)
s∗2 =
(tH − tF )K
γ2
(3.3)
s∗3 =
(tH − tF )I
γ3
(3.4)
Equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) indicate that the corporate group shifts profits to
the low-tax jurisdiction F insofar as tH > tF .
The data described in Section 3.3 do not contain information on the flows of profits
between the low-tax subsidiaries and the ultimate owner. Only the number of tax
havens subsidiaries is available. Given the restrictions placed on this analysis by
the data, there are two ways in which the profit-shifting functions s1, s2, and s3 can
be modeled. First, profit shifting to tax havens can be represented as a function of
a dummy recording whether the corporate group has at least one subsidiary in tax
havens.25 Second, profit shifting can be thought of as a general quadratic function
of the number of tax havens subsidiaries such that:
s1 = δ1n+ δ2n
2 (3.5)
s2 = φ1n+ φ2n
2 (3.6)
s1 = λ1n+ λ2n
2 (3.7)
25Robustness checks on this specification are presented in Section 3.5 and in Table 3.13.
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To empirically investigate the effects of profit shifting into tax havens on the tax
liabilities, it is useful to represent the group tax bill as
T = tH [piA(1− ξ − s∗1)− s∗2K − s∗3I]+
+tF [s∗1pi
A + s∗2K + s
∗
3I]
(3.8)
Substituting (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) in equation (3.8) and dividing through by K:
T
K
= φ1(t
F − tH)n+ φ2(tF − tH)n2+
+[tH(1− ξ)]pi
A
K
+
+δ1(t
F − tH)pi
A
K
n+ δ2(t
F − tH)pi
A
K
n2+
+λ1(t
F − tH) I
K
n+ λ2(t
F − tH) I
K
n2
(3.9)
Equation (3.9) is estimated as:
Yi,t = α0 + α1ni,t + α2n
2
i,t+
+α3(
piA
K
)i,t + α4(
piA
K
n)i,t + α5(
piA
K
n2)i,t+
+α6(
I
K
n) + α7(
I
K
n2) + fi + ²i,t
(3.10)
where
α1 = φ1(t
F − tH); α2 = φ2(tF − tH);
α3 = t
H(1− ξ);
α4 = δ1(t
F − tH); α5 = δ2(tF − tH);
α6 = λ1(t
F − tH); α7 = λ2(tF − tH)
(3.11)
and i indexes a group filing consolidated accounts, and t denotes a year. Yi,t is
the tax (430)26 charged to the consolidated P&L account divided by total assets
(412). The tax variable used here reflects book taxes. There might be discrepan-
26The variables codes in ORBIS are given in parenthesis and in bold.
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cies between the tax charges reported in the financial accounts and the real taxes
paid. In particular, in countries with a worldwide system of taxation of corporate
profits, tax charges can be reported in the financial accounts because profits will
be repatriated and taxes paid on them sometimes in the future. If the tax liabili-
ties charged to the P&L account reflect only accounting adjustments and not real
taxes paid, this research would not estimate a real effect but only an accounting
effect. This is a problem common to the rest of the literature.27
The literature traditionally employs the ETR (that is, tax bill divided by prof-
itability) as the dependent variable (for example, Markle and Shackelford (2009))
where both the numerator and the denominator are positive. The sample used
here contains positive and negative values for both the tax bill and profitability.
Selecting only profitable companies and companies paying positive taxes might
lead to biased results as explained below.28
The extent of tax haven operations is represented by n and it is measured by
the number of subsidiaries located in the low-tax jurisdictions listed in Table 3.5.
piA symbolises accounting profitability which is measured as P&L before taxation
(429); K represents the capital stock and it is measured by the book value of total
assets (412). I represents intangibles measured by the book value of intangible
fixed assets (405); fi is an unobserved time-invariant group-specific effect; and εi,t
is an idiosyncratic shock likely to be correlated with the right-hand side variables.
This model allows the group tax payments to change when the extent of opera-
27For more details on the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of using accounting
tax charges, see Markle and Shackelford (2009), footnote 14 and references therein.
28Using sales instead of profitability as in Desai et al. (2006b) also mitigates the problem.
Unfortunately, the variable net sales is scarcely available in the working sample.
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tions in tax havens changes. The coefficient α1 captures the effect of tax haven
operations independently of profitability (direct effect); α1 is expected to be neg-
ative. α2 captures any non-linear relationship between tax haven operations and
the corresponding conditional expectation of Yi,t. In this model, it is possible to
estimate the extent to which the group ETR drops when more offshore operations
become available within a corporate group. In equation (3.10), α3 measures the
marginal ETR29 for a group without tax haven operations. α4 and α5 measure
the additional effect on the marginal ETR for a group which switches from zero to
one subsidiary in tax havens; α4 is expected to be negative, as the marginal ETR
should decline when tax haven operations are available; α5 captures the non-linear
effects of tax haven operations on the marginal ETR.
For companies with tax haven operations, the marginal ETR is given by (α3 +
α4n+α5n
2). Thus, as shown in (3.11), the marginal ETR depends on the corporate
statutory tax rates tF of the countries where profits have been shifted. Empiri-
cally, the marginal ETR will be determined not only by the corporate statutory
tax rates of tax havens but also by the statutory tax rates of other countries where
real profits are located or where profits have been shifted. The data used here do
not contain information on the location of all subsidiaries of a corporate group.
This implies there is no information on all the relevant foreign corporate tax rates.
When comparing marginal ETR across different companies, it is therefore not pos-
sible to control for the different foreign tax rates relevant for calculating the overall
group tax burden.
Intangible assets such as patents are often used to transfer profits from high- to
29In fact, α3 =
∂( tax billtot. assets )
∂( P&Ltot.assets )
= ∂(tax bill)∂(P&L) for a group without tax haven operations. A similar
approach is used in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).
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low-tax jurisdictions: they can be moved easily and arm’s length prices are dif-
ficult to establish for them. Since a higher concentration of intangibles creates
more opportunities for transfer-pricing, α6 is expected to be negative. α7, like α5
captures non-linear effects of low-tax operations.
In the setting analysed here, there are three econometric issues that need to be
addressed. The first one is related to the possible endogeneity of tax haven op-
erations. The choice of setting up operations in low-tax jurisdictions might be
determined by the profit and hence by the tax bill itself. Table 3.11 shows that
groups without tax haven operations are more likely to report losses, and their
losses are larger than those of groups present in tax havens. Unprofitable com-
panies have less profits to shift and therefore they will gain less from tax haven
operations, as they are already able to reduce their tax bill through the loss car-
ryforward provisions. This result is important. It shows that the selection of only
profitable companies can bias the estimations towards finding a negative effect of
tax haven subsidiaries on tax liabilities as profitable firms have a greater incen-
tive to locate part of their operations in offshore low-tax jurisdictions. Two key
implications can be drawn from Table 3.11. First, unprofitable entities and un-
profitable years have to be included in the sample. Second, the presence in tax
havens is likely to be determined endogenously by previous tax positions. This is
connected with the second econometric issue. This second issue stems from the
likely presence of unobservable group fixed effects and unobservable time-variant
shocks which simultaneously affect the tax bill and the decision to locate activities
in tax havens. The third issue concerns regressors other than the number of tax
haven subsidiaries. Important determinants of the tax bill such as profitability
and intangibles intensity could be determined simultaneously with the tax bill.
This chapter tackles the first issue by including unprofitable entities and years in
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which a group reports an aggregate loss. It deals with the last two issues by first
constructing a time-variant indicator for tax haven operations and then by using
the difference generalised method of moments (GMM-diff) estimator described in
Arellano and Bond (1991).
3.5 Main results
Table 3.12 presents results for the basic specification of equation (3.10) where the
dependent variable is the ratio of consolidated tax charges to the consolidated
book value of total assets. Presence in low-tax jurisdictions is measured by the
number of first-level subsidiaries in tax havens. All specifications include a lagged
dependent variable which controls for slow adjustments in the tax bill. Tax lia-
bilities might depend on previous tax payments for many reasons. For example,
a company might arise the suspicion of tax authorities if it shifts an amount of
ernings that is too high with respect to previous years. All specifications also in-
clude country-year dummies which control for factors in the country of the GUO
likely to affect tax liabilities. Examples of such factors are the statutory corporate
income tax rate, the extent of deductions from the tax base, the effectiveness of
the anti-avoidance legislation, the effectiveness of tax authorities in detecting tax
avoidance and tax evasion, and the economic cycle.
Column 1 of Table 3.12 shows the results from a pooled OLS regression. In this
context, the estimator does not control for group-specific effects, nor does it deal
with the likely correlation of the regressors with the error term. The within-group
estimator in column 2 controls for group fixed effects, but it does not deal with
the bias arising from the correlation between the regressors and the error term.
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Blundell et al. (2000) showed that the pooled OLS estimator of the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable is upward-biased, whilst the within-group estimator
is downward-biased. Hence, columns 1 and 2 are useful for setting an upper and a
lower bound to the estimates of the lagged dependent variable shown in columns
3 to 5 and obtained using a GMM-diff estimator.
As explained above, the GMM-diff controls for unobservable group fixed effects,
and at the same time it deals with the likely correlation of unobservable shocks
with the first-difference of the lagged dependent variable and of other regressors.
The set of instruments used in the GMM-diff of columns 3 to 5 includes the first
and second lag of the previous two periods’ average tax bill divided by total as-
sets.30 The average tax bill in the two previous periods is a suitable instrument for
the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. In fact, it is likely to be a good predictor
of whether the company decides to expand its tax haven operations or not. A
group with a low-tax bill will be less willing to incur the costs of expanding its
operations in low-tax jurisdictions, ceteris paribus. As standard in Arellano and
Bond (1991), other instruments employed are the second and further lags of the
number of subsidiaries in tax havens, of profitability, intangible intensity, size, and
of their interactions with the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. The appropriate
lags of these variables31 can be good instruments for the number of subsidiaries in
tax havens as well. For example, groups with higher profitability in the past have
higher incentives to expand their tax haven operations. Country-year dummies
are also included in the instrument set. Instruments are collapsed as described in
30The average value of the tax bill divided by total assets for the previous two peri-
ods is calculated as follows:
(
tax billt−1
tot.assetst−1 )+(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )
2 . The instruments used are therefore
(
tax billt−2
tot.assetst−2 )+(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )
2 and
(
tax billt−3
tot.assetst−3 )+(
tax billt−4
tot.assetst−4 )
2 .
31As explained below, the appropriateness of the lagged values as instruments is tested using
the Hansen test for the orthogonality of the instruments to the errors and the Arellano and Bond
test to check whether there is serial correlation in the error structure in the original equation.
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Roodman (2009a) to contain their proliferation. In the specifications of columns 3
to 5, the test for over-identification and the tests for first and second order serial
correlation are satisfactory. The null hypothesis of first order serial correlation is
rejected and the null hypothesis of second order serial correlation is not rejected.
Under the Sargan-Hansen test, the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the
estimated equation is not rejected.
The estimates of Table 3.12 are consistent with the model presented in Section
3.4. In columns 3 to 5, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
lies between the pooled OLS value of column 1 and its within-group equivalent
displayed in column 2. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable varies between 0.068 and 0.071.
Column 3 reports results for the model displayed in equation (3.10). The direct
effect of the number of tax haven subsidiaries on the tax bill over total assets is not
significant; it remains so across all specifications in Table 3.12. The marginal ETR
estimated by the coefficient of profitability α3 is highly statistically significant. It
remains so across all specifications in Table 3.12. Its magnitude is estimated to be
around 34 per cent. This means that for companies without tax haven operations,
a one US dollar increase in the consolidated accounting profit leads to about a 34
cents increase in the consolidated tax liabilities. As expected, the coefficient on the
interaction term between profitability and the number of tax haven subsidiaries α4
is negative but not significant.
As discussed in Section 3.4, it is important to control for losses, as companies
with negative earnings might have less incentive to expand in tax havens. The
coefficient of the dummy indicating an aggregate loss is positive and significant.
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This might seem counter-intuitive. However it is possible that an ultimate owner
has a positive tax bill even when it reports losses in the consolidated accounts.
In fact some of its subsidiaries might be profitable and therefore might be paying
taxes, even if total group losses are larger than the profits of those subsidiaries.
The presence of a consolidated loss interacted with tax haven subsidiaries reduces
the tax bill, as shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
interaction between the dummy for losses and the number of subsidiaries in tax
havens.
It is known that larger firms tend to have more intangibles. It is therefore use-
ful to control for both intangibles and size32 in the same regression, as shown in
column 4. The coefficient of intangible intensity is not statistically significant at
conventional levels. However, the coefficient of the interaction between intangible
intensity and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens is negative and significant.
This indicates that intangibles per se might not influence the tax bill, but it is
their role in conjunction with tax havens that really reduces tax charges. The
effect of size on the tax bill seems more complex to analyse. The significant and
positive coefficient of the interaction between the logarithm of employment and the
presence in tax havens points to a slightly higher tax over total assets for larger
entities with operations in tax havens.
Column 4 of Table 3.12 shows that the marginal ETR is around 33 per cent and
highly significant across different specifications. It also indicates that there is a
negative and statistically significant effect of low-tax operations on the marginal
ETR as α4 is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient α5 is instead
32Size is measured by the logarithm of the number of employees (425).
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not significant. Considering a corporate group with two tax haven subsidiaries,33
the coefficient estimates imply that its marginal ETR will be 0.4 percentage points
lower than the marginal ETR of companies without tax haven subsidiaries, ceteris
paribus. Considering the mean number of subsidiaries in tax havens for the group
of companies with at least one offshore subsidiary (five), the marginal ETR will be
about one percentage points lower (that is, at about 32 per cent) than the marginal
ETR of companies without tax haven operations. As explained above, the coeffi-
cient of the dummy recording whether the corporate group reports a consolidated
loss is positive and statistically significant. This positive effect is however reduced
by the use of tax haven operations as indicated by the negative and statistically
significant value of the coefficient on the interaction term between the indicator for
losses and the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. This provides evidence that
the combined presence of aggregate losses and operations in low-tax jurisdictions
reduces the tax burden of the corporate group.
The specification in column 5 controls for the size of losses. The coefficient of the
value of losses is not significant. The same can be said for the coefficients of the
interaction between the value of losses and the number of tax haven subsidiaries
and its squared value. The other coefficients confirm the results in column 4. α4 is
negative and statistically significant pointing to a reduction of the marginal ETR
through tax haven operations. Low-tax offshore operations also reduce the tax
liabilities through the use of intangibles (see the negative and significant coeffi-
cient of the interaction between tax haven subsidiaries and intangible assets) and
losses. The number of operations in tax havens do not seem to have a non-linear
relationship with the tax bill and with the marginal ETR. The coefficient of the
33The sample mean value of the variable number of subsidiaries in tax havens is 2. For more
details see Table 3.9.
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variables interacted with the squared value of the number of tax haven subsidiaries
is never significant, except than in the case of size proxied by the logarithm of the
number of employees.
In a polynomial model with interaction terms, coefficients are not directly inter-
pretable as the effect of their associated covariates depends on the value of the
covariate itself and on the value of the other regressors. To quantify the overall
effect of an additional tax haven subsidiary, it is useful to write:
∂y
∂n
= α1 + 2α2n+ α4
piA
K
+ 2α5
piA
K
n+
+α6
I
K
+ 2α7
I
K
n+
+α8dloss + 2α9dlossn+
+α10log(employees) + 2α11log(employees)n
(3.12)
It is possible to calculate the value of equation (3.12) for each observation of the
sample by multiplying the value of the estimated coefficients by the relevant vari-
ables. In this way, it is possible to obtain a sample mean value for the derivative
in equation (3.12). The sample mean value for the derivative is -0.0013, which
applied to the sample mean value of the dependent variable (0.019) indicates that
an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces the tax liabilities over total assets by
about 7 per cent. The long-run effect is very similar, at about 7.4 per cent.34
Table 3.13 introduces a slightly different model by employing dummy indicators
for tax haven activity. Each specification of Table 3.13 includes a dummy d1 which
records whether the corporate group owns at least one low-tax offshore subsidiary.
34The calculations of the long-run effect are as follows: −0.0013(1−0.0703) = −0.0014 and −0.00140.019 =−0.074
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To capture additional effects of a large number of tax haven subsidiaries, dummies
registering whether the group has two or more, three or more, four or more, and
30 or more35 offshore subsidiaries are employed in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respec-
tively. Dummies vary very little in the sample. Table 3.14 shows that only a few
companies switch from owning zero to owning some tax haven subsidiaries. The
variation is even smaller for the dummies recording whether the corporate group
has more than 2, 3, 4, or 30 low-tax offshore subsidiaries. With so little variation
the dummies are unlikely to pick up the effects being studied here. Contrary to the
number of subsidiaries in Table 3.12, in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.13 the dummy d1
identifies a negative and statistically significant direct effect on total tax liabilities
divided by total assets. Column 4 instead identifies only the effect of tax havens on
the marginal ETR. The estimated coefficient of the dummies recording more than
two, three, four, or 30 tax haven subsidiaries are never statistically significant.
The same can be said for the estimated coefficients of the variables interacted with
those dummies. This is probably a consequence of the little within-group varia-
tion of the dummies. Most of the ultimate owners enter and exit the sample with
either some or no tax haven subsidiaries whilst many groups frequently vary the
number of offshore operations. Therefore, dummies may not be able to pick up
adequately the effect this chapter attempts to analyse. The number of subsidiaries
in tax havens employed in Table 3.12 seems therefore a more suitable measure for
corporate groups’ activity in low-tax jurisdictions.
The findings of the model measuring offshore activities with the number of sub-
sidiaries in tax havens are robust to various changes in the sample, as shown in
Table 3.15. For ease of comparison, column 1 of Table 3.15 reports the preferred
specification initially introduced in column 4 of Table 3.12. About 3 per cent of the
35The top percentile for the variable ‘number of subsidiaries in tax havens’ is 30.
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ultimate owners in the sample are resident in Ireland or Switzerland, two countries
considered as tax havens for the purpose of this research. Groups headquartered
in low-tax jurisdictions may profit less from tax haven operations, as they already
enjoy mild taxation in the home country. The results of the preferred specification
are robust to the exclusion of GUOs located in Ireland or Switzerland, as displayed
in column 2 of Table 3.15. Column 3 shows that when excluding companies clas-
sified as domestic entities at least once between 2003 and 2007, the results remain
very close in magnitude to those of column 1. As for corporations headquartered
in low-tax jurisdictions, companies reporting losses are likely to profit less from tax
haven operations. However, results are also robust to the exclusion of companies
always reporting aggregate losses between 2003 and 2007, as shown in column 4.
The same can be said of a set of companies with a total number of tax haven
subsidiaries smaller than 30 (column 5 of Table 3.15).36
All countries in the sample exempt foreign profits with the exception of Ireland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United Kingdom shifted to a ter-
ritorial system in 2009 and the new rules will apply from the fiscal year 2009–2010.
The change in the taxation of foreign profits has spurred a debate on whether the
new system will be more vulnerable to tax avoidance. In a territorial system, there
is an incentive for a corporate group to both locate the real activities and shift
profits to low-tax jurisdictions as foreign profits from low-tax jurisdictions bear no
taxation at home even if they are repatriated. In a worldwide taxation system,
foreign profits enjoy mild or zero taxation only insofar as they are not repatri-
ated. In theory, tax haven operations are more effective in reducing the overall
tax burden for multinationals headquartered in countries with a territorial system,
although this does not hold in practice if multinationals rarely repatriate their
36The top percentile for the variable ‘number of subsidiaries in tax havens’ is 30.
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profits to a home jurisdiction with a worldwide system. The question becomes
an empirical one. Table 3.16 investigates this issue in two ways. First, it investi-
gates whether tax haven operations are more effective at reducing the tax burden
of corporate groups headquartered in exemption countries, rather than of groups
resident in jurisdictions with a worldwide taxation system. Second, it evaluates
whether the marginal ETR of the former set of countries is statistically different
from the marginal ETR of the latter group, at conventional significance levels.
The specification in column 1 of Table 3.16 is obtained by interacting the variables
of the preferred specification (column 4 of Table 3.12) with a dummy dCR which
takes the value one when the GUO is resident in a jurisdiction which applies a
worldwide system for the taxation of corporate profits. Some interacted variables
are then dropped if their estimated coefficient is not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels in all specifications presented in Table 3.16. This should reduce
multicollinearity problems and shrink the number of instruments. For all compa-
nies, the specification is able to identify both a negative and statistically significant
direct effect of tax haven operations on the tax bill (α1) and a negative statistically
significant effect of low-tax activities on the marginal ETR (α4). In column 1 the
effect of offshore operations on tax liabilities does not differ statistically between
territorial and worldwide systems of corporate income taxation. None of the coef-
ficients of the variables recording the number of tax haven subsidiaries interacted
with the credit dummy dCR is significant, except for those interacted with the
dummy recording an aggregate loss.
Column 2 excludes companies classified at least once as domestic. When only
MNCs are considered, the effect of tax haven subsidiaries on the marginal ETR is
larger for companies headquartered in countries with an exemption system than
for companies headquartered in a credit country. The effect for the former group
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of companies is given by the coefficient of the variable interacting profitability with
the number of tax haven subsidiaries (0.8 percentage points). The effect for the
latter set of firms is 0.1 percentage points (0.008 - 0.007). The differential effect
of tax haven operations between territorial and credit countries is also robust to
the specifications of the last two columns of Table 3.16. Column 4 excludes GUOs
headquartered in Ireland and Switzerland whilst column 5 drops GUOs reporting
only losses between 2003 and 2007. The direct effect of low-tax offshore operations
on the tax bill (α1) and the effect on the marginal ETR (α4) are robust to the
specifications of columns 3 to 6.
A crucial result for the comparison of territorial and worldwide systems of taxa-
tion is that the marginal ETR is substantially lower for corporate groups head-
quartered in jurisdictions which exempt foreign profits. Depending on the sample
considered, the group marginal ETR of companies with a GUO resident in an ex-
emption country is between 13 and 14 percentage points lower than the marginal
ETR of groups headquartered in credit countries. This is shown by the coefficient
of the profitability variable multiplied by the dummy for credit countries. The
difference is statistically significant at 1 per cent. Corporate groups headquartered
in countries which exempt foreign profits may be able to reduce their overall tax
liabilities by locating their real activities and by shifting profits into jurisdictions
that can guarantee a lower fiscal burden without being tax havens. The difference
between the marginal ETR of the two groups cannot be entirely attributed to
the different ways in which the territorial and the worldwide systems tax foreign
profits and therefore to the amount of tax avoidance activity in the two systems.
The marginal ETR of each company is influenced by many characteristics of the
tax system of each country where the corporate group has some operations. These
characteristics include the statutory corporate tax rates and the deductions al-
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lowed on the tax base. Also, for credit countries, the taxes reported in the P&L
accounts could be higher than those really paid. In fact, taxes could be reported
in the financial accounts in anticipation of profits repatriation in future accounting
periods. Because of constraints in the data, this study is unable to control for
these characteristics.
Columns 5 and 6 investigate the difference in marginal ETRs further. By interact-
ing country dummies with the profitability for the three credit countries (Ireland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States), the last two columns of Table 3.16
explain in more details the determinants of such difference. The corporate groups
headquartered in the United States are characterised by the highest marginal ETR
which is between 13 and 15 percentage points higher than the mean marginal ETR
of groups headquartered in exemption countries. Companies headquartered in the
United Kingdom have a marginal ETR of about 29 per cent, 7.7 percentage points
higher than companies headquartered in exemption countries. The difference in
marginal ETRs between US- and UK-owned groups might reflect a tougher stance
taken by the United States on profit shifting for example through the implementa-
tion of passive income rules and interest allocation rules. Irish companies display
an overall marginal ETR lower than that of groups headquartered in exemption
countries. This is expected as Ireland has the lowest corporate tax rate among
OECD countries (12.5 per cent). These results do not describe the tax revenues of
an individual country or of a group of countries. They instead describe the overall
tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in a specific jurisdiction or in a
specific set of jurisdictions. They are consistent with the idea that the territorial
system is more flexible in allowing corporations to minimise their tax burden by
choosing where to locate real activities and profits.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the effect of tax haven operations on tax liabilities of
multinational groups headquartered in 15 OECD countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Using
consolidated accounting data from ORBIS (2003–2007) and ownership changes
constructed by merging ZEPHYR with ORBIS, this chapter finds that, at the
mean, an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces tax liabilities over total assets
by about 7 per cent in the short run and 7.4 per cent in the long run. More
specifically, at the mean, the marginal ETR of a corporate group with tax haven
subsidiaries is about one percentage point lower than groups without low-tax off-
shore operations. The results are likely to underestimate the effect of offshore
low-tax operations on the tax bill, as the number of subsidiaries in tax havens may
not pick up the entire extent of profit shifting into low-tax jurisdictions.
This chapter also investigates whether a territorial system for the taxation of cor-
porate profits entails a lower consolidated tax burden than a worldwide taxation
system. The results show some evidence consistent with tax haven operations
reducing tax liabilities more in territorial systems. Multinational companies head-
quartered in exemption countries reduce their marginal ETR more from low-tax
offshore operations than do corporate groups headquartered in a credit country.
The results also indicate that the marginal ETR of the first set of companies is
lower than the marginal ETR of corporate groups headquartered in jurisdictions
which do not exempt foreign profits. More specifically, companies headquartered
in the United States are characterised by the highest marginal ETR. Cross-country
variations in statutory corporate tax rates, in the way the tax base is calculated,
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and in the way future tax liabilities are recorded into the accounts can only par-
tially explain such a divergence.
The results on the marginal ETRs presented in this chapter do not describe the
tax revenues of countries with a territorial or a worldwide system. They instead
describe the overall tax burden of corporate groups headquartered in countries with
either one or the other system of taxation of corporate profits. The findings are
consistent with the territorial system being more flexible in allowing corporations
to minimise their tax burden by choosing where to locate real activities and profits.
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Table 3.1: Corporate Groups by Sector
Sector No. of corporate groups Per cent
Mining and quarrying 110 3.25
Manufacturing of food products and beverages 92 2.71
Manufacturing of tobacco products 5 0.15
Manufacturing of textiles 22 0.65
Manufacturing of wearing apparel 28 0.83
Manufacturing of leather products 11 0.32
Manufacturing of wood 10 0.30
Manufacturing of paper 36 1.06
Publishing and printing 54 1.59
Manufacturing of coke, petroleum, and nuclear fuel 14 0.41
Manufacturing of chemicals 220 6.49
Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products 46 1.36
Manufacturing of other non-metallic products 31 0.91
Manufacturing of basic metals 51 1.50
Manufacturing of fabricated metal products 46 1.36
Manufacturing of machinery and equipment 172 5.08
Manufacturing of office machinery and computers 65 1.92
Manufacturing of electrical machinery 61 1.80
Manufacturing of radio, TVs, and communication equipment 280 8.26
Manufacturing of medical, precision, and optical instruments 192 5.67
Manufacturing of transport equipment 99 2.92
Manufacturing (various) 68 2.01
Electricity, gas, and water supply 83 2.45
Construction 76 2.24
Wholesale and retail trade 307 9.06
Hotels and restaurants 73 2.15
Transport 97 2.86
Post and telecommunication 130 3.84
Financial intermediation 102 3.01
Real estate activities 43 1.27
Renting of machinery and equipment 22 0.65
Computer and related activities 348 10.27
Research and development 35 1.03
Other business activities 244 7.20
Recreational, cultural, and sport activities 116 3.42
Total 3,389 100.00
(i) Sectors correspond to the two-digit NACE codes (Rev. 1.1).
128
Table 3.2: Construction of the Dataset used in the Empirical Analysis
No. of companies No. observations
ORBIS (online version 16/10/2008)
Selecting on large and very large companies 1,093,428
Exclude companies with no financial information 739,989
Region: Western Europe (26), Canada, and the United States 427,331
Industrial companies only 401,944
Number of employees available non missing 293,906
Only Global Ultimate Owners 26,193
Active companies only 25,201
Firms with consolidated accounts only 17,876
Total assets available for last year 17,863
Companies with majority owned subsidiaries(i) 17,816
Real download from online version(ii) 15,207 136,863
Drop if accounting period different from 12 months 15,207 134,360
Drop if total assets negative or zero 15,207 134,257
Drop non-suitable sectors 14,592 128,833
Drop countries with less than 300 observations 14,555 128,503
Drop if incorporation year is missing 13,918 122,842
Drop outliers(iii) 13,710 117,495
Drop if total assets, P&L before tax, or tax bill missing 13,089 76,445
Drop if information on ownership structure missing 12,959 75,930
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers) 295 348
MERGE WITH ZEPHYR VENDORS 12,959 75,930
- of which present in ZEPHYR (vendors) 190 271
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) 437 606
Drop if number of subs in tax havens is negative 12,908 75,532
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 386 541
Drop if number of employees missing 5,161 35,288
Drop if (intangibles/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
Drop if (debt/total assets) missing 4,618 28,882
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 335 471
Drop if observations not contiguous in the time for same company 4,618 27,120
- of which present in ZEPHYR (acquirers and (or) vendors) also 323 452
(i) Subsidiaries are of the following type: industrial, insurance, banks, or financial institutions.
(ii) The number of companies obtainable through the real download is slightly smaller than the number of
companies potentially available from the online version of ORBIS. This happens because the some obser-
vations are dropped during the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and
identification number. (iii)Outliers are defined as the observations with a value of P&L before taxation
total assets
,
Tax bill
P&L before taxation
, Fixed assets
no. employees
, or age within the top or bottom 1 per cent. The observations dropped
are 4.35 per cent of the sample.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Observations Across Years
Year Frequency Percent
2003 2,115 16.43
2004 2,387 18.54
2005 2,610 20.27
2006 2,813 21.85
2007 2,951 22.92
Total 12,876 100.00
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Table 3.4: Country Distribution by Type of Group
MNCs MNCs Domestic Total
with TH subs without TH subs groups (%)
Austria 15 [63] 9 [37] 0 24 (0.71)
Belgium 15 [68] 6 [27] 1 [5] 22 (0.65)
Denmark 15 [44] 18 [53] 1 [3] 34 (1.00)
Finland 21 [34] 36 [59] 4 [7] 61 (1.80)
France 112 [56] 68 [34] 20 [10] 200 (5.89)
Germany 105 [50] 83 [40] 22 [10] 210 (6.18)
Greece 8 [32] 16 [64] 1 [4] 25 (0.74)
Ireland 9 [29] 20 [65] 2 [6] 31 (0.91)
Netherlands 34 [69] 12 [24] 3 [6] 49 (1.44)
Norway 10 [26] 28 [72] 1 [3] 39 (1.15)
Spain 20 [44] 24 [53] 1 [2] 45 (1.33)
Sweden 36 [42] 45 [53] 4 [5] 85 (2.51)
Switzerland 42 [70] 16 [27] 2 [3] 60 (1.77)
United Kingdom 242 [38] 255 [40] 142 [22] 639 (18.86)
United States 635 [34] 710 [38] 520 [28] 1,865 (55.03)
Total 1,319 (38.92) 1,346 (39.72) 724 (21.36) 3,389 (100)
(i) Figures indicate the number of ultimate owners. (ii) In parenthesis, percentage
of ultimate owners over the total sample. (iii) In brackets, percentage over the total
number of ultimate owners within a single country.
Table 3.5: Classification of Tax Havens in the Sample
Small tax havens Large tax havens
Andorra (AD) Hong Kong (HK)
Anguilla (AI) Ireland (IE)
Antigua and Barbuda (AG) Lebanon (LB)
Aruba (AW) Liberia (LR)
Bahamas (BS) Panama (PA)
Bahrain (BH) Singapore (SG)
Barbados (BB) Switzerland (CH)
Belize (BZ)
Bermuda (BM)
Cayman Islands (KY)
Cyprus (CY)
Dominica (DM)
Gibraltar (GI)
Grenada (GD)
Iceland (IS)
Jordan (JO)
Liechtenstein (LI)
Luxembourg (LU)
Macau (MO)
Mauritius (MU)
Malta (MT)
Marshall Islands (MH)
Monaco (MC)
Netherlands Antilles (AN)
Saint Kitts and Nevis (KN)
Saint Lucia (LC)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VC)
Samoa (WS)
Seychelles (SC)
Vanuatu (VU)
Virgin Islands (British) (VG)
(i) Table 3.5 does not provide an exhaustive list of low-tax ju-
risdictions. Some tax havens such as the Maldives, the Isle
of Man, and the Channel Islands are not included. Table 3.5
includes only the offshore fiscal centres in which the ultimate
owners in the working sample own a subsidiary.
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Table 3.6: Subsidiaries in Each Tax Haven, by Country of GUO
Country of Ultimate Owners
Tax AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GR IE NL NO SE UK US Total
havens
AD 2 (67) 1 (33) 3 [0.10]
AG 1 (33) 1 (33) 1 (33) 3 [0.13]
AI 2 (100) 2 [0.07]
AN 2 (5) 5 (11) 1 (2) 2 (5) 6 (14) 1 (2) 2 (5) 25 (57) 44 [1.56]
AW 1 (17) 2 (33) 1 (17) 2 (33) 6 [0.20]
BB 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (3) 5 (6) 68 (87) 78 [2.69]
BH 1 (6) 2 (12) 1 (6) 2 (12) 6 (35) 5 (29) 17 [0.63]
BM 7 (4) 1 (0.6) 3 (2) 1 (0.6) 2 (1) 1 (0.6) 2 (1) 15 (9) 128 (80) 160 [5.64]
BS 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (6) 3 (9) 1 (3) 3 (9) 22 (67) 33 [1.19]
BZ 1 (100) 1 [0.07]
CH 11 (2) 3 (0.5) 58 (11) 79 (15) 11 (2) 3 (0.5) 11 (2) 57 (11) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 17 (3) 1 (0.2) 20 (4) 56 (10) 211 (39) 540 [12.74]
CY 3 (5) 1 (2) 4 (7) 1 (2) 4 (7) 8 (13) 2 (3) 3 (5) 1 (2) 7 (12) 26 (43) 60 [2.36]
DM 1 (33) 2 (67) 3 [0.10]
GD 1 (100) 1 [0.03]
GI 1 (4) 1 (4) 1 (4) 4 (17) 16 (70) 23 [0.83]
HK 1 (0.2) 3 (1) 21 (6) 21 (6) 4 (1) 1 (0.2) 5 (1) 31 (8) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.5) 1 (0.2) 9 (2) 69 (19) 198 (54) 368 [13.47]
IE 1 (0.2) 4 (1) 10 (2) 13 (3) 1 (0.2) 7 (2) 5 (1) 21 (5) 1 (0.2) 28 (7) 15 (4) 1 (0.2) 11 (3) 113 (27) 181 (44) 412 [15.13]
IS 1 (9) 2 (18) 2 (18) 1 (9) 5 (45) 11 [0.36]
JO 1 (6) 3 (19) 2 (12) 2 (12) 3 (19) 5 (31) 16 [0.53]
KN 1 (100) 1 [0.03]
KY 1 (1) 5 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 5 (3) 1 (1) 17 (11) 117 (79) 149 [1.76]
LB 3 (15) 1 (5) 1 (5) 8 (45) 6 (30) 20 [0.76]
LC 2 (33) 2 (33) 2 (33) 6 [0.20]
LI 1 (6) 4 (25) 2 (12) 1 (6) 1 (6) 3 (19) 4 (25) 16 [0.56]
LR 1 (9) 1 (9) 9 (81) 11 [0.50]
LU 1 (0.3) 9 (3) 11 (4) 19 (7) 1 (0.3) 6 (2) 3 (1) 38 (15) 2 (0.8) 1 (0.3) 8 (3) 7 (3) 47 (18) 108 (41) 261 [9.59]
MC 1 (10) 5 (50) 2 (20) 2 (20) 10 [0.40]
MH 1 (20) 4 (80) 5 [0.23]
MO 1 (10) 1 (10) 2 (20) 6 (60) 10 [0.33]
MT 3 (10) 2 (6) 8 (28) 2 (7) 1 (3) 1 (3) 7 (24) 5 (17) 29 [1.19]
MU 1 (1) 3 (4) 4 (5) 1 (1) 10 (13) 3 (4) 54 (71) 76 [2.75]
PA 7 (11) 4 (7) 4 (7) 5 (8) 3 (5) 1 (2) 6 (10) 31 (51) 61 [2.32]
SC 1 (33) 1 (33) 1 (33) 3 [0.13]
SG 2 (0.4) 3 (0.6) 27 (5) 31 (6) 6 (1) 1 (0.2) 4 (1) 46 (9) 1 (0.2) 2 (0.4) 12 (2) 6 (1) 10 (2) 69 (14) 276 (56) 496 [17.55]
VC 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 [0.07]
VG 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 19 (23) 48 (59) 82 [3.52]
VU 4 (100) 4 [0.13]
WS 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 [0.10]
Total 27 (1) 25 (1) 173 (6) 204 (7) 29 (1) 28 (1) 31 (1) 248 (8) 17 (0.5) 38 (1.2) 84 (3) 12 (0.4) 66 (2) 468 (15) 1,577 (52) 3,026 [100]
(i) Figures are taken from the 2007 ORBIS static ownership structure. (ii) In parentheses per cent of country of ultimate owner (columns) for
each specific tax haven (rows). (iii) In brackets per cent of subsidiaries in each tax haven over total number of tax haven subsidiaries.
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Table 3.7: Download of ZEPHYR
ZEPHYR ACQUIRERS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(acquirers)
Acquirer located in OECD country 379,323
Target located in tax haven 11,348
Deal type: merger or acquisition 6,634
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 4,295
Real downloadi 3,963 4,762 4,256
Drop if acquirer’s ID missing 2,405 3,204 3,142
Drop if country of target missing 2,362 3,143 3,138
Keep if final stake is majority 1,792 2,248 2,244
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,579 1,957 1,957
Drop if acquirer’s country not relevant 1,523 1,886 1,957
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,491 1,841 1,886
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,491 1,701
ZEPHYR VENDORS (online version 06/01/2009) No. firms No. obs No. deals
(vendors)
Vendor located in OECD country 140,425
Target located in tax haven 5,166
Deal completed from 1999 onwards 3,252
Real downloadi 3,224 4,097 3,223
Drop if aquirer’s ID missing 1,528 2,401 2,086
Drop if country of target missing 1,392 2,189 2,084
Drop if year of deal 2008 or missing 1,257 1,822 1,822
Drop if country of target not tax haven 1,220 1,773 1,773
Create a panel with only one observation for each year and each company 1,220 1,528
(i) The number of deals obtainable through the real download is slightly smaller than the number of deals poten-
tially available from the online version of ZEPHYR. This happens because some observations are dropped during
the download as they miss all the variables, including the company name and identification number.
Table 3.8: Construction of ‘Number of Tax Havens Subsidiaries’ –Example
Year Static ownership structure ZEPHYR ZEPHYR No. subsidiaries
from ORBIS (vendors) (acquirers) in tax havens
BB BM CH HK IE KY LC LU MO PA VC BH HK SG CH MC
1999 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 18
2000 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 17
2001 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 15
2002 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2003 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 14
2004 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 15
2005 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2006 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 15
2007 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 14
(i) Barbados (BB), Bermuda (BM), Switzerland (CH), Hong Kong (HK), Ireland(IE), Cayman Islands (KY),
Saint Lucia (LC), Luxembourg (LU), Macau (MO), Panama (PA), Saint Vincent (VC), Singapore (SG),
Monaco (MC). (ii) Figures represent the number of subsidiaries located in each tax haven. In the section
‘ZEPHYR (vendors)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries sold by the ultimate owner in that spe-
cific year. In the section ‘ZEPHYR (acquirers)’ the figures represent the number of subsidiaries acquired by
the ultimate owner in that specific year. (iii) The value of the variable recording the number of subsidiaries
located in tax havens for 2007 is created by adding up the static information from ORBIS (column 2 to
12). The value of such a variable for the previous year (2006) is created by adding up the information from
ZEPHYR vendors (column 13 to 16, row 2007) and by subtracting the information from ZEPHYR acquirers
(column 17, row 2007). The process continues backwards until the last year (here 1999).
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tax bill/total assets .019 .026 -.190 .222
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens 2 6.134 0 192
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary .409 .492 0 1
Dummy - more than two tax haven subsidiaries .261 .439 0 1
Dummy - more than three tax haven subsidiaries .184 .388 0 1
Dummy - more than four tax haven subsidiaries .139 .346 0 1
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries .011 .103 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .070 .070 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.056 .227 -6.964 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .243 .429 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .203 .190 0 .975
Log(employees) 7.390 2.175 0 14.557
(i) Intangibles include goodwill (ii) The total number of ultimate owners is 3,389 and to-
tal number of observations is 12,876.
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics by Type of Group
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MNCs with Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,407 .022 .025 -.190 .222
Number of total subsidiaries 76 137.29 1 2,288
Number of subs in tax havens 5 8.684 0 192
Dummy - any subs in tax havens .974 .161 0 1
Dummy - less than 2 subs in tax havens .534 .490 0 1
Dummy - more than 2 subs in tax havens .439 .496 0 1
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .077 .070 0 .421
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.021 .102 -2.434 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .165 .371 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .207 .174 0 .934
Log(number of employees) 8.406 1.987 0 14.557
MNCs without Subsidiaries in Tax Havens
Tax bill/total assets 5,045 .019 .027 -.113 .159
Number total subsidiaries 23 59.13 1 1,398
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .069 .071 0 .521
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.059 .21 -4.252 0
Dummy - aggregate loss .256 .437 0 1
Intangibles/total assets .192 .189 0 .924
Log(number of employees) 6.929 1.905 0 12.806
Domestic Groups
Tax bill/tot. assets 2,424 .013 .027 -.115 .143
Number total subsidiaries 8 17.71 1 249
P&L before tax/total assets (if gain) .053 .066 0 .483
P&L before tax/total assets (if loss) -.128 .338 -6.964 0
Dummy - making a loss .390 .488 0 1
Debt ratio .536 .353 .012 4.935
Intangibles/total assets .213 .224 0 .975
Log(number of employees) 6.023 2.040 0 11.695
(i)GUOs are grouped according to the situation in 2007. (ii) The variable ‘Number of sub-
sidiaries in tax havens’ and the dummy variables indicating the presence of those subsidiaries
are equal to zero for all MNCs without tax haven subsidiaries and for domestic groups.
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Table 3.11: ETRs, Losses, and Tax Charges Across Types of Companies
MNCs MNCs Domestic MNCs MNCs Domestic
with TH subs without TH subs groups with TH subs without TH subs groups
ETR - only positive values (per cent) ETR - all observations (per cent)
2003 32 34 34 23 21 18
2004 30 31 33 24 20 17
2005 30 30 32 24 21 17
2006 29 30 33 24 21 17
2007 28 30 31 23 20 17
Mean 30 31 33 23 21 17
Per cent of groups reporting losses Per cent of groups reporting negative tax charges
2003 23 31 40 17 24 40
2004 17 27 37 13 23 38
2005 15 24 38 12 21 36
2006 14 23 39 11 20 37
2007 15 23 39 11 21 34
Mean 17 25 40 12 22 37
Mean gain size (over total assets) Mean loss size (over total assets)
2003 .062 .058 .048 .032 .069 .165
2004 .074 .067 .051 .021 .061 .105
2005 .079 .071 .052 .020 .055 .126
2006 .083 .074 .057 .017 .062 .129
2007 .084 .074 .053 .019 .053 .124
Mean .077 .069 .053 .021 .059 .128
(i)Mean ETR calculated using only observations with both positive pre-tax profit and positive tax charges
(ii)Mean ETR calculated setting to zero observations with either losses or negative tax charge.
(iii)All values are consolidated.
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Table 3.12: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets OLS WG GMM-diff
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.292*** -0.023* 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of tax havens subsidiaries (α1) -0.00003 0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared (α2) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.228*** 0.226*** 0.341*** 0.332*** 0.336***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries (α4) 0.0004 0.004*** -0.0005 -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared (α5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss -0.001 0.001 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
X No. tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00003** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.007 0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.001** -0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared -0.00001** -0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if loss) -0.007
(0.007)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries 0.002
(0.003)
X Number of tax havens subsidiaries squared 0.000
(0.000)
Country-year dummies X X X X X
AR(1) -13.00 -12.62 -12.62
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.080 -0.995 -1.030
p-value [0.278] [0.320] [0.305]
Hansen over-identification test 64.48 86.64 96.63
Degrees of freedom (68) (92) (110)
p-value [0.462] [0.638] [0.815]
Observations 12,876 12,876 12,876 12,876 12,876
Number of groups 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389
(i) Regressions run using pooled OLS (column 1), within-group estimator (column 2) and GMM-diff estimator
(Arellano and Bond (1991)) in columns 3 to 5. (ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Instruments used are
2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax bill, and country-year dummies. Instru-
ments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009a). (iv) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.13: Presence in Tax Havens Measured by Dummy Variables
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.083***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)
Dummy - at least 1 tax haven subsidiary (d1) -0.048* -0.048* -0.050* -0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
Dummy - 2 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d2) 0.025
(0.028)
Dummy - 3 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d3) 0.031
(0.039)
Dummy - 4 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d4) 0.010
(0.042)
Dummy - 30 or more tax haven subsidiaries (d5) -0.290
(0.475)
P&L/total assets (if gain) 0.351*** 0.349*** 0.354*** 0.348***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
X d1 -0.028 -0.035 -0.029 -0.077*
(0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
X (d2) -0.016
(0.042)
X (d3) -0.027
(0.040)
X (d4) -0.044
(0.039)
X (d30) 0.064**
(0.028)
Making loss dummy 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
X (d30) -0.016***
(0.006)
Intangibles/total assets 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(number of employees) -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X (d1) 0.005 0.006* 0.006** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X (d2) -0.002
(0.003)
X (d3) -0.003
(0.003)
X (d4) -0.003
(0.003)
X (d30) -0.005**
(0.003)
AR(1) -13.58 -13.64 -13.68 -13.75
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -1.386 -1.318 -1.402 -1.030
p-value [0.166] [0.188] [0.161] [0.303]
Hansen over-identification test 98.44 114.6 106.8 88.21
Degrees of freedom (92) (92) (92) (92)
p-value [0.304] [0.0552] [0.138] [0.592]
(i) Number of observations is 12,876 and number of corporate groups is 3,389.
(ii) Coefficient estimates of the variable intangible intensity multiplied by different dummies are not
reported. They are insignificant. The same is true for the dummy recording an aggregate loss mul-
tiplied by the dummies for at least one, 2 or more, 3 or more, and 4 or more tax haven subsidiaries.
(iii) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
(iv) Standard errors in parentheses. (v) Country-year dummies used in all specifications.
(vi) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax
bill, and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009a).
(vii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 3.14: Within-group Changes in Tax Haven Dummies
No. of groups Per cent of total corporate groups
Dummy - at least one tax haven subsidiary 47 1.3
Dummy - two or more tax haven subsidiaries 37 1.1
Dummy - three or more tax haven subsidiaries 29 0.9
Dummy - four or more tax haven subsidiaries 19 0.6
Dummy - more than 30 tax haven subsidiaries 10 0.3
Total 3,389
(i)Number of corporate groups recording at least one change in the dummy.
Table 3.15: Different Samples
Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag(tax bill/total assets) 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.069***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018)
Number of tax haven subsidiaries (α1) -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared (α2) 0.0001 0.0001** 0.00003 0.0001** 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.318*** 0.330*** 0.361***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries (α4) -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared (α5) 0.00002 0.00002** 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared 0.00003** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries -0.003* -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared 0.00004 0.00004*** 0.00005*** 0.00004*** 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.005** -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
X Number of tax haven subsidiaries squared -0.00001** -0.0001*** -0.00001** -0.00002*** -0.00003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country-year dummies X X X X X
AR(1) -12.62 -13.87 -12.89 -13.88 -13.71
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.995 -1.136 -0.981 -1.092 -1.060
p-value [0.320] [0.256] [0.327] [0.275] [0.289]
Hansen over-identification test 86.64 84.28 87.02 83.97 91.22
Degrees of freedom (92) (92) (92) (92) (92)
p-value [0.638] [0.704] [0.627] [0.712] [0.503]
Observations 12,876 12,522 10,452 11,951 12,749
Number of groups 3,389 3,298 2,665 3,060 3,359
(i) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)). (ii) Standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax bill, and country-year
dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009a). (iv) Column 1 contains results for the entire
sample. In column column 2, GUOs resident in Ireland and Switzerland are dropped. In column 3 domestic entities are
dropped. In column 4 groups always reporting a consolidated loss are dropped. In column 5 companies with number of
tax haven subsidiaries larger than the 99th percentile (30) are dropped. (v) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
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Table 3.16: Worldwide versus Territorial Systems of Taxation
Dependent variable: Tax bill/total assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag(tax/total assets) 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.082***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of tax havens subs. (n) (α1) -0.008** -0.004 -0.007* -0.009** -0.010*** -0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of tax havens subs. squared (n2) (α2) 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P&L/total assets (if gain) (α3) 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.229*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.219***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
X n (α4) -0.007** -0.008*** -0.006* -0.005* -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X n2 (α5) 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.140***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
X dUS 0.152*** 0.133***
(0.041) (0.041)
X dUK 0.077* 0.075*
(0.042) (0.042)
X dIE -0.046 -0.027
(0.111) (0.113)
X dCR X n 0.004 0.007** 0.003 0.002 0.006* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X dCR X n2 -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy - aggregate loss 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
X n -0.006*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
X n2 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.0001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR -0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
X dCR X n 0.004** 0.003 0.006*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
X dCR X n2 -0.0002** -0.000 -0.0003*** -0.0001* -0.0002** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intangibles/total assets 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
X n -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
X n2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.00005*** 0.00006*** 0.00005*** 0.00006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(number of employees) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
X n 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X n2 -0.00002*** -0.00003*** -0.00002*** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** -0.00003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
X dCR X n -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
X dCR X n2 0.000 0.00001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AR(1) -13.90 -12.59 -13.76 -13.75 -13.82 -12.52
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) -0.888 -1.066 -1.039 -0.869 -1.183 -1.251
p-value [0.357] [0.274] [0.364] [0.282] [0.206] [0.211]
Hansen over-identification test 140.0 147.2 133.6 137.4 151.2 156.1
Degrees of freedom (146) (146) (146) (146) (158) (158)
p-value [0.624] [0.457] [0.761] [0.682] [0.636] [0.527]
Observations 12,876 10,452 12,522 11,951 12,876 10,452
Number of groups 3,389 2,665 3,298 3,060 3,389 2,665
(i) Regressions run using GMM-diff estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Instruments used are 2nd and further lags of firm-level variables, 1st and 2nd lag of mean tax
bill, and country-year dummies. Instruments are collapsed as described in Roodman (2009a).
(iv) The dummy dCR takes value one if the group is headquartered in a country with a credit system. The dummies dUS, dUK, and dIE
take value one if the group is headquartered in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, respectively.
(v) Column 1 and 5 show results for the entire sample. In column 2 and 6 domestic entities are dropped. In column 3, GUOs resident in
Ireland and Switzerland are dropped. In column 4 groups always reporting a consolidated loss are dropped.
(vi) Country-year dummies are used in all specifications. (vii) The variables n*dCR, n2*dCR, intangibles/tot. assets*dCR, intangibles/tot.
assets*n*dCR, and intangibles/tot. assets*n2*dCR not reported as insignificant in all specifications.
(viii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Conclusion
This thesis reports an empirical investigation of some of the fundamental issues
raised by a source-based corporate income tax in an open economy.
The first chapter addressed the essential question of the true incidence of the cor-
porate income tax. Differently from the previous literature, it introduced a model
with location-specific rents. This allowed us to distinguish between two effects:
a direct effect and an indirect effect of the corporate income tax on labour. The
former occurs when an increase in the corporate income tax reduces the size of
the rent over which the employees and the company can bargain. This reduces
the bargained wage, ceteris paribus. The latter effect is the result highlighted
in previous literature wherein an increase in the corporate income tax leads to a
lower stock of capital, lower labour productivity, and consequently to lower wages
(Gordon (1986)).
Chapter 1 estimated the direct effect using unconsolidated accounting data from
a panel of over 55,000 companies in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom over the period 1996 to
2003. The results showed that the tax is largely shifted to the labour force. The
central estimates illustrated that, conditional on value added per employee, in the
long run an exogenous $1 increase in the tax bill tends to reduce real wages at the
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median by 75 cents. Since wage payments are deductible from the tax base, this
induced reduction in wages will usually generate a further increase in the tax bill.
At the mean statutory tax rate in our sample (35 per cent), this would imply a
further increase in tax of just over 26 cents. Relative to this overall tax increase
of $1.26, the effective incidence on labour is therefore approximately 59 per cent.
The second and the third chapters cast doubts on the feasibility of taxing profits
on a source basis. When profit-shifting opportunities are available, the principle
underlying the current system of taxing corporate income might fail in practice,
as earnings are transferred away from the jurisdiction in which they have been
generated.
Chapter 2 showed that the profit-shifting activities of MNCs have important impli-
cations for the productivity literature. More specifically, measured productivity of
international firms is overestimated in low-tax countries (and vice versa), because
multinationals have an incentive to manipulate the value of sales upwards and the
costs of intermediate inputs downwards. The well-documented productivity ad-
vantage of multinationals with respect to domestic entities is also a function of the
tax system. This has important implications for cross-company and cross-country
productivity comparisons. The analysis is carried out using unconsolidated ac-
counts from a panel of about 16,000 firms located in Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
between 1998 and 2004. The results showed that a 10 percentage points cut in the
statutory corporate tax rate would induce affiliates of multinationals to increase
their measured total factor productivity by about 10 per cent relative to domestic
firms. At the sample mean, the TFP advantage of international companies would
increase by about 44 per cent.
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Chapter 3 investigated whether tax haven operations reduce the tax burden of a
corporate group. Using consolidated accounting data for a panel of about 3,400
corporate groups in 15 OECD countries from 2003 to 2007, the study found that
tax haven operations reduce the tax liabilities of multinational companies. More
specifically, at the mean, an additional tax haven subsidiary reduces the tax li-
abilities over total assets by 7 per cent in the short run and by 7.4 per cent in
the long run. Offshore low-tax operations also have an effect on the ETR. At the
mean, the ETR of a corporate group with tax haven subsidiaries is 0.2 percentage
points lower than the ETR of entities without such operations. Chapter 3 also
found that the marginal ETR of companies headquartered in a jurisdiction with a
territorial system is lower than the marginal ETR of companies headquartered in
jurisdictions adopting a worldwide taxation system.
This thesis has produced evidence consistent with the corporate income tax being
largely passed on to the labour force (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 anal-
ysed different aspects of profit shifting. Results from both chapters highlight the
consequences of the difficult implementation of a source-based corporate income
tax in a world of integrated capital markets. Overall, the empirical analysis carried
out in this work suggests that in an open economy, a corporate income tax levied
on a source basis creates large distortions. In a world where the source-based cor-
porate income tax is still widely used, and is still generating revenues (Devereux
et al. (2004)), the policy implications of the research findings of this thesis are
important. They point to the need for a reform of the corporate income tax as
applied in most countries.
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Appendix A
Data Appendix
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This Appendix provides a brief summary of some of the data employed in the
empirical research carried out in this thesis and (or) used in the cited literature.
It describes datasets suitable for the study of the effects of taxes on companies’
behaviour in the open economy. The first type of data described here is aggregate
data on FDI, available through national balance of payments statistics. These
are published for most countries by either national statistics offices or central
banks. EUROSTAT, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) collect data from individual countries and make them available in a
broadly comparable format across countries.
According to the definition used by EUROSTAT (2007a), page 143, the balance
of payments is:
“. . . a statistical statement that systematically summarises, for a
specific time period, the economic transactions of a country with the rest
of the world. The two main categories of the balance of payments are:
the current account (goods, services, and income and current trans-
fers) and the capital and financial account (capital transfers, direct in-
vestment, portfolio investment, other investment, and reserve assets).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows appear in the financial account
of the balance of payments, FDI income flows in the current account.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is cross-border investment made by
a direct investor with the intent of obtaining a lasting interest in an
enterprise resident in another country (direct investment enterprise).
International investment is classed as FDI when an investor owns 10
per cent or more of ordinary shares or voting rights in an incorpo-
rated or unincorporated enterprise abroad respectively. FDI flows are
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direct investment transactions from the reporting to the partner country
(outward FDI) and from the partner to the reporting country (inward
FDI). They include the net purchase by the investor of the investment
company’s equity capital, plus the direct investor’s share in the com-
pany’s reinvested earnings, plus other capital, which is the net increase
in trade and other credit, including the net purchase of debt and other
financial instruments. Also referred to as FDI positions, foreign direct
investment stocks are a measure, at a specific point in time, of the value
and composition of a country’s FDI assets (outward stocks, or claims
on the rest of the world) and of its FDI liabilities (inward stocks from
the rest of the world)”.
FDI flows therefore differ from measures of capital expenditure in two main ways.
The first is that a multinational corporation resident in country i which undertakes
capital expenditure though an affiliate in country j, may finance the investment in
several ways. The parent in j can issue a loan or new equity. This would represent
a flow of FDI from i to j. The affiliate can also raise funds locally, in which case
there is no flow of FDI. In fact roughly equivalent options are available to any
company in j : any company can raise funds for capital expenditure domestically,
or on the international market. In the latter case, there would be a flow of foreign
portfolio investment (FPI) to j. The second way is that FDI can fund activities
other than capital expenditure. In particular, a large proportion of FDI flows
tend to finance mergers and acquisitions. For example, the multinational in i may
simply purchase another existing company in j. If they finance the purchase by a
flow of funds from the multinational, it would count as FDI from i to j. Such FDI
will have no effect on the aggregate capital stock in j. It merely reflects a change
in ownership.
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Every country collects data on the national balance of payments and on FDI. Table
A.1 below summarises the data collected by a number of major countries, while
Table A.2 describes in more detail the case of the United States as an example of
widely used data on FDI. Tables A.3 to A.5 summarise cross-country collections
of data on FDI gathered by international organisations such as EUROSTAT, the
OECD, and UNCTAD. The analysis of the companies’ behaviour in the open
economy can also be carried out using aggregate data on activities of affiliates of
multinational companies, such as the US Operations of Multinational Companies
database (see Table A.6) and the OECD Activities of Foreign Affiliates (AFA)
database (see Table A.7). Aggregate cross-country analyses can also be carried
out using the sector-level Structural Analysis (STAN) database produced by the
OECD (Table A.8).
Aggregate data have some important drawbacks. When employing them, it is
difficult to control for heterogeneous responses of firms to changes in the tax sys-
tem. For example, it is likely that larger companies with more involvement in
the international economy react faster to changes in the tax system. Micro data
with firm-level information on foreign direct investment are more suitable for this
purpose. Firm-level data are identifiable in different directions. Compustat (Ta-
ble A.9) and ORBIS (Table A.10), contain information for companies resident in
different countries. In Compustat it is not possible to link parent data with infor-
mation on its subsidiaries. ORBIS contains ownership information and potentially
financial data for both parent companies and their affiliates. Originally the infor-
mation on the ownership structure was time-invariant but the latest versions of
ORBIS contain historical ownership changes from 2002 onwards. Variations in the
old versions and for the years before 2002 can be created by merging ORBIS with
ZEPHYR, a dataset gathering information on mergers and acquisitions (see Table
A.11).
145
Firm-level data can also be country-specific like the US BEA firm-level dataset
(Table A.12), the German Micro database on Direct Investment (Table A.13),
and the UK Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (Table A.14). The
three datasets are constructed through surveys of the business sector. They are
confidential in that they can only be accessed on site through special programs.
The literature has also used the US firm-level tax return data (Table A.15) which
are not available to researchers outside the US government bodies. Table A.16
summarises other country-specific firm-level datasets which contain information
on the foreign activities of domestic companies and of the domestic activities of
foreign companies.
This Appendix also includes information on the tax system which can be employed
in the empirical analysis of the effects of the tax system on companies’ behaviour.
Measures of tax rates can be divided into forward-looking and backward-looking
measures. The former include the EMTR and the EATR. Calculations are carried
out by applying the rules of a particular tax regime (such as tax incentives, depre-
ciation allowances, valuation method for inventories) to a hypothetical investment
(for example in plant and machinery), with a given financing method (for example
retained earnings), and the specific tax status of the investor (see Table A.17).
Backward-looking measures are generally calculated by dividing a tax liability or
payment by a measure of profit. They can be calculated either at the aggregate
level as implicit tax rates (Table A.18) using data on aggregate tax payments, and
aggregate measures of profit or capital income. They can also be calculated at
the micro level as average tax rates (Table A.19) using company-level data on tax
liabilities and profits.
The final part of this Appendix contains a brief description of some datasets con-
taining useful and relevant information on tax legislation and tax systems (Table
A.20) and on tax revenues (Table A.21 and Table A.22).
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Table A.1: National Statistics
Country Collected by Collection method Coverage
France Banque de France
and the Ministe`re de
l’E´conomie des Finances
et de la Privatisation
Data on flows and end-of-year
positions of FDI in France and
French investment overseas are
collected through surveys sent
to the enterprises and bank set-
tlements.
Operations with foreign capital partic-
ipation greater than 10 per cent, in-
creases of capital, purchases of shares
in a firm, loans of affiliates from par-
ent companies (short and long-term),
unguaranteed loans and subsidies, pur-
chases of property.
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank Enterprises report transactions
and investment stocks to the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
Additionally, data are also col-
lected from an annual survey
on direct investment.
Data are available on a monthly basis.
Ireland Central Statistics Office Data are collected through
an annual survey of domes-
tic branches and subsidiaries of
foreign parent companies.
Italy The Ufficio Italiano
Cambi and the Bank of
Italy
The Ufficio Italiano Cambi col-
lects information on settle-
ments. The Bank of Italy then
compiles the balance of pay-
ments based on the transac-
tions.
Transactions above a certain value
have to be declared to the Ufficio Ital-
iano Cambi which registers them. Any
participation of over 20 per cent in the
capital of a firm is treated as direct in-
vestment. Direct investment flows con-
tain equity capital and debt securities
but they exclude reinvested earnings.
Japan Balance of payment data
are collected by the
Bank of Japan. Data on
FDI are published by the
Ministry of Finance
Data for the balance of pay-
ments are based on total net
transactions and include rein-
vested earnings only for incor-
porated enterprises. The posi-
tion at the end of the fiscal year
is derived from the cumulative
value of FDI.
FDI data include all foreign projects
which lead to an intended participation
in the management of a business enter-
prise. FDI stock data are derived from
the cumulated approved values of spe-
cific projects presented to the Japanese
Ministry of Finance.
Spain Banco de Espan˜a Any transaction above a cer-
tain threshold has to be re-
ported to the Banco de Espan˜a
according to the International
Transaction Reporting System.
Data include information on shares
and other equity representing more
than 10 per cent of a company’s cap-
ital, real estate investment, and long
and short-term net claims (claims less
liabilities) on parent and (or) affiliate
companies. Data on reinvested earn-
ings and data on positions are not
available.
Sweden Sveriges Riksbank Companies report information
on FDI flows directly to the
Sveriges Riksbank. An annual
sample survey gathers data on
stocks and reinvested earnings.
The survey is submitted to
Swedish companies with sub-
sidiaries abroad and to Swedish
enterprises wholly or partially
owned by non-residents.
FDI flow data include equity capital,
inter-company long-term loans, and
reinvested earnings.
United
Kingdom
Office of National Statis-
tics
FDI data are collected with
compulsory annual and quar-
terly surveys.
Key data series by area and main coun-
try include net UK FDI investment
flows abroad; net UK FDI interna-
tional investment positions abroad at
year end; net earnings from UK FDI
investments abroad; net foreign FDI
investment flows into the UK; net for-
eign FDI international investment po-
sitions in the United Kingdom at year
end, and net Earnings from foreign
FDI investments in the United King-
dom.
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Table A.2: US FDI Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
Coverage Type of data: Balance of payments and direct investment position data cover
US affiliates of foreign companies when an affiliate’s assets, annual sales,
or annual net income exceeds $20 million (inward investment). Regarding
outward investment, the data cover all foreign business enterprises owned at
the level of 10 per cent or more, directly or indirectly, by a US investor.
Frequency quarterly
Unit of observation: country (United States)
Variables Inward(i)
• Direct investment capital flows
• Direct investment income
• Royalties and licence fees
• Other transactions with affiliated foreigners
Outward
• Direct investment income (current account flows item)
• Royalties and licence fees (current account flows item)
• Charges for other services (current account flows item)
• Equity capital (capital account flows item)
• Inter-company debt (capital account flows item)
• Reinvested earnings (capital account flows item)
• Direct investment position abroad (stock item)
Sources of data and methods
of collection
Balance of payments and direct investment position data are collected through
a quarterly mandatory survey.
Drawbacks of the data The FDI data are based on a benchmark survey carried out every four years.
For non-benchmark years, all the series are estimated by extrapolating the
benchmark data based on sample data from the quarterly survey. When new
benchmark data are available, the previous estimates are not revised and this
could lead to an incorrect estimate of true FDI. The bias would become worse
the further the year is away from the benchmark year.
Availability Available on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website:
http://www.bea.gov/international/
Information on the dataset http://www.bea.gov/international/
Barefoot and Mataloni (2009); Mataloni (1995); Quijano (1990)
(i) Inward data are all presented by country of foreign parent and by industry of affiliate.
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Table A.3: EUROSTAT Data
Coverage Type of data: Balance of payments data (with FDI flows and positions) for
European Union countries, Japan, Norway, Turkey, and the United States.
Frequency: Balance of payments data are available monthly (only for
the Euro-zone), quarterly, and annual. FDI annual data are available.
Unit of observation: country
Variables Current account transactions
• Exports, imports and balance of account for goods, services, income
and current transfers
• Balance of the current account
Balance of payments
• Trade integration of goods and services
• Balance of international trade in goods and services
• Direct investment flows (as percentage of GDP)
• Direct investment stocks (as percentage of GDP)
• FDI intensity
European Union direct investment
• Current account transactions
• Extra-EU outward FDI (by sector (i), country, and economic activity)
• Extra-EU inward FDI (by sector, country, and economic activity)
• Income from FDI from outside the EU (ii)
• Intra-EU outward and inward direct investments (breakdown by sector
and country)
• EU FDI in emerging markets (iii)
Sources of data and collection
methods
Data are collected from questionnaires sent out to member states, from na-
tional balance of payments publications, and additional information provided
by national compilers. EUROSTAT collects FDI data via common EURO-
STAT and (or) OECD questionnaires from member states.
Drawbacks of the data Definitions of FDI vary across countries. Consequently, data may not be com-
pletely comparable across countries.(iv)
Availability www.europa.eu/eurostat
Information on the dataset EUROSTAT (2007a)
(i) International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and NACE codes are used. (ii) FDI income consists of
income on FDI equity and of interest payable on inter-company debt. Income on equity consists of dividends due
for payment in the period to the direct investor, gross of withholding taxes, plus the direct investor’s share of the
company’s reinvested earnings. Interest payable on inter-company debt is interest accrued during the period by
the enterprise on the direct investment; it includes interest on the borrowing and the lending of funds including
debt securities and suppliers’ credits. (iii) Data are also divided in European FDI towards candidate countries,
placeLatin America, Far East Asia, and Mediterranean Partner Countries. (iv) Some countries have different
collection methods, concepts, and classifications for gathering FDI data. To overcome such problems, EUROSTAT
harmonises national data. EUROSTAT also estimates missing data for each member state to create complete
European Union FDI flows and positions.
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Table A.4: OECD International Direct Investment Database
Coverage Type of data: The OECD International Direct Investment Database gathers
data on FDI to and from the OECD member countries.(i)
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: country
Variables
• Direct investment inflows (by sector and country)
• Direct investment outflows (by sector and country)
• Direct investment inward positions (by sector and country)
• Direct investment outward positions (by sector and country)
Sources of data and collection
methods
FDI data are collected through common EUROSTAT/OECD questionnaires
from member states.(ii)
Balance of payments and international investment position statistics compiled
by central banks or statistical offices are used together with other sources (for
example FDI notifications or approvals).
Drawbacks of the data Definitions of FDI vary across countries. For example some countries do not
include retained earnings. Consequently, data may not be completely compara-
ble across countries. Comparability is also affected by differences in industrial
classifications and geographic breakdowns.
Availability Available online at OECD.Stat under the section International Trade and Bal-
ance of Payments.
Information on the dataset IMF and OECD (2004)
(i) The 30 OECD member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, the Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (ii) Some countries have different collection methods,
concepts and classifications for gathering FDI data and this might make the comparison difficult.
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Table A.5: UNCTAD Databases
Coverage Type of data: The UNCTAD FDI/TNC (Transnational Corporations) database contains
information on inward and outward flows and stock of FDI classified by type of investment,
by region, and by industry for almost 200 countries and economies worldwide.
The cross-border mergers and acquisitions database covers data on cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions, documenting all transactions with more than 10 per cent equity capital
since 1987. It also includes information on over 73,000 deals involving more than 150 countries.
The largest TNCs database ranks the world’s largest non-financial TNCs by the size of
their foreign assets. The database has been published since 1993 and it has been comple-
mented by a list of the 50 largest TNCs with headquarters in developing countries since 1995
and by a list of the 25 largest TNCs from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe since
1999.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: country
Variables FDI/Transnational corporations database:
• Inward and outward FDI flows and stocks
• TNCs number of employees, wages, and salaries
• TNCs sales, profits, and value added
• TNCs exports and imports
• TNCs R&D expenditures and employment
Mergers and acquisitions database:
• Value and nature of the deal
• Name of acquiring company, its home economy, and industry
• Acquired company’s name, its host economy, and industry
The largest TNCs database:
• Total and foreign sales
• Assets and employment by company and by industry
• Index of transnationality
Sources of data and
collection methods
UNCTAD collects published and unpublished national, official FDI data from central banks,
statistical offices, or national authorities on an aggregated and disaggregated basis. These
data are further complemented by data obtained from: (i) other international organisations
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the OECD; (ii)
regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Secretariat and
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; (iii) Banque Centrale de l’Afrique
de l’Ouest; (iv) Banque Centrale des E´tats de l’Afrique Centrale, and (vi) UNCTAD’s own
estimates.
Drawbacks of the
data
There are limitations in data comparability due to differences in national definitions. Data for
some countries are missing and therefore estimated.
Availability Data are available at the UNCTAD website: www.unctad.org/fdistatistics. For the largest
TNCs database, data are available in UNCTAD (2008).
Information on the
dataset
UNCTAD (2008)
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Table A.6: US Operations of Multinational Companies Database (BEA)
Coverage US direct investment abroad data focus on the overall operations of the
US affiliates whose assets, sales, or net income exceed $1 million (inward
investment), and on the overall domestic and foreign operations of US
multinationals, that is parent companies and their affiliates in which the
parent owns at least 10 per cent of the capital.
Foreign direct investment in the place US data cover existing US busi-
ness enterprises in which foreign direct investors acquired (directly or through
their US affiliates) at least a 10 per cent ownership interest, and new US
business enterprises established by foreign direct investors.
Type of data: Financial and operation data for US companies and their
foreign affiliates and for US affiliates of foreign companies providing indicators
of the overall domestic and foreign operations of US multinational companies,
irrespective of the degree of intra-MNC funding.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: country (United States) and country of investment.
Variables Financial and operating data(i)
• Income statement items
• Balance sheet items
• External financial position
• Property, plant, and equipment
• Number of employees
• Employees’ compensation
Tax variables
• Direct foreign and home taxes paid
• Indirect home and foreign taxes paid
Sources of data and collection
methods
Financial and operating data are collected through a mandatory annual survey
and a mandatory benchmark survey organised every five years. The BEA
Benchmark Survey contains more detailed and complete information.
Establishment and acquisition data are collected through an annual manda-
tory survey.
Drawbacks of the data The FDI data are based on a benchmark survey carried out every four years.
For non-benchmark years, all the series are estimated by extrapolating the
benchmark data based on sample data from the quarterly survey. When new
benchmark data are available, previous estimates are not revised and this could
lead to an incorrect estimate of the true FDI. The bias would worsen, the
further the year is away from the benchmark year.
Availability Available on the BEA website:
http://www.bea.gov/international/
Information on dataset Barefoot and Mataloni (2009); Mataloni (1995); Quijano (1990)
(i) For US multinationals (outward investment), financial and operating data are separately tabulated for
two foreign-affiliate groups: all foreign affiliates and majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs). MOFAs are
foreign affiliates in which the combined ownership of all US parents exceeds 50 per cent.
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Table A.7: OECD Activities of Foreign Affiliates (AFA) Database
Coverage Type of data: The AFA database contains information (inward and outward
investment) on activity of majority-foreign-owned affiliates (more than 50 per
cent of the firm’s capital is owned by a foreign enterprise)(i) or majority- and
minority-foreign-owned (more than 10 per cent) mainly in the manufacturing
sector. Data are provided for the following declaring countries: Canada, the
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: industrial sector (based on International Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 3) of country of origin.
Variables Variables:
• Number of enterprises and (or) establishments
• Number of employees
• Production, turnover, and value added
• Wages and salaries
• R&D expenditure and number of researchers
• Gross fixed capital formation
• Total imports and exports
• Intra-firm imports and exports
• Gross operating surplus
• Technological payments and receipts
• Stock of foreign direct investment
Sources of data and collection
methods
The AFA database is based on a survey sent out by the OECD Directorate
for Science, Technology, and Industry. Member countries report to the OECD
based on their own surveys or their own business register’s information.
Drawbacks of the data The AFA database does not contain the capital stock of the enterprises. Data
availability varies according to country. There might be problems in comparing
different countries. Discrepancies are related to different definitions of foreign-
controlled affiliates, the use of different sources, and different definitions of the
variables.
Availability Available online at OECD.Stat under the section Globalisation, Activity of
Multinationals.
Information on dataset Giovannini (2008); OECD (2007).
Note Unlike data on FDI flows covering all transactions representing more than 10
per cent of the firms’ capital, AFA data are based on the notion of control (50
per cent of the capital) (Giovannini (2008)).
The AFA dataset can be merged with the OECD Structural Analysis database
(see Table A.8).
The OECD produces also the Foreign Affiliates Trade in Services database
gathering inward and outward FDI of multinationals in the services sector.
(i) This definition of majority-foreign-owned affiliate can change across countries and across time.
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Table A.8: OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database
Coverage OECD countries, excluding Mexico and Turkey. It covers all activities
(including services).
Type of data: Sector-level data on output, labour input, investment,
and international trade.
Sectors are classified according to the ISIC of all economic activities, Revision
3.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: country-sector.
Variables Bilateral Trade data:
• Import and export of goods
Database for structural analysis:
• Gross output
• Intermediate inputs
• Value added
• Labour costs, wages, and salaries
• Number of employees and full-time equivalents
• Self-employed
• Gross fixed capital formation
• Gross and net operating surplus
Indicators:
• Export/import ratio
• Value added shares
• Distribution of R&D expenditures
• R&D intensity
• Employment shares
• Labour share in value added
• Labour productivity
Sources of data and collection
methods
STAN is primarily based on Member countries’ annual national accounts by
activity tables. It also uses data from other sources, such as national industrial
surveys and censuses.
Drawbacks of the data Some data points in STAN are estimated.
Availability STAN can be accessed via OECD’s data dissemination service OECD.Stat
under the chapter Industry and Services.
Information on the dataset www.oecd.org/sti/stan/
Note STAN can be merged with the OECD AFA database (Table A.7). For more
details, see Criscuolo (2005).
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Table A.9: COMPUSTAT Industrial and Commercial Database
Coverage Type of data: Financial and accounting data including income statement items, balance sheet
and cash flow items in both consolidated and unconsolidated form.
Compustat North America covers US and Canadian publicly traded companies and data from
wholly owned subsidiaries of companies required to file with the US Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Compustat Global covers non-US and non-Canadian publicly traded companies in more
than 80 countries, representing 90 per cent of the world’s market capitalisation.
Frequency: annual and quarterly
Unit of observation: firm
Variables Some examples:
• Labour costs and number of employees
• R&D expenditures
• Foreign pre-tax earnings
• Property, plant, and equipment (capital expenditures)
• Interest expenses and long-term debt (total, issuance, reduction)
Geographic segment file
• Exports to unaffiliated foreign customers
• Sales from foreign operations to unaffiliated foreign customers
Prices-Dividends-Earnings file
• Monthly stock prices
• Dividends (cash, preferred)
• Issued capital
Tax variables
• Total tax expenses
• Cash taxes paid
• Income taxes (state and other)
• Deferred taxes and investment tax credit
• Foreign taxes paid
Sources of data and
collection methods
The producers of the dataset employ original company sources by extracting financial information,
removing reporting biases, and reconciling data discrepancies. They standardise data by financial
statement and by specific data item definition, preparing information that is broadly comparable
across companies, industries, time, and sectors.
Drawbacks of the
data
Not possible to link parent data with subsidiaries.
Availability Created and sold by Standard and Poor’s.
Information on the
dataset
www.compustat.com
Note Standard and Poor’s also sells the Compustat Global Financial Service file which contains infor-
mation on the income statement, the balance sheet, and the flow of funds for financial companies.
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Table A.10: ORBIS and Firm-level Datasets Produced by Bureau van Dijk
Coverage Type of data: Accounting and financial data including P&L accounts and
balance sheet items and securities and price information, (i) in a consolidated
and unconsolidated form.
Population of 57 million public and private companies around the world
(ii) (July 2009).
For about 21 per cent of the sample, detailed financial data are avail-
able. For 42 per cent of the sample, only summary financial information is
recorded and for the rest, no financial information is available (July 2009).
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: firm
Variables Some examples:
• Number of employees and total employees’ compensation
• Interest expenses
Ownership variables:
• Country, name, and identifier of shareholders and subsidiaries
• Direct/total percentages of ownership
• Type of shareholders (iii)
• Independence indicator
• Country, identifier, and financial information on ultimate global owner
Tax variables:
• Taxes charged to the P&L account
Sources of data and
collection methods
Data are derived from the official balance sheet, P&L account, and notes to
financial statements, and are complemented with news, market research, infor-
mation from official bodies (for example, stock exchanges), and private corre-
spondence. The producer of the data has developed a uniform format which
is applied to each entity analysed to address comparison issues.
Drawbacks of the
data
There might be differences in accounting standards which could make the com-
parison difficult.
Availability The data set is compiled by the Bureau van Dijk and can be accessed online
with an annual subscription or bought as a DVD.
Information on
dataset
www.bvdep.com
continued...
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Table A.10: ORBIS and Firm-level Datasets Produced by Bureau van Dijk (continued)
Note Many national and sector subsets of ORBIS have been used in the literature.
They broadly contain the same information as ORBIS, even though some items
might be recorded in more detail. This happens because some specific items
are dropped, or are aggregated in the cross-country and cross-sector dataset
for the sake of comparability. Some of the subsets used in the literature cited
in the thesis are:
• AMADEUS which contains accounting and ownership information for
public and private companies in 41 European countries
• OSIRIS which contains information for listed companies, banks, and
insurance companies around the world
• AIDA which contains information on Italian public and private com-
panies
• FAME which contains information on UK public and private companies
• BANKSCOPE which contains financial and ownership information on
public and private banks around the world
(i) The data available include current, monthly, and annual market capitalisation figures, together with current and
annual stock data, and valuation, security information, type of share, market price, and price trends in any stock
exchange on which the company is listed. Beta values, correlation coefficients to the main indexes and monthly
pricing series are also available. (ii) There are three different modules available. The very large companies’ module
contains data for all listed companies, regardless of their size and for companies satisfying at least one of the following
criteria: operating revenues larger than US$130 million, total assets larger than US$260 million, or number of em-
ployees greater than 1000. In the large companies’ module, companies are included if they satisfy at least one of the
following criteria: operating revenues larger than US$13 million, total assets larger than US$26 million, or number of
employees greater than 150. In the medium companies’ module, companies are included if their operating revenues
are greater than US$1.3 million, their total assets are larger than US$2.6 million, or their number of employees is
greater then 15. Small companies include the entities not fulfilling the aforementioned criteria. (iii) Shareholder types
are divided into 11 categories: banks and financial companies, insurance companies, industrial companies, public au-
thorities/State/Government, one or more individuals or families, foundations (including research institutes), mutual
and pension funds/nominees/trusts/trustees, employees/managers/directors, unnamed individuals and families, bulk
lists of companies and private owners, public (used only for publicly listed companies).
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Table A.11: ZEPHYR
Coverage It contains information on the merger and acquisitions deals and financial
summary indicators for the participating entities.
Deals covered are acquisitions, initial public offerings, institutional buy-
outs, joint ventures, management buy-ins, management buy-outs, mergers,
minority stakes, planned initial public offerings, and share buy-backs. (i)
There is no minimum deal value for being included in the dataset. It contains
about 671,000 deals (July 2009).
The geographic coverage should be worldwide but new countries have
been added in different years.
Unit of observation: deal
Variables Some examples:
• Deal structure
• Deal value
• Equity value
• Enterprise value or estimated enterprise value
• Name of target plus activity and country
Ownership variables:
• Name, activity, country, and parent of acquirer
• Name, activity, country, and parent of vendor
• Global ultimate owner, shareholders, and subsidiaries of target
Financial variables (for target company):
• Turnover
• EBIT
• Pre-tax profits and losses
• Total assets
Sources of data and collection
methods
Bureau van Dijk has established a subsidiary called Zephus whose main task
is to collect information on M&A deals. Information is collected from different
sources and complemented with news, market research, and information from
official bodies.
Drawbacks of the data The geographic and time coverage of ZEPHYR has increased substantially
from 2001 onwards. Previous years record a smaller number of deals.
Availability The data set is compiled by the Bureau van Dijk and can be accessed online
with an annual subscription or bought as a DVD.
Information on the dataset www.bvdep.com
Note ZEPHYR can be merged with ORBIS to recover more financial information on
the companies participating in the deal.
(i) Sub deal type covered are contested bid, exit, hostile bid, leveraged buy-out, partial exit, private in-
vestments in public equity, privatisation, public takeover, capital pool, demerger, exit, partial exit, exit
new stake, hostile initially became recommended, recommended initially became hostile, unsolicited bid,
recommended bid, reverse take-over or start up.
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Table A.12: Affiliate-level Operations of US Multinational Companies Database
(BEA)
Coverage Type of data: unconsolidated accounting and financial data (i)
The Inward Investment database contains data for all non-bank US affiliates of foreign
companies (owned 10 per cent or more). Data are separately tabulated for two foreign-affiliate
groups: all foreign affiliates and majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs). MOFAs are foreign
affiliates in which the combined ownership of all foreign parents exceeds 50 percent.
The Outward Investment database contains data for all foreign business enterprises owned
10 per cent or more, directly or indirectly, by a US person or corporation.
Frequency: every five years and annual
Unit of observation: affiliate
Variables Some examples:
• Number of employees and employees’ compensation (ii)
• US parent’s and affiliates’ domestic sales
• Affiliates’ arms-length sales to United States (iii)
• Foreign sales (iv)
• Intermediate inputs shipped intra-firm (in both directions)
• R&D expenditures
• Capital expenditures
• Property, plant, and equipment
• Dividends and (or) net income to owners
• Location of subsidiaries (including tax havens)
Tax variables
• Direct and indirect taxes paid (v)
• Foreign income and indirect taxes paid
Sources of data and
collection methods
Data are taken from the mandatory Benchmark and Annual Surveys of US Direct Investment
Abroad. In non-benchmark survey years, a sample survey is conducted, which excludes small
affiliates, to reduce the reporting burden on them. The BEA estimates the data for these affiliates
by extrapolating their data from the most recent Benchmark Survey.
Drawbacks of the
dataset
For smaller firms, data between two Benchmark Surveys are estimated.
Availability It can be accessed only on-site at the Bureau of Economic Analysis through the ‘BEA Program
for Outside Researchers’. An aggregated version of the same data is publicly available. For more
details, see Table A.6.
Information on the
dataset
www.bea.org
Barefoot and Mataloni (2009); Mataloni (1995); Quijano (1990)
(i) Information on foreign subsidiaries is collected according to US accounting principles. This implies that variables
are comparable across subsidiaries located in different countries Desai et al. (2006b). (ii) As explained in Desai et al.
(2006b), payroll taxes are reported as an indistinguishable component of employee compensation. (iii) The BEA data
do not contain US parents’ arms-length sales to the country where the affiliate is located. (iv) These are sales to
unaffiliated foreign customers from foreign operations. (v) The indirect tax burden is reported as a sum of sales taxes,
value added taxes, and excise taxes paid. For more information, see Desai et al. (2006b).
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Table A.13: Deutsche Bundesbank Microdatabase on Direct Investment (MiDi)
Coverage Type of data: Unconsolidated (and sometimes consolidated) balance sheet data of foreign-owned
firms based in Germany and foreign affiliates of German parent companies.
Period: Panel data are available from 1996. From 1989 to 2001, only semi-aggregated
data by country and (or) by sector are available.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: affiliate
Variables Some examples:
• Number of foreign affiliates
• Country of affiliate and parents (including tax havens)
• Number of employees
• Liabilities
• Liabilities to shareholders and (or) affiliates
• Total balance sheet of affiliates and parent
• Stock of foreign direct and indirect investment (in German affiliates) (i)
• Shares in the assets and liability positions of the non-residents
• Capital invested in property, plant, and equipment
• P&L after tax and before dividend distributions
Sources of data and
collection methods
According to the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) and
the Law on Foreign Trade and Payments (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz ), foreign-owned firms based
in Germany have to submit answers to an annual stock survey, organised by the Deutsche
Bundesbank, if the enterprise has a balance sheet total of more than 3 million in which a
non-resident (or several economically linked non-residents) holds 10 per cent or more of the shares
or voting rights, directly or indirectly. Reports are also required if foreign-owned branches or
permanent establishments located Germany have operating assets in excess of 3 million.
German-owned enterprises have to report their foreign direct investments if either the cap-
ital shares or voting rights in the foreign affiliate exceed directly, or indirectly, some threshold
(10 per cent starting in 2002) and (or) the balance sheet total of the foreign affiliate is above a
threshold (3 million EUR starting in 2002).
Advantages of the
data
Coverage of both flow and stock data for all affiliates, irrespective of their level of affiliation.
Drawbacks of the
data
Data for the foreign parent are scarce; information is restricted to the economic sector and the
country in which the firm is active.
There are neither income statement items, except for after-tax balance sheet profits, or tax data.
Threshold for mandatory reporting of data varies over time and therefore the number of firms
available every year varies before 2002.
Availability Data are confidential and available only on-site at the Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank
Central Office in Frankfurt.
Information on the
data
Lipponer (2008).
Note From 2005 onwards, the dataset contains the same parent company’s identification number avail-
able in ORBIS. This means that the two datasets can be merged.
(i) This variable gives the sum of equity capital of the foreign affiliate, capital reserves, and retained earnings which
are held by a foreign-owned firm based in Germany.
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Table A.14: UK Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI)
Coverage Type of data: Financial flows in the form of FDI for foreign affiliates
of UK entities (Outward Inquiry) and foreign-owned firms based in the
United Kingdom (Inward Inquiry). It covers all UK firms engaging or receiv-
ing FDI if the investor holds at least 10 per cent of the capital of the recipients.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: affiliate
Variables Some examples:
• Subsidiary or branch net profit, profit, and loss
• Country of affiliate or branch (including tax havens)
• Interest (net, received, paid)
• Branch and (or) head office debt from and to the United Kingdom
• Percentage owned
• Subsidiary or branch net earnings
• Total net earnings
• Subsidiary unremitted profits
• Subsidiary dividends
• Subsidiary or branch net investment
Tax data
• Subsidiary tax credits
• Subsidiary tax refunds
Sources of data and collection
methods
Data are collected through survey forms sent to the head of enterprise groups
in the United Kingdom. Firms are sampled from different registers, including
HM Customs and Revenue, Dunn and Bradstreet’s ‘Worldbase’ system, and
ONS inquiries on Acquisitions and Mergers. The largest firms all receive the
survey forms every year, while only a proportion of the smaller firms do.
Drawbacks of the data Information on FDI is not always entered promptly, depending on when the
Office of National Statistics learns about the investment from various sources.
Tax data are rarely available.
Availability Data are confidential and available only on-site at the Office of National Statis-
tics in London or Newport.
Information on the data www.ons.gov.uk
Criscuolo and Martin (2009); Criscuolo and Martin (2007); Gilhooly (2007)
Note Through the enterprise group reference, the AFDI can be linked to the Annual
Respondents Database (ARD) to derive more balance sheet and P&L account
information on the domestic- and foreign-owned establishments based in the
United Kingdom. Information in ARD includes turnover, costs of intermediate
inputs, number of employees, and labour costs.
The dataset can also be merged with AMADEUS, the European subset of
ORBIS (see Table A.10)
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Table A.15: US Firm-level Tax Returns
Coverage Type of data: Tax return data for all companies filing tax returns in the
United States.
Frequency: annual
Unit of observation: parent company and affiliate
Variables Some examples:
• Inter-company transactions
• R&D expenditures of the parent
• Income of the parent and of the controlled foreign-controlled company
(CFC)
Tax variables:
• Income taxes paid
• Deductions
• Foreign taxes paid
Sources of data and collection
methods
Data are taken directly from US tax returns Forms 1120, 1118, and 5471. The
former is the basic parent corporate income tax return. The second is the
form used to claim a foreign tax, and the latter contains the CFC’s income,
foreign taxes paid, and transactions with related parties, including the parent
company.
Availability Data are confidential and not publicly available.
Information on the dataset Grubert and Mutti (2000); Altshuler et al. (2001)
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Table A.16: Other Firm-level Datasets Available
Country Inward/ Outward Name of Dataset Coverage
France Inward L’Implantation Etrange`re dans l’Industrie,
Service des Statistique Industrielles, Min-
iste`re de l’Industrie, de la Poste e des
Te´le´communications.
Foreign-owned manufactur-
ing enterprises with 20 or
more employees.
Outward Liaison Financie`res, annual mandatory sur-
vey developed by the Institute National de la
Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques.
Private enterprises with 20 or
more employees.
Ireland Inward Census of Industrial Production, annual sur-
vey elaborated by the Irish Central Statistics
Office.
Enterprises based in Ireland
with at least three employees
and owned at least at the 50
per cent level by foreign com-
panies or individuals.
Italy Inward/Outward Reprint Database developed at the Depart-
ment of Economics and Production of the
Politecnico di Milano with the support of
the National Institute for Foreign Trade and
the Italian National Council for Economy and
Labour.
Mining and manufacturing
firms based in Italy and con-
trolled by foreign companies
or foreign entities controlled
by Italian companies.
Japan Inward/Outward Annual Survey on Trends in Business Activ-
ities of Foreign Affiliates in Japan and on
Japanese Investors and their Foreign Affil-
iates carried out by the Enterprise Statis-
tics Division, Research and Statistics Depart-
ment, and the International Business Affairs
Division, Industrial Policy Bureau.
Majority foreign-owned firms
based in Japan (excluding fi-
nancial, insurance, and real
estate sector) and Japanese
investors abroad.
Spain Inward Central de Balances del Banco de Espan˜a
dataset of the Central Balance Sheet Office
of the Bank of Spain. It reports shares of a
firm’s capital owned by non-residents. Thus,
it is possible to recognise foreign-owned enti-
ties.
Panel of Spanish manufac-
turing companies (excluding
companies in the energy sec-
tor).
Inward/Outward Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales
dataset (Inquiry on the Firms’ Strategies). It
reports Spanish firms’ capital shares owned
by non-residents and the number of foreign
countries where a Spanish-owned firm has es-
tablishments.
Unbalanced panel of Spanish
manufacturing companies.
Sweden Inward Annual surveys on foreign-owned enterprises
in Sweden, by the Swedish National Board for
Industrial and Technical Development with
Statistics Sweden.
Majority foreign-owned
Swedish enterprises
Outward Surveys on Swedish-owned enterprises
abroad conducted by the Swedish Na-
tional Board for Industrial and Technical
Development.
All Swedish groups having
subsidiaries abroad with
more than one employee
Repeated survey (every 4 to 5 years) prepared
by the Research Institute of Industrial Eco-
nomics.
Manufacturing Swedish com-
panies with 50 or more em-
ployees
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Table A.17: Forward-looking Tax Measures
Description EMTR: Proportionate difference between pre-tax and post-tax required rates
of return:
EMTR =
(p∗− r)
p∗
where p∗is the cost of capital for the marginal unit of investment and r is the
associated post-tax rate of return. The higher the EMTR, the greater the
required pre-tax rate of return, and thus the lower the incentive to invest.
EATR: For a given value of the cost of capital, the EATR is the net
present value of tax payments expressed as a proportion of the net present
value of total pre-tax capital income:
EATR =
NPV (tax payments)
NPV (total pre−tax capital income) =
p∗
(1+r)
.
For a given investment, the EATR represents the share of profits which
is taken by taxes.
Developed by The EMTR was developed by King and Fullerton (1984) for domestic invest-
ment. Alworth (1988); OECD (1991); and Keen (1991) extended this to cross-
border investment. Devereux and Griffith (1998); Devereux and Griffith (2003)
proposed an alternative methodology for the EMTR. They also developed a
measure of the EATR.
Availability Devereux et al. (2008) provide a wide range of EATRs and EMTRs for the 27
European Union countries, Japan, and the United States.
Advantages Based on a theoretical neoclassical model of investment and therefore appro-
priate for measuring tax burden on marginal and average investment
Drawbacks The EMTR and the EATR depend on assumptions made about the type of
investment, personal income taxation, the source of finance for the investment,
and on whether inflation and the market rate of interest fluctuate.
Table A.18: Backward-looking Measures: Implicit Tax Rates (ITRs)
Description The implicit tax rate (ITR) is calculated by dividing total tax revenues by a
measure of the operating surplus of the economy. The ITR can be calculated
for different parts of the economy such as labour, consumption, and capital.
Developed by Mendoza et al. (1994); European Commission (2003)
Availability For the 27 European Union member countries, EUROSTAT provides implicit
tax rates on capital for corporations.
Data are available free of charge from the website: www.europa.eu/eurostat
Information on
ITRs
EUROSTAT (2007b); Carey and Rabesona (2004); Clark (2004); European
Commission (2004)
Advantages The calculation of implicit tax rates is relatively straightforward and requires
less statistical input than, for example, marginal tax rates. ITRs allow for
comparisons across countries, years, and types of taxes.
Drawbacks ITRs are not based on a theoretical model of investment; they group together
different taxes.
The potential tax base used in the calculations does not necessarily coincide
with the actual tax bases as defined in the legislation. In practice, there might
be problems in linking developments in the implicit tax rates to tax policy
changes.
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Table A.19: Micro-level Average Tax Rates (ATRs)
Description Micro-level ATRs are computed as the ratio of taxes paid by a firm divided by
a measure of its operating surplus.
Availability Data necessary for building an ATR are available from tax returns and ac-
counting data (for example, ORBIS, BEA firm-level data, Compustat).
Advantages Easy to calculate once firm-level data are available.
Drawbacks ATRs only denote the impact of taxes at one period and not over the life of
a particular investment. They depend on the history of the firm, since many
variables such as business losses are carried forward to the following years.
Table A.20: OECD Tax Database
Description The OECD Tax Database contains detailed information on personal and corpo-
rate income taxes, consumption taxes, and social security contributions levied
on both the employers and employees.
Information concerns both tax systems and tax rates.
Information includes:
• Basic corporate statutory income tax rates (for central, sub-central,
and combined rates)
• Surtaxes
• Small businesses tax rates
• Other targeted provisions
• Statutory tax rate on dividend income
• Effective statutory tax rates on distributions of domestic source income
(i)
Information is available annually from 2000.
Developed by OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration
Availability Publicly available at the following website: www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase
Advantages There is very detailed information on many aspects of taxation. Tax rates are
also reported for the different levels of governments. It is a very useful tool for
international comparisons.
(i) This variable takes into account the corporate income tax, the personal income tax, and any
type of integration or relief to reduce the effects of double taxation.
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Table A.21: OECD Revenue Statistics
Description OECD Revenue Statistics has collected tax and non-tax government revenues,
including social security contributions, for all member countries since 1984;
these are classified by levels of government. Some interesting variables for the
aforementioned analysis are:
• Corporate taxes on income and profits
• Taxes levied on the capital gains of corporate enterprises
Developed by OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Analysis
Availability OECD (2008)
Data are also available online at OECD.Stat under the section Public Sector,
Taxation, and Market Regulation.
Advantages The tax revenues are classified in very detailed categories and sub-categories
so that taxes paid can be easily linked to the related economic activity.
Table A.22: IMF Government Finance Statistics
Description IMF Government Finance Statistics collect data on revenue, expense, transac-
tions in assets and liabilities, and stocks of assets and liabilities for the general
government sector and its sub-sectors. Data are available in levels and as a
percent of GDP.
Tax variables:
• Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains (divided between taxes on
individuals and taxes on corporations and other enterprises)
• Taxes on payroll and workforce
• Taxes on property
• Taxes on goods and services, including value added taxes, sales taxes,
and excise taxes
• Taxes on international trade, including customs and other taxes on
import duties and taxes on exports
• Social contributions
• Other taxes
Developed by International Monetary Fund
Availability www.imf.org
Advantages It provides tax revenues for a wide rage of developing and developed economies.
It separates tax revenues raised from individuals from taxes raised from cor-
porations together with other businesses.
Drawbacks Some series have missing data. There might be discrepancies with other IMF
data sources such as the IMF country reports.
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Appendix B
Dataset Used in Chapter 2
In this Appendix, we describe the construction of the dataset used in the empirical
analysis. The starting point is the ORBIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk
(2007) (2007 CD version) which records data for nine million companies around
the world. The database includes information for each company on the country of
residence, the industry, and the accounting date. It also provides broad informa-
tion on balance sheet and P&L account items.
We calculate value added per employee as either EBIT (427)1 plus costs of em-
ployees (435), or as sales (426) minus costs of materials (434). We proxy the
capital stock with either fixed assets (404), or tangible fixed assets (406) and we
use data on the number of employees (425).
The database also provides information on the firms’ ownership structure. This
includes information on direct owners (including their shareholdings in the com-
1The ORBIS reference number for each item is in parentheses in bold.
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pany), on the ultimate or ‘global’ owner (including its relevant direct and total
capital ownership share), on companies’ subsidiaries, if any, and the corresponding
percentages of ownership. Only the most recently reported ownership information
(usually for 2004) is recorded.
We exclude micro firms as defined by European Commission (2003) by including
only companies with total assets (412) exceeding 2 million Euros for two consecu-
tive years since 2001. This yields a starting sample of 931,324 firms from 1993 to
2005. Below, we describe how we derived the final sample from this initial dataset
(see Table B.1). We first illustrate how we use the ownership information. We
then explain the treatment of financial data.
Ownership Information
We classify companies in our sample as either being part of a multinational group
or as domestic entities. The latter are either stand-alone companies with no affili-
ates or they belong to a domestic group which has neither affiliates nor corporate
global owners abroad. Firms are classified as being part of a multinational group
if their ultimate owner (as reported in ORBIS) is a corporation and it is resident
abroad, or if other corporate affiliates in the group are resident in a different ju-
risdiction. We allocate companies to their global ultimate owner directly if this
information is provided by ORBIS. If this is not possible, we create a chain of
ownership employing the data on the direct owners (DOs). The latter are classi-
fied according to their type: individual or corporate owners where the latter group
includes banks, financial, industrial, and insurance companies. If these DOs are
not found in the sample,2 the ownership chain is interrupted and a global owner
2To be identified by our procedure, direct owners have to be within the initial sample of
931,324 companies.
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cannot be identified. In this case, we exclude the firm from the sample. If DOs are
available, we first check their shareholding. If none of them holds more than 50
per cent of the firm’s capital and the firm does not itself own subsidiaries abroad,
then the company is classified as domestic. The same happens if the main DO is
an individual, irrespective of whether they have the majority of the firm’s capital.
If the DO is found in our starting sample and it is both a corporation and inde-
pendent,3 then it is defined as the global owner. If it is not independent, then its
DO (that is, second level owner) is identified and the process continues until no
other corporate DO with more than 50 per cent shareholding can be identified. If
the DO with a majority shareholding in the firm is a fund or an individual, then
the last corporate DO in the chain is designated as the global owner.
Financial Data
From the initial sample of 931,324 firms, we remove companies for which only
consolidated accounts are reported. This avoids duplication and allows us to dis-
tinguish among different affiliates. We then drop observations with number of
employees, EBIT, cost of employees, or fixed assets either missing or equal to zero.
We also eliminate observations with a negative value for the sum of EBIT plus cost
of employees. Observations with accounting closing dates from July of year x until
June of year x+ 1 are assigned to calendar year x. To ensure that the accounting
period between two subsequent calendar years is close to twelve months, we drop
observations that are less than 11 months or more than 13 months distant from the
end of the previous accounting period. In the next step, we remove observations
with clear mistakes. We sum the P&L account and the balance sheet sub-items
3A company is defined as independent if it does not have any corporate shareholders owning
more than 50 per cent of its capital.
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(for example, current assets and fixed assets) which should add up to a core item
(for example, total assets). Observations are dropped if the sum of these sub-items
amounts to less than 95 per cent or more than 101 per cent of the corresponding
core item. In addition, we eliminate observations with negative total assets, nega-
tive total liabilities (423), or interest payments (437).
At this stage, we merge the financial data with the ownership data. We only keep
companies which we are able to classify as either domestic or multinational entities.
Among MNCs, we keep only firms whose global owner is an industrial company.
To work with comparable production functions and to avoid problems in the def-
inition of TFP, we focus only on the manufacturing sector by keeping firms with
NACE code (Rev 1.1) between 15.00 and 40.00.4 The coverage for some countries
is quite poor before 1998 and in 2005. Hence, we only retain observations between
1998 and 2004, inclusive. Subsequently, we drop countries with very few firms
(that is, less than 15 domestic or multinational companies). To make the domestic
companies more comparable to the multinational companies, we eliminate very
small entities in the first group and very large firms in the second one. Specifically,
we drop domestic companies whose size in terms of total assets is smaller than the
5th percentile of the multinationals’ size5 distribution. We also drop multinational
companies with total assets greater than the 95th percentile of the domestics’ size
distribution. We also drop outliers in the financial data. We define outliers with
respect to two ratios: (i) fixed assets over employees and (ii) cost of employees
over the sum of EBIT and wage bill (that is, value added). Every observation that
4To calculate TFP as in equation (2.4), we have divided the sample into three manufacturing
sub-sectors. The first one includes companies with a NACE code (Rev. 1.1) between 15.00 and
20.00. The second group contains companies with NACE code between 20.00 and 30.00. The
rest of the firms are grouped in the third sector (that is, NACE code between 30.00 and 40.00).
5Here size is measured as total assets.
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falls in the top or bottom 1 per cent of those two ratios is dropped. Finally, we
keep only firms with no missing values for EBIT and costs of employees for three
consecutive years between 1998–2004 to limit the confounding effect of entry and
exit from the sample. This reduces the number of countries. Some of them have
less than 15 domestic firms or 15 multinationals in each year. These countries are
dropped. As shown in Table B.1, the final sample contains 16,022 firms for a total
of 85,606 observations.
Time-varying Ownership Dummy
During the sample period, some companies might have changed their ownership
status from domestic to multinational or vice versa. More specifically, multina-
tional companies might have taken over highly productive domestic companies
after a cut in the corporate tax rate. In this case, the multinational dummy would
be endogenous. As mentioned above, ORBIS does not contain time-varying own-
ership information. To track changes in the ownership dummy we use a dataset
called ZEPHYR. It records M&A operations involving some of the companies in
our regression sample as targets, acquirers, or vendors. ZEPHYR is also com-
piled by Bureau van Dijk as ORBIS and it is therefore possible to merge the two
datasets with the potential to create changes in the multinational dummy. Un-
fortunately, ZEPHYR does not always contain enough information to know with
certainty whether a firm has really changed its status from domestic to multina-
tional or vice versa. In the robustness checks of Table 2.7, we then decided to drop
companies involved in a M&A deal during the sample period.6
6Table B.2 describes the country distribution of these observations.
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The Construction of Ownership Changes Using ZEPHYR
In a M&A deal, a company can act as a target, an acquirer, or a vendor. To encom-
pass all possible cases, we downloaded three different datasets from ZEPHYR. The
first includes deals for which targets are located in Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden (as in our
regression sample), the second includes acquirers, and the third includes vendors
located in the same countries.
All possible changes in ownership are summarised in tables B.3 to B.5. For our
analysis, the cells on the south-west to north-east diagonals are the most interest-
ing, as they record changes in the multinational dummy.
The number of deals reported in ZEPHYR increases substantially from 2002 on-
wards. In previous years, the coverage is less effective. This is reflected in Table
B.6 which shows a breakdown by years of the number of deals affecting companies
in our sample. About 40 per cent of the M&A operations take place in the United
Kingdom. Belgium, France, Spain and Sweden represent each about 10 per cent
of the deals (see Table B.2).
Initially we downloaded deals between 1998 and 2004 in which targets are lo-
cated in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway,
Poland, Spain, and Sweden. For a description of the dataset, see Table B.7.
We use the information in this dataset to establish which companies in our regres-
sion sample have been part of a deal and, as a consequence, have changed their
ownership status from domestic to multinational or vice versa. If a company in
ORBIS is also present in ZEPHYR as a target, it is possible to trace changes in
its ownership in the way shown in Figures B.1 and B.2 below.
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To identify the status of the target before the deal7, we first need to know the
country of the vendor. Unfortunately, in the targets dataset about 50 per cent of
the deals (129 out of 256 deals) do not report any information on the vendor. This
means that the id number, the country, the name, and the parent of the vendor
are missing. For these observations, it is impossible to identify what the ownership
status of the target was before the deal.
If the country of the vendor is available and it is different from the country of
the target, the latter can be classified as part of a multinational group before the
deal (that is, Box 1 of Figure B.1). If the country of the target and the country
of the vendor are the same, we need information on the ownership structure of
both the vendor and the target, as shown in Figure B.1. Among the observations
for which the country of the vendor is available (121), about 70 per cent record a
country of the vendor which is the same as the country of the target. This could
be interpreted as evidence that the company was part of a domestic group before
the deal8. However, the vendor might in fact be part of a multinational group
itself and (or) the target might have foreign subsidiaries. Since we do not have
ownership information for companies before 2004, we are unable to establish the
ownership status of the vendor and of the target. Consequently, we cannot distin-
guish between Box 2 and Box 3 in Figure B.1.
The ownership status of the target after an M&A operation could easily be ap-
proximated with its ownership structure available in ORBIS for 2004 (see Figure
B.2).
In summary, provided that the information on the country of the vendor is avail-
able, we can identify some of the cases in the third row of Table B.3 (that is, when
the target was a multinational entity before the deal). Unfortunately, without
7This means identifying from which cell of the second column of Table B.3 the firm starts.
8Also, if the vendor is an individual, the company could have been a stand-alone.
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further assumptions we are unable to identify the fourth row (that is, when the
target was a domestic entity before the deal). We cannot decide whether the firm
was truly a domestic entity (that is, decide between Box 2 and Box 3 in Figure
B.1) when the country of the vendor and the country of the target are the same.
We could make an assumption. When the target and the vendor are resident in
the same country, we could consider the former as being domestic before the deal
occurred (see Table B.7).
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Figure B.1: How to Identify the Ownership Before a Deal Occurred (ZEPHYR
targets)
Country of target (T) 6= country of vendor (V)
YES
1. T was MNC
before deal
NO
Was V part of MNC group
(that is, did V have foreign
subsidiaries and (or) owners)?
OR
Did T have foreign subsidiaries?
Difficult to establish:
lack of information before 2004
YES
2. T MNC
before deal
NO
3. T DOMESTIC
before deal
ZEPHYR-Acquirers
The second dataset contains deals in which the acquirers are located in Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Poland, Spain,
and Sweden. For a description of the dataset, see Table B.8.
For the acquirers in ZEPHYR, it is hard to establish their ownership status before
the deal because there is no information on the ownership structure before 2004.
We can only identify two cases. First, when the acquirer is classified as a domestic
entity in ORBIS in 2004, by acquiring the firm the same company could have only
been domestic before the deal. Second, when the acquirer is classified as multina-
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Figure B.2: How to Identify the Ownership After a Deal Occurred (ZEPHYR
targets)
Country of target (T) 6= country of acquirer (A)
YES
4. T is MNC
after deal
NO
Is T part of a
multinational group?
Possible to establish
using information in ORBIS (2004)
YES
5. T MNC
after deal
NO
6. T DOMESTIC
after deal
tional in ORBIS and at the same time it acquires a company located in the same
country, it must have been multinational before the deal. For the acquirers clas-
sified as multinationals in 2004, and buying a foreign subsidiary, it is not possible
to identify their ownership status before the M&A operation. They could have
been domestic and become multinational purely through the acquisition recorded
in ZEPHYR9 or they could have already been part of an international group. In
terms of Table B.4, we are only able to identify some of the elements of the main
diagonal. We could make a strong assumption. We could assume that the foreign
subsidiary acquired is the only foreign subsidiary of the group. This would mean
that the acquirer was a domestic entity before the deal and that it has become a
multinational entity only because of the acquisition recorded in ZEPHYR.
9This would in fact be the most interesting case for our analysis.
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ZEPHYR-Vendors
The third dataset contains vendors involved in M&A operations between 1998
and 2004 and located in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. For a description of the dataset,
see Table B.9.
If a company in ORBIS is also available in ZEPHYR as the vendor, we can easily
establish its multinational status before the deal when the country of the target
is different from the country of the vendor (see Box 7 of Figure B.3). In this
case, the vendor was a multinational before the deal. After the deal, it can either
remain part of a multinational group or become a domestic entity if the sold
subsidiary was its only foreign subsidiary. We can distinguish between those two
cases employing the ORBIS ownership structure for 2004. Problems arise when
the countries of the vendor and of the target are the same. As shown in B.3, we
are unable to distinguish between Box 8 and Box 9 as we do not have information
on the ownership structure of the vendor and of the target before 2004. Even if the
target is located in the same country as the vendor, we cannot identify the latter
as part of a domestic entity before the deal. If the target had foreign subsidiaries,
the vendor would be part of a multinational group before the M&A operation.
In summary, when a company is involved in M&A operations as a vendor, we can
identify the third row of Table B.5. We are able to identify some of the vendors
which were part of a multinational group before the deal10. Unfortunately, because
of the lack of information before 2004, we are unable to identify multinational
companies which become domestic by selling domestic subsidiaries with foreign
operations.
As for the targets dataset, we could make an assumption. When the target and
10This refers to the vendors which sell a foreign subsidiary, but not to the vendors which sell
a target located in their country but with foreign subsidiaries.
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the vendor are resident in the same country, we could consider the latter as being
domestic before the deal occurred (see Table B.9).
Figure B.3: How to Identify the Ownership Before a Deal Occurred (ZEPHYR
vendors)
Country of target (T) 6= country of vendor (V)?
YES
7. V was MNC
before deal
NO
Were V or T part of
a multinational group?
Difficult to establish:
no information before 2004
YES
8. V was MNC
before deal
NO
9. V was
DOMESTIC
before deal
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Merging ZEPHYR with ORBIS
We merge the three datasets downloaded from ZEPHYR with ORBIS in order
to create a changing ownership dummy. Tables B.2 to B.10 describe some of the
characteristics of the new dataset. Table B.11 summarises all the changes in the
ownership structure that we are able to classify, including those identified through
the assumptions outlined in the paragraphs above and summarised below11:
1. TARGETS dataset. When the target and the vendor are resident in the same
country, we consider the former as being domestic before the deal occurred
(see Table B.7).
2. ACQUIRERS dataset. The foreign subsidiary acquired is the only foreign
subsidiary of what is classified in ORBIS as an international group in 2004.
This means that the acquirer was a domestic entity before the deal and that it
has become a multinational entity with the acquisition recorded in ZEPHYR
(see Table B.8).
3. VENDORS dataset. When the target and the vendor are resident in the
same country and the vendor is recorded as a domestic company in ORBIS,
we consider the latter as being domestic before the deal occurred (see Table
B.9).
11Overall the changes classified using the aforementioned assumption are 119, about 28 per
cent of the observations included reported in ZEPHYR and 0.14 per cent of the whole sample.
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Table B.1: Creation of the Sample
Steps Firms Observations
Starting sample 931,324 12,107,212
Keep only unconsolidated data 809,715 10,526,295
Drop if variable requirements not met(i) 464,903 2,656,419
Drop long or short accounting periods 464,892 2,644,260
Drop accounting mistakes 462,862 2,588,187
Keep firms with known ownership status 120,243 697,303
Keep firms within the manufacturing sector 35,456 224,655
Drop if year< 1998 and year = 2005 34,876 174,094
Drop host countries with small sample sizes 29,466 154,725
Create comparable sample in terms of size 23,498 109,641
Drop outliers 21,804 94,930
Keep firms with three consecutive years of observations 16,022 85,606
(i) We drop observations with EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets and number of
employees either missing or equal to zero. We also drop observations with the sum
of the cost of employees plus EBIT either equal to or smaller than zero.
Table B.2: Country Distribution of Deals in ZEPHYR
Country MNCs Domestic groups Stand-alones Total Per cent
Belgium 22 17 1 40 9.57%
Czech Republic 5 0 0 5 1.20
Finland 16 10 2 28 6.70
France 20 15 4 39 9.33
Italy 16 7 5 28 6.70
Norway 11 7 2 20 4.78
Poland 2 3 3 8 1.91
Spain 16 14 14 44 10.53
Sweden 22 23 0 45 10.77
United Kingdom 91 67 3 161 38.52
Total 221 163 34 418 100
Table B.3: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status –Targets
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI; NPI(ii) PI; NPI(ii)
Domestic NPI NPI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further
assumptions. (ii) These cases are identifiable with certainty only if the coun-
try of vendor is different from the country of target. If the country is the
same, we cannot decide whether the vendor was really domestic or part of an
international group. We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
Table B.4: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status –Acquirers
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI; NPI(ii) NPH
Domestic NPI PI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further
assumptions. NPH: not possible to happen. (ii) These cases are identifiable
with certainty only if the country of acquirer is the same as the country of
target. We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
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Table B.5: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status –Vendors
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI PI; NPI(ii)
Domestic NPH NPI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further
assumptions. NPH: not possible to happen. (ii) These cases are identifiable
with certainty only if the country of vendor is different from the country of
target. We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
Table B.6: Year Distribution of Deals in ZEPHYR
Year MNCs Domestic Stand-alones Total Per cent
1998 9 3 0 12 2.87
1999 9 5 0 14 3.35
2000 11 6 2 19 4.55
2001 13 9 0 22 5.26
2002 52 56 14 122 29.19
2003 56 39 9 104 24.88
2004 71 45 9 125 29.90
Total 221 163 34 418 100
Table B.7: ZEPHYR –Targets Dataset
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Targets in 9 countries(i) 80,504
Time: 1998-2004 42,034
Min final stake 50% 23,738
Completed deals only 21,891 NA 25,478
Drop if id missing 12,844 12,619 13,298
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 10,428 10,260 10,789
After merging with ORBIS NA 249(iii) 256
- no info on country of vendor 134 135
- MNC to MNC 24 24
- MNC to Domestic 12 12
- Domestic to MNC (iv) 38 40
- Domestic to Domestic(iv) 44 45
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain,
and Sweden. (ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the
download from the website is not precise. Therefore, in STATA we have to
drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005. (iii) The numbers
below do not add up to 249 but to 252, as the same company might report
the country of the vendor in one deal and not report it in another one. (iv)
These observations were identified using the following assumption: when the
country of the target and of the vendor are the same, the target is considered
as domestic before the deal.
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Table B.8: ZEPHYR –Acquirers Dataset
Acquirers in Zephyr
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Acquirers in 9 countries(i) 78,215
Time: 1998-2004 40,913
Min final stake 50% 22,930
Completed deals only 21,541 NA 24,898
Drop if id missing 18,031 10,095 18,322
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 14,927 8,724 15,172
After merging with ORBIS NA 130 136
- no info on country of target 2 2
- MNC to MNC 42 44
- Domestic to MNC (iii) 16 17
- Domestic to Domestic 70 73
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain,
and Sweden. (ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the
download from the website is not precise. Therefore, in STATA we have to
drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005. (iii) These observations
have been identified assuming that the foreign subsidiary bought in the deal
has made a domestic company become part of a multinational group. This
assumption is likely not to hold for many cases.
Table B.9: ZEPHYR –Vendors Dataset
Vendors in Zephyr
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Vendors in 9 countries(i) 36,424
Time: 1998-2004 18,303
Min final stake 50% 10,459
Completed deals only 9,399 NA 12,701
Drop if id missing 6,824 4,781 7,837
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 5,674 4,101 4,989
After merging with ORBIS NA 32 32
- no info on country of target 0 0
- MNC to MNC 14 14
- MNC to Domestic 1 1
- Domestic to Domestic(iii) 17 17
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain,
and Sweden. (ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the
download from the website is not precise. Therefore, in STATA we have to
drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005. (iii) These observations
were identified using the following assumption: when the country of the target
and of the vendor are the same, the vendor is considered as domestic before
the deal.
Table B.10: Firms with at Least One Observation in ZEPHYR
Companies with information in Zephyr
as Target as Acquirer as Vendor
MNCs 213 144 59 14
(3.64%)
Domestic groups 152 83 62 16
(3.05%)
Stand-alones 33 22 9 2
(0.64%)
TOTAL 398 249 130 32
(2.49%)
(i) Percentages of entire sample in parentheses. (ii) The last three columns
do not always add up to the second one as companies might act as target,
acquirer, and vendor across years.
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Table B.11: Changes in Ownership –Observations (Number of Companies)
After the deal
MNC Domestic TOTAL
Before the deal
MNC 81 (79) 13 (13) 94 (92)
Domestic 57 (54) 135 (126) 192 (180)
TOTAL 138 (133) 148 (139) 286 (272)
(i) The observations in the fourth row were identified using the following
assumption: when the country of the target and of the vendor are the same,
the firms are considered to be domestic before the deal.
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